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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Forensic psychiatry 
Forensic psychiatry can be defined as the part of psychiatry which deals with patients and 
problems at the interface between the legal and psychiatric systems (Gunn & Taylor, 1993). 
Forensic psychiatry is based on several disciplines such as criminology, law, philosophy, 
psychiatry and psychology and covers two areas: First, the contribution of the judicial system 
to psychiatry, i.e. by constituting rules and laws regulating the practice of psychiatry. Second, 
the contribution of psychiatry to the judicial system, i.e. the psychiatric evaluation of 
offenders in order to assist the courts in questions of “responsibility” or criminal insanity 
(Borup Svendsen et al., 1977). Thus, the forensic psychiatric field consists of both civil and 
criminal forensic psychiatry; however, this thesis will only deal with the latter part.  
In criminal cases the courts may ask psychiatric or psychological expertise for guidance 
in complex matters such as human behaviour, criminal insanity, the competence to stand 
trial, the risk of repeated violence, and other related problems. For these purposes the courts 
may appoint one or several forensic psychiatric or psychological experts (in short, experts) to 
make a qualified assessment of the defendant. In some countries the findings of the experts 
are handed to the court as reports only, while in other countries the experts appear in court 
to present their report, explain their findings and answer questions. In Norway, the latter 
approach is practiced in the most serious cases. 
1.2. Why conduct research in forensic psychiatry? 
In 1994 my colleague Lene C. Holum, MA, and I intended, as our joint student thesis in 
psychology, to conduct interviews with patients at a high security hospital who had 
committed homicide. We were interested in examining if there were qualitative differences 
between patients who had been found legally sane and insane, respectively, first by the 
experts and subsequently by the court. However, the project was not approved by the 
Regional Committee for Medical Research Ethics. Somewhat puzzled we were unsure of 
what to do next. In an informal discussion with Professor Jon Martin Sundet, he suggested to 
us that we might interview forensic psychiatric experts regarding their methods and 
understanding of important concepts in forensic psychiatric work. Thus, this became the 
central theme of our student thesis. 
After completing my degree I began to work within the forensic psychiatric field, first as a 
clinical psychologist at the high security hospital at Dikemark, and later as a forensic expert 
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at Office for Forensic Psychiatry at the Oslo Police Department. Gradually in the course of 
my forensic work I felt that this special field seemed to be characterised by conservative 
traditions  and dominated by the opinions of a few highly profiled experts. In my view, the 
field was based upon surprisingly little empirical research. Additionally, there appeared to be 
a deeply rooted trust in the unstructured clinical interview, and few other methods were 
applied when examining a defendant. Since the reliability of such interviews is low, this 
approach could be a threat to the quality of such reports. A high quality would imply 
verifiability, which means that valid information is presented to members of the legal 
profession and to lay judges in such a way that the premises and conclusions are clearly 
understandable since verifiability demands the optimal use of clinical and test-based 
information. 
I therefore concluded that to obtain more empirical knowledge in regard to Norwegian 
forensic psychiatry would be of great importance, particularly since the experts’ reports to the 
courts can have serious consequences for the defendants. 
 
My main intension with this thesis and the effort put into it is to contribute to Norwegian 
forensic psychiatry with comparative empirical studies. If successful, and with significant 
findings, my work could contribute to a better practice and quality of forensic psychiatry, and 
an eventual consequence of this would be a strengthening of the legal safeguards for the 
defendant in (serious) criminal cases.  
 
To me, a good starting point was to obtain a comparative and systematic knowledge 
about how the Scandinavian countries organised and conducted their forensic psychiatric 
examinations, as possessing such knowledge could help to determine whether these other 
countries had procedures and methods that could contribute to improvements in Norwegian 
forensic psychiatric practice.  
In my work at the Office for Forensic Psychiatry, my colleagues and I wrote numerous 
screening forensic reports, advising the principals whether a full psychiatric report was 
needed or not. Since we hardly ever received feedback on our recommendations, I found it 
worthwhile to systematically investigate exactly how our recommendations were being used 
by the principals since such knowledge could indicate the usefulness of the screening reports 
and eventually contribute to improvements (practically and/or methodologically).  
The concept of amnesia (i.e. unconsciousness in the Norwegian Penal Code) is 
considered to be among the most difficult ones to grasp in forensic psychiatry. At the same 
time, defendants claiming amnesia for a serious criminal act is not uncommon and is 
frequently given considerable coverage by the media. On a personal level, I have 
experienced that claims of amnesia by defendants have often left me with doubt in terms of 
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how I should examine the genuineness of these claims, and I wondered how other experts 
methodically examined defendants claiming amnesia. According to the Norwegian Penal 
Code, if the amnesia is genuine, the defendant might be considered to have been 
unconscious at the time the crime was committed and could therefore not be punished in an 
ordinary way. For that reason, the advice of the forensic experts is crucial for both the court 
and the defendant, and to know the methodological basis of the experts’ conclusions in these 
types of cases would be of great importance.  
For quite awhile, the media and some papers in the literature have been highly critical of 
the work and judgments of forensic psychiatric experts in Norway, pointing to topics such as 
ethics, a lack of verifiability and so forth. Some papers even claimed that the judgments of 
laypeople were as good as those made by forensic experts. Due to the seriousness of the 
consequences of the judgment of forensic experts, as well as their task in the work of the 
courts, I found it important to obtain a more systematic knowledge of this issue. 
1.3. The thesis and the papers 
This thesis is an analysis of criminal forensic psychiatry with regard to the practices, methods 
and premises behind forensic psychiatric reports primarily in Norway, but also to some extent 
in Denmark and Sweden, and consists of a summary and four papers based on four different 
samples. 
Paper I (the comparative forensic reports paper) gives an overview of Scandinavian 
forensic psychiatric organisation and practises, and compares examination methods in 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden.  
Paper II (the screening report paper) examines forensic psychiatric screening reports, 
whether their recommendations were used by the principals, and compares them to the 
conclusions of the full reports issued in the wake of the screening report.  
Paper III (the amnesia paper) examines the circumstances when a defendant claims total 
or partial amnesia for a homicidal act, and explores how experts assess this claim.  
Paper IV (the case vignette paper) uses case vignettes concerning forensic issues and 
compares both how professionals versus laypeople and psychiatrists versus psychologists 
rate the same clinical vignettes. 
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2. BACKGROUND
2.1. Core features of forensic psychiatry 
To a great extent, forensic psychiatric practices in a given country are determined by national 
legislation. Through its legislation, each country adheres to different models and principles, 
which both guide and control the tasks and work conditions of forensic psychiatry. 
2.1.1. Models and principles 
The forensic models in various countries are rooted in both philosophical and judicial 
thinking, so criminal law basically builds on the assumption that individuals have a “free will” 
to either commit or abstain from committing criminal acts (Syse, 2006). Without the 
fundamental tenet of “free will”, an individual cannot understand that a criminal act is wrong, 
and eventually he/she should not be punished for committing that act. In order to find an 
individual guilty of a criminal act, two elements have to be proven: 1) That the event actually 
occurred and was committed by the identified person (actus reus), and 2) That the person 
had the required “free will state of mind” in relation to the crime (mens rea) (Gunn & Taylor, 
1993).  
There are two main models as to how mens rea is determined, namely the mixed model 
and the biological model (Table 1), with the mixed model divided into the psychological 
principle and the causal principle (see Table 1 based on Thorvik (2000) and Syse (2006)). 
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Table 1 - Overview of different models for determining mens rea, i.e. the 
conditions that must be fulfilled in order to consider legal insanity as the cause 
of a defendant’s actions. 
MODEL CORE FEATURES CRITIQUE
1 The mixed model 
 
A cognitive approach derived from 
the thinking of Kant. Has an almost 
complete emphasis on reason and 
cognitive abilities. 
To be considered legally insane will 
require both a mental disorder and 
specific supplementary conditions. 
 
Requires both a mental disorder 
and a lack of ability to understand 
the criminal aspects of the 
committed act. 
 
Requires a causal connection 
between the mental disorder and 
the committed crime. 
 
Too much emphasis upon pure 
cognitive abilities such as 
capacity to separate right from 
wrong. Ignorance of feelings as 
an important source for 
motivation. 
 
 
 
Same as above. 
 
 
 
Difficult for the experts and the 
court to reconstruct a given 
state of mind at the time the act 
was committed. 
2 The biological 
model 
A non-cognitive approach derived 
from the thinking of Hume. The will 
is independent – and man is 
furnished with a basic notion of 
sympathy for his fellow man “the 
fellow feeling”. Emotions play an 
important role for our motivations 
and actions.  
 
Clear defects in cognition and 
basic emotions will imply legal 
insanity. The circumstances of the 
crime do not count, only the 
diagnosis and the severity of the 
mental disorder. 
A total emphasis on a mental 
condition - “fishing for a 
diagnosis” - without any regard 
to the circum-stances of the 
crime, i.e. psychotic motivation 
for their act.  
 
 
 
Defendants regarded as 
psychotic may know that their 
act is wrong, but will 
nevertheless be regarded as 
legally insane. The psychotic  
patient is not given any 
responsibility for his actions 
 
The most famous example of the psychological principle is the M’Naghten ruling from 1843. 
Daniel M’Naghten, who suffered from paranoid delusions, stalked the British prime minister 
and mistakenly shot his secretary, who he believed to be the prime minister. M’Naghten was 
assessed by a total of nine psychiatrists who found him criminally insane, which resulted in 
the court ruling that M’Naghten was not guilty due to being legally insane. This decision led 
to an outrage in the public partially due to his clear intent in committing the act. Therefore, 
the Supreme Court of England created a new model for determining mens rea, which 
demanded that the following elements all had to be present at the time of the crime:  
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A disease of mind;  
The diseased mind being the cause of a defect of reason; 
The defect of reason so severe that the defendant lacked the ability at the time of his actions 
to either:  
a) know the wrongfulness of his actions, or 
b) understand the nature and quality of his actions. 
This model has been named the M’Naghten test or the M’Naghten rule. 
 
An example of the causal principle is the Durham rule, named after Monte Durham, a 23-
year-old man who had been in and out of prison and mental institutions since he was 17, and 
was convicted of breaking into a house in 1953. In the appeal case, Judge Bazelton created 
the Durham 1954 test, stating that: “The accused is not criminally responsible if the unlawful 
act is the product of mental disease or defect”, which created a 14-fold increase in the 
number of insanity acquittals over the next three years. This ruling did not require any lack of 
or defect in (cognitive) reasoning (Thorvik, 2000), and was much criticised due to a wide 
interpretation of what constitutes mental disease.  
 
The most famous and/or cited case in Norway based on this biological principle is one 
involving the Nobel prize winner in literature, Knut Hamsun. After World War II, he underwent 
an extensive forensic examination due to the suspicion of cognitive impairment and a 
pronounced hearing disability after his expressed support of the Nazi regime in Norway.  
The reason why there are so few examples of cases based on biological reasons is 
probably because very few countries adhere to this principle, although Norway is one of them 
(Høyer & Dalgard, 2002). In the Norwegian forensic system, the circumstances (i.e. 
motivation or psychotic intent) of the crime do not count, only a person’s mental state is 
decisive in defining sanity on legal grounds. An example which illustrates this point, concerns 
a man who killed one passenger and wounded four others in a bloody attack onboard a 
tramcar in Oslo in 2004. The experts found him to be legally insane because he clearly had 
psychotic symptoms and suffered from schizophrenia, and the court found him not guilty (but 
nevertheless sentenced him to compulsory psychiatric care) due to his schizophrenia. 
Whether his action was motivated because of psychotic delusions or whether he knew that 
his actions were illegal, was not taken into consideration by the court. 
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2.1.2. Judicial systems 
Two main judicial systems for court proceedings dominate the Western world: the adversarial 
and the inquisitorial system. 
In the adversarial system, which is found in most Anglo-Saxon countries, e.g. in Great 
Britain, the United States and Canada, the court has a more secluded role. It is the legal 
parties (the defence versus the prosecution) who are at the centre of events. Various experts 
represent the two parties and engage in a so-called “battle of experts”, i.e. fighting each other 
both professionally and academically. An illustration of this “battle of experts” was shown in 
the trial of John Hinckley, who attempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan in 1981. 
The parties appointed a total of eight experts: four for the defence and four for the 
prosecution, and these experts drew opposite conclusions regarding Hinckley’s legal sanity 
depending on which side they testified on behalf of (Sharf, 1986; Ewing & McCann, 2006). In 
the adversarial system, the jury decides on guilt and the judge decides what punishment 
should be given if the defendant is found guilty. 
The inquisitorial system is found in most of continental Europe and the Nordic countries, 
and the court plays a more prominent role in the proceedings. The experts are appointed by 
and represent the court, i.e. they shall act in a neutral manner and not represent either 
parties, and the court usually follows the advice given by these presumed neutral experts 
(Syse, 2006; Höglund et al., 2009; Falk-Pedersen, 1997). 
2.1.3. Legislation and core concepts  
Norwegian forensic psychiatry is regulated by both the Penal Code and the Criminal 
Procedure Act (CPA), and the current legislation was revised in 2002. The court may initiate 
a forensic psychiatric examination according to Section 165 of the CPA and appoints one or 
usually two experts, and the experts are given a specific mandate from the court concerning 
their examination of the defendant. As a general rule, the experts will be asked to evaluate or 
investigate whether the defendant is legally insane or not according to three conditions listed 
in Section 44 of the Penal Code. These conditions are:  
 
Psychosis; 
Unconsciousness; 
Severe mental retardation (IQ <55).  
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Psychosis is the core condition in most countries which leads to acquittal due to reasons of 
legal insanity, and implies a fundamental defect of reality testing (Malt et al., 2003). The 
basic symptoms are:  
Sensory misperceptions, i.e. visual, auditory, touch or smell hallucinations;  
Disordered thinking, i.e. loosening of associations, blocking of thoughts, etc;  
Delusions, false interpretations of reality that cannot be changed despite obvious evidence to 
the contrary; and  
Confusion and other conditions, with acute or chronic severe cognitive impairment.  
 
The rationale for legal insanity due to psychosis is that a defendant who has such a 
fundamental defect in reality testing cannot be held responsible for his criminal action due to 
the corruption of his “free will” by the psychotic disorder. 
Unconsciousness is the inability to encode and store episodic memory due to organic or 
psychological reasons (see Section 2.2.1). The rationale for legal insanity is that such a loss 
of memory implies that the defendant cannot defend himself properly – since he/she does 
not remember what happened (Gunn & Taylor, 1993). In addition, when consciousness is 
presumed to be disturbed, the defendant will lack the ability to identify the criminal act as 
being illegal (Langfeldt, 1947). While Norwegian law uses the term “unconsciousness”, other 
countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand uses the term “automatism”, i.e. 
involuntariness comprising a complete lack of capacity in the defendant to contain his 
conduct (Yeo, 2002). Nevertheless, the notion that an individual can commit a criminal act 
while being “unconscious” or due to “automatism” remains quite controversial, both in 
Norway and internationally.  
Unconsciousness is both difficult to comprehend and complicated to evaluate (Hartvig et 
al., 2003). The expert must assess whether the claimed amnesia is genuine, examine the 
causes of amnesia, and if the clinical condition satisfies the criteria for the legal condition 
termed “unconsciousness”. As a consequence of this, the experts’ conclusions as to whether 
the defendant was unconscious or not at the time of the crime can be of vital importance to 
the criminal proceedings. Thus, it is of interest to know how the experts conduct such 
evaluations, i.e. what methods are used etc., which is the topic of Study III (the amnesia 
paper).  
Severe mental retardation, i.e. defendants who have an intellectual disability and a limited 
capacity to understand and control their actions. As a result, they will be regarded as being 
legally insane in relation to their criminal acts. In Norway, the law requires a person to have 
an intelligence quotient (IQ) 55 to be regarded as legally insane, but since persons with 
intellectual disability have a variable level of functioning, both the measured IQ and an 
evaluation of the defendant’s total functioning are taken into account. An assessment of a 
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defendant who is suspected of severe mental retardation represents a challenge for the 
experts, with this issue receiving perhaps too little attention by the Criminal Justice System 
(Søndenaa et al., 2008). 
 
In Norway (in addition to Sweden and the Netherlands) in accordance with the Criminal 
Procedure Act (§ 165), the prosecuting authorities can request a forensic psychiatric 
screening report to be made, and can request such a report if they are in doubt as to whether 
to instigate a full forensic psychiatric report or not. If the expert issuing the screening report 
expresses doubt about the defendant being criminally insane, he/she may recommend to the 
principals that a full report be conducted, and based on the advice given, the principals may 
instigate a full report. This arrangement with such screening reports is considered to save 
both time and money, though we do not know if the principals actually consider the report to 
be relevant and follow the advice given, which is the topic of Study II (the screening report 
paper). 
 
In accordance with the Criminal Procedure Act (§ 147), it is mandatory that the fully 
completed forensic report (the screening reports are not included here) is submitted to and 
controlled by the National Medical Forensic Board (NMFB). The NMFB can accept the 
premises and conclusions in the report or can comment on the weakness of the premises 
behind the experts’ conclusions. In a few cases, the NMFB can disagree with the experts’ 
conclusions and request that the experts conduct a supplementary report, meaning that the 
experts must either form a better basis for their conclusions or change them.  
In some cases after a report is conducted, the experts appear in the court proceedings to 
observe the defendant and present their report. Based on their observations in the 
proceedings, they may find that they have to change their original conclusions, and in such 
instances, they issue a supplementary report to account for their new conclusions. 
2.1.4. Special measures  
A decision by the court that a defendant is legally insane for his actions will not automatically 
lead to an acquittal. If the court finds the defendant to be psychotic, and the crime to be of a 
serious nature, the defendant may be sentenced to compulsory psychiatric treatment due to 
the risk of re-offending, according to Section 39 of the Penal Code. If the offender is severely 
mentally retarded, he can be transferred to compulsory care, according to Section 39 a.  
A defendant who is not considered to be psychotic, but who has acted under the 
influence of a severe mental disorder in such a way that he has a reduced understanding of 
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his criminal act, can be given a reduced sentence, according to Section 56 c in the Penal 
Code. 
If the defendant is held legally sane for his actions at the time of the crime, he may be 
sentenced to detention in certain cases, according to Section 39 c of the Penal Code. Such a 
special measure may be decided if the court finds the criminal act particularly severe and 
considers society to be in need of protection due to the risk of re-offending. The detention is 
not limited to a specific amount of time, although the court shall set a minimum and 
maximum time, and the maximum time for detention may be prolonged if the court still 
regards the convicted at risk of committing new and serious crimes. 
2.2. Development of forensic psychiatry 
To understand how the forensic psychiatric system reached its current state of practice, the 
knowledge of some of its history will be helpful. The development of this field has mainly 
occurred over the three last centuries, and the practice of forensic psychiatry, at least in 
Norway, is largely built upon established traditions.  
2.2.1. International development 
In all known societies, there are rules directing what individuals can or cannot do. If someone 
violates these rules, he will be subjected to some type of punishment or reaction (Qvarsell, 
1993). Though our understanding of the causes of insanity has changed profoundly over 
time, it has nevertheless been widespread recognized that some individuals do not realize 
that their act(s) are wrong or illegal. For that reason, they should not be punished in an 
ordinary way, and this way of reasoning was clearly stated by Johann Weyer (1515-1588), 
who is often regarded as one of the founders of psychiatry:  
“If there is anyone who wishes conscientiously to maintain that the will must be punished 
severely, I wish him first of all to distinguish perfect will of a sane man from that of a man 
who has started to act with the sense of a troubled spirit, or, if you wish, from the corrupted 
will of a person who is out of his senses and with which the devil plays his game, as if the 
person were in the power of someone else. Such a corruption of will could also be imputed to 
melancholies, to the insane, to little children, about whom one may easily make believe that 
they have done this or that; the children themselves imagine falsely that this is so. The Lord 
who knows the heart of man, does not permit that all be punished in the same manner as 
those whose mind is free; so much less should a man permit such things to happen” 
(Zilboorg, 1941). 
Weyer built his viewpoints on old traditions. In ancient India (880 B.C.E – Before the 
Common Era, which is the same as B.C.) the laws gave special consideration to retarded 
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persons and children under 15 years of age (Gutheil, 2005). In the Old Testament, a 
passage (Deuteronomy 4: 41-42, about the 7th century B.C.E) may indicate an 
understanding of different motivations, e.g. insanity, behind a crime. In Antiquity, both Plato 
(423-347 B.C.E.) and Aristotle (384–322 B.C.E.) claimed that those without normal sense or 
“free will” could not be held responsible for their actions. Later, the Babylonian Talmud 
(approximately 500 C.E. – The Common Era, which is the same as A.D.) stated that: “It is an 
ill thing to knock against a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor. He that wounds them is 
culpable, but if they wound him they are not culpable." The Roman Court (27 B.C.E.– 476 
C.E.), which greatly influenced later court systems in Europe, also acknowledged that insane 
individuals who had committed a crime should be treated differently than other persons 
(Qvarsell, 1993).  
In spite of special regulations concerning the legally insane, legal systems did not always 
give more humane treatment to these individuals. They were often hidden away and suffered 
from harsh and humiliating treatment, and were frequently at the complete mercy of their 
families (ibid).  
There are many accounts of the various understandings of legal insanity over the 
centuries, and courts’ trepidations as to best deal with the criminally insane. In the English 
courts of the 14th century, the “right and wrong test” was developed, and in the 16th century, 
the “wild beast test” was suggested. However, these were not formal tests, but rather merely 
attempts to create operational descriptions of defendants who should be considered legally 
insane. These descriptions were unsystematic and not based on any scientific approach, 
while few doctors and scientists had any particular interest in defining legal insanity. Weyer 
should be mentioned since he claimed that doctors rather than judges should decide how the 
legally insane should be dealt with.  
Gianbattista della Porta (1536–1615), often said to be the first criminologist, searched for 
a systematic link between the physical features of a criminal and his/her compulsion to 
commit criminal acts. He claimed that thieves had small ears, big lips, etc., and he also 
claimed that criminals should undergo treatment – not punishment. My point with all of this is 
that these opinions and approaches were unique during their times, though they did not 
reflect a systematic interest shown by society at large. 
From the Middle Ages until approximately 1800, two developments concerning forensic 
psychiatry can be traced: 1) The defendant was given an increased opportunity to make 
excuses, i.e. claim insanity for his actions, and 2) The science of the psychology of man and 
his social life gradually emerged with more of an emphasis on the individual – not merely on 
the criminal act itself (Moe, 2008). 
Up until about the year 1800, most criminal laws focused on the criminal act only and 
gave hardly any consideration to the mental state of the offender (Nye, 1984; Schaanning, 
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2002; Moe, 2008). From the 19th century onward, several new scientific approaches emerged 
that were based on a more systematic study of criminals, i.e. the individual behind the crime. 
Although it is difficult to follow how different writers categorise these various approaches, four 
approaches seem to have developed: criminal psychology, criminal anthropology, social 
Darwinism, and (forensic) psychiatry. 
Criminal psychology, founded by J. B. Friedreichs (1796–1862), attempted to explain why 
criminal acts occur, and wanted to develop criteria for legal sanity and explain criminal 
behaviour (Qvarsell, 1993). According to Friedreichs, the determination of whether a 
defendant was legally insane or not should be assessed by doctors or medical lawyers. 
Criminal anthropology was based upon studies of physiognomy and phrenology. Franz 
Josef Gall (1758–1828) was an anatomist of the brain and founder of phrenology. He 
claimed that certain mental characteristics/abilities had special locations in the brain, and that 
these characteristics could be measured on the outside of the skull. Thus, by taking 
measurements of the skull, one could tell who had the characteristic personality features of a 
criminal and if this was caused by defects in the brain (Schaanning, 2002). Historically 
speaking, the most famous criminal anthropologist of all was probably Cesare Lombroso 
(1835–1909), who made systematic measurements of the skulls of Italian criminals. He 
claimed that certain individuals are born criminals (“huomo delinquente”), and that they could 
be identified by the shape of their skull. He developed a complex theory called atavism which 
stated that some persons were “arrested” in an earlier developmental stage and were 
consequently “primitive”. According to Lombroso, they could also be identified by their 
frequent use of tattoos and several other features (language, low intelligence, etc). One of 
Lombroso’s main ideas was that the criminal does not commit crimes out of evil, but instead 
does so because he is acting in the way that a primitive human being would do (Qvarsell, 
1993). As a result, Lombroso said the criminal could not change, so he suggested that 
criminals should be detained until they no longer constituted a danger to others (ibid).  
Social Darwinism emerged in the 19th century, inspired by the ideas of degeneration by 
Bénédict A. Morel (1809–1873), which were put forth as an explanation for mental 
disorders. These were deterministic ideas which claimed that some negative or positive traits 
(such as criminality, high/low intelligence, and mental disorders) prevailed and became 
worse for each successive generation in some families. A popular notion was that one had to 
control, even extinguish those families with bad (criminal, etc.) traits in order to stop them 
from destroying society as a whole – a form of social Darwinism practiced by the Third Reich 
(Schaanning, 2002). 
Finally, psychiatry came as a separate branch of medicine in the English speaking world 
in approximately 1840 and dealt with mental disorders (Allan et al., 1995). Psychiatrists 
would soon offer their expertise to the courts, perhaps to distinguish their speciality or to 
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“explain the unexplainable” with regard to a defendant’s motivation and eventual insanity in 
relation to serious and sometimes incomprehensible crimes. One example of such a 
psychiatrist is James C. Prichard (1786-1848), who introduced the term moral insanity which 
pointed to a form of mental derangement that left one’s intellectual faculties uninjured, but 
primarily affected the capacity for moral judgment. Pritchard raised the issue of whether 
some defendants were “mad or just bad” - an issue that was highly relevant to the courts. In 
1835, Pritchard wrote that a person suffering from “moral insanity” was: “….incapable of 
conducting himself with decency and propriety in the business of life", though according to 
Meloy (1988), Pritchard’s approach contaminated scientific (psychiatric) objectivity with moral 
judgments.  
The modern forensic psychiatric expert is essentially a product of the 19th century 
(Gutheil, 2005; Foucault, 1978; Allan et al., 1995; Skålevåg, 2002). In 1825, so-called “mad 
doctors” were acting as expert witnesses in English courts, although half of them did so on 
behalf of friends or patients they had treated (Allan et al., 1995). Eventually, independent 
medical experts began to replace the therapists as witnesses (Gutheil, 2005), but European 
courts often rejected doctors’ conclusions (Foucault, 1978). From the 20th century onward, 
experts played an increasingly important role in the legal system in all Western countries 
(Qvarsell, 1993). One reason for this development was the growing fear of an (presumed) 
increased criminality, and the social need to control these criminal elements. The experts 
held the opinion that they could help to control and understand criminals in part by sharing 
their knowledge with the courts (ibid).  
Today, experts are more or less routinely called upon to evaluate defendants for the 
courts in most Western countries, with medical doctors being the first to appear in court, 
followed by specialists in psychiatry and later by psychologists as well. The first psychologist 
to appear in court (a civil case) was Professor Karl Marbe (1869-1953), who did so in 1911 
(Allan et al., 1995).  
2.2.2. Development of Norwegian forensic psychiatry 
As in other Western countries, it was during the 19th century that Norway began to use a 
more systematic approach with regard to the mentally ill and the law, and the Norwegian 
Criminal Law of 1842 was the first law to create explicit rules for the mental conditions that 
can lead to an acquittal due to insanity (Moe, 2008). This law adhered to the biological 
principle (Høyer, 1985), though the new Penal Code of 1902 was more liberal. As a result, 
the legally insane could receive preventive (custodial or non-custodial) supervision (i.e. 
“sikring”) instead of punishment, and individuals with “deficient mental development” and/or 
“permanently impaired mental capacity” (i.e. “mangelfullt utviklede og/eller varig svekkede 
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sjelsevner”), although not the legally insane, could obtain a reduction in their punishment or 
even be acquitted (Grøndahl, 2000).  
In 1929, the Penal Code was revised again due to the general concern because of an 
apparent increase in criminality, as it was claimed that too many criminals were acquitted 
due to insanity using the legal definition. Consequently, defendants with a reduced 
intellectual capacity would no longer be acquitted, but could now receive both punishment 
and preventive supervision.  
The most recent and current revision of the Penal Code was introduced in Norway in 
2002 and is previously described in Sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.4.  
Concerning forensic expertise, medical professors were assigned the duty of assisting 
the courts in general forensic matters starting in 1815 (Høyer, 1985). In 1887, a radical 
revision of the CPA introduced a more formal arrangement in appointing experts to assess 
questions of insanity for the courts (Lundeberg & Skålevåg, 2004). This change, together 
with the establishment of the NMFB in 1900, made the psychiatric expert’s role in the legal 
system more explicit and formalized. However, forensics has never been an established 
speciality in the professional psychiatric or psychological associations of Norway. 
Nevertheless, the system of using court appointed experts has more or less remain 
unchanged since 1887. The idea that experts would increase the understanding, control and 
legal safeguards of the defendants has been strongly endorsed. Still, for a long time, forensic 
psychiatry has been regarded by many as a controversial element of the courts and has 
been subjected to much criticism over the years, particularly from the social sciences 
(Ellingsen, 1987; Kongshavn, 1987; Schaanning, 2002; Halvorsen, 2002).  
Despite this criticism, there is apparently little empirical data about either the quality or 
standards of the forensic psychiatric experts and their forensic reports. Though there are 
clear differences among the medico-legal systems in the various Scandinavian countries, 
there are also corresponding similarities, with each country applying approximately the same 
mandate (to examine whether the defendant is suffering from severe mental disorder 
(primarily psychosis) at both the time of the crime and the time of observation). In addition, all 
the Scandinavian countries adhere to the inquisitorial system and a systematic comparison 
of the medico-legal systems and their quality (methods used, verifiability etc.) of the 
Scandinavian reports can therefore indicate something about the quality of Norwegian 
forensic psychiatry, which is the topic of Study I (the comparative forensic reports paper). 
2.3. Critique of forensic psychiatric evaluations 
The question has been raised as to whether forensic experts have really brought objective 
knowledge, clarity, neutrality and better legal safeguards for the defendants into the courts? 
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The answer is equivocal. Up until the last four decades, the courts were often impressed by 
the experts’ qualifications and seldom questioned their conclusions (Jackson, 1986; Saks & 
Koehler, 2005; Ennis & Litwak, 1974), although growing criticism has gradually weakened 
the experts’ former prestige in the courtroom. Over the years, both the forensic psychiatric 
field in general and the experts in particular have been subjected to quite an extensive and 
perhaps sometimes harsh and unjust critique. Experts have been accused of being “double 
agents” (talking pleasantly with the defendant, while actually assisting the legal system), 
thereby helping society to stigmatize and restrict the defendant (Nedopil, 2002; Rogers, 
2004) and failing to reach reliable and valid conclusions (Faust & Ziskin, 1988).  
So, what are the problems in using evaluations by experts? To separate the legally sane 
from the insane is sometimes a very difficult task since the experts cannot enter a 
defendant’s brain or see what he thinks. Psychiatry and psychology are soft sciences that get 
most of their information by inferences and have to draw the difficult line between matters of 
“facts” and matters of “values” (Rogers, 2004; Kenny, 1984). One heretical question is 
whether the court really needs experts in psychiatry/psychology to assist them in the first 
place. Are the judgements of laypeople in regard to criminal insanity the same or significantly 
different from that of the experts? This is the topic of Study IV (the case vignette paper).  
There can sometimes be quite a lot at stake in some penal cases, and there is a huge 
difference between defendants being acquitted for homicide due to reasons of legally defined 
insanity (but in some cases sentenced to compulsory treatment) as opposed to receiving a 
life sentence if found legally sane. Therefore, the legal parties can use a considerable 
amount of time and effort in order to convince the court that the experts are wrong and to 
criticise them for conclusions not in favour of their client. 
In summary, there are at least three aspects which contribute to controversies in the field 
of forensic psychiatry (Low et al., 1986): 
1) Within the legal profession: Specialists of the legal profession and lawmakers cannot 
reach a consensus concerning whether a given insanity defence is consistent with the 
purposes of the Penal Code (as stated in the various jurisdictions), and exactly how to 
achieve these purposes.  
2) Within the social and mental health profession: Specialists have trouble in achieving 
agreement on how to best assess, describe and present insanity and other deviant behaviour 
in legal terms for the courts according to the Penal Code as written. 
3) Between the legal and mental health professions: Legal professionals and 
medical/psychological professionals have difficulty in communicating with each other due to 
different nomenclature, cultures, values and objectives. 
In addition, the social sciences (at least in Norway) have often criticised the role and 
methods of forensic psychiatry experts primarily based upon ideological reasons. 
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This thesis will not dwell on the first aspect addressed above. The problems within the 
legal profession concerning the achievement of a consensus as to whether an insanity 
defence is consistent with the purposes of the Penal Code, and how to achieve this, is 
considered to be outside the realm of this thesis.  
The second aspect concerns the main theme of this thesis: how do forensic experts 
methodologically assess a defendant and how is the quality of their assessments?  
The third aspect, legal versus forensic professionals, is only partially dealt with here, 
primarily in Study II (the screening report study).  
What is the current “state of the field” of forensic psychiatry in Norway, and what criticism 
is relevant? What type of knowledge is needed for the further development of forensic 
psychiatric practice and quality assurance in Norway? To approach these questions, a 
review of relevant forensic psychiatric research studies will be presented. 
2.4. Research in Norway and Scandinavia 
This Section mainly describes the current status of relevant clinical research within forensic 
psychiatry in Norway and Scandinavia (Denmark and Sweden). 
2.4.1. Forensic psychiatric research in Norway 
Research on the quality, practices and methods of forensic psychiatry is rather scarce in 
Norway, and among the studies conducted, few have been done by practicing forensic 
psychiatrists. These studies have mostly provided quality assurance or control methods 
which have been collected as descriptive statistics and summed up in annual reports. These 
reports have outlined the number of forensic examinations concluding with psychosis in the 
defendants, the number of homicide cases, etc., with one example being the reports made 
by the psychiatrists Kjell Noreik and Berthold Grünfeldt (Noreik & Grünfeld, 1996), while 
another is the annual reports of the NMFB. 
Some clinical forensic research studies, however, are worth mentioning. Psychiatrist 
Hans Jacob Stang studied 236 forensic psychiatric examinations (178 men, 58 women) 
issued in the years from 1949-1954. His study had two research questions: 1) What mental 
disorders were covered by the legal terms of “deficient mental development”, (i.e. 
“mangelfullt utviklede sjelsevner”) and/or “permanently impaired mental capacity” (i.e. “varig 
svekkede sjelsevner”). Since these terms were removed in the revised Penal Code of 2002, 
only the second question is of interest here: 2) What is the experts’ accuracy in predicting a 
defendant’s risk of committing new crimes? Stang found that the experts’ prognosis was 
correct in only 55% of the cases for the men and in 49% of the cases for the women, which is 
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hardly better than chance, as the experts had clearly overestimated the risk and 
dangerousness of future crimes. Since the experts had such a low accuracy in their 
predictions, Stang suggested that the mandate for the experts to give a prognosis of a 
defendant’s risk of criminal recidivism (i.e. “gjentagelsesfare”) should be omitted (Stang, 
1966). This study had a decisive influence on the revision of the Penal Code in 1978, which 
freed the experts from their duty of making a prognosis on the future recidivism of 
defendants.  
In a retrospective study, the sociologist Dag Ellingsen (1987) used a mixture of qualitative 
and descriptive quantitative design to examine all 110 Norwegian forensic psychiatric reports 
issued in 1980. He wanted to study how the experts defined and used the (formerly used) 
terms “deficient mental development” and/or “permanently impaired mental capacity”, 
although his findings about the experts’ use of the terms are of less interest now because the 
terms were abandoned by the Penal Code revision of 2002. However, he also reported that 
the verifiability of the reports was generally low since in half of them the experts did not state 
where or when the observation took place, and in the other half, the total time spent with the 
defendant was not stated (Ellingsen, 1987). Findings from a study of forensic reports issued 
only in 1980 may not be generalised since that year could be less representative than others 
concerning reports. Nevertheless, the methodology applied by Ellingsen seems to be valid 
regarding his approach to the reports in an inductive and non-hypothetical way, though it is 
hard to follow how he actually quantitatively registered the data from the reports. Ellingsen’s 
study was one of the first in Norway to actually investigate the verifiability of forensic 
psychiatric reports, which is important because the reports are issued for both the legal 
parties and the courts. The reports should be clear so that the legal parties can understand 
the methods used and how the experts reached their conclusions, thereby enabling the legal 
parties to eventually challenge the validity and reliability of the stated conclusions. 
Hartvig et al. (2003) studied all (n = 42) cases examined during 1981-2000 in which 
Norwegian forensic experts stated that the defendant was “amnesic/ unconscious” at the 
time of the criminal act. The authors were in disagreement with the experts’ conclusions in 12 
of the 42 reports and were of the opinion that many of the reports lacked valid premises for 
their conclusions (Hartvig et al., 2003), with roughly half of the 42 cases receiving comments 
or corrections from the NMFB. The authors did not substantiate their findings by means other 
than re-diagnosing and describing the material and stating their subjective opinions about the 
quality of the reports. Nonetheless, the study is interesting since the authors, despite 
limitations, illustrate how the quality of such forensic reports can vary in their opinion. To 
investigate whether a defendant is suffering from genuine amnesia is among the most 
challenging tasks in forensic psychiatry (see Study III).  
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Be that as it may, the research done on forensic psychiatry in Norway thus far has been 
limited to student theses on criminology (Kongshavn, 1987; Hansen, 1994; Faber, 1998) and 
psychology (Holum & Grøndahl, 1995; Davidsen, 1999; Lyster, 2008; Gullhagen, 2004), and 
all of these but one (Gullhagen) have been conducted with qualitative design and small 
sample sizes. Gullhagen compared nine forensic reports (Sample 1) from evaluations made 
at the Brøset High Security Hospital with 32 records (Sample 2) from persons admitted for 
ordinary psychiatric observation according to § 3 of the Psychiatric Health Care law. 
Gullhagen also examined the groups in regard to the number of sessions with the 
expert/therapist, the differences among psychiatrists and psychologists as therapists, as well 
as the use of specific tests and examination among other variables. Of primary interest here 
are the findings of Sample 1, in which Gullhagen found that the experts had a mean number 
of six sessions with the defendants (median 5, range 1-12) in addition to the examinations 
lacking a systematic or standardised approach (11% had a structured clinical interview, 22% 
had a psychological test, 44% had a neuropsychological test), and that the basis for the 
conclusions in the reports in some cases was weak according to Gullhagen (2004). 
The last studies mentioned have definite limitations on the basis of being student theses, 
but can hardly be generalised and may at best only generate hypotheses for later 
quantitative research.  
To sum up, there are hardly any empirically-based studies of forensic psychiatric reports 
published in Norway concerning the use of methods, practises and quality, so the need for 
this type of research therefore seems to be of great importance in relation to the serious 
consequences of such reports for the defendant, his family and society. 
2.4.2. Scandinavian studies 
Johan Calltorp, a Swedish professor of health services management stated in 1996 that “the
Nordic laboratory is a goldmine for public health and medical care research”. The former 
Chief Executive of The National Board of Forensic Medicine in Sweden, Gunnar Holmberg, 
has argued in similar ways. He stated that the Nordic countries have many common 
historical, social and cultural factors in addition to homogenous populations with high social 
standards. The countries also share a social-democratic and humanistic view in the way that 
mentally disturbed offenders should not be punished or sentenced to prison if they are 
considered unaccountable for their actions (Holmberg, 1997a). For this reason, there should 
be a good foundation for collaborative and/or comparative studies in terms of forensic 
psychiatry. So what Scandinavian studies in forensic psychiatry exist? 
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Review papers 
Several survey papers have been issued which give an overview and description of 
Scandinavian forensic psychiatry concerning the organisational differences of forensic 
investigations (institutions, settings, etc.), legislation (different criteria for insanity by legal 
terms), investigational procedures, financing etc. (Rättsmedisinalverket, 1995; Holmberg, 
1997a; Borup Svendsen et al., 1977; Øjesjö, 1986). Holmberg particularly stresses the need 
and possibilities for research in forensic psychiatry among the Nordic countries (Holmberg, 
1997b) and discusses several planned research projects. Of special interest here is the plan 
which aims to collect forensic psychiatric reports from Denmark, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden in order to perform an analysis of the similarities and differences among such 
reports (ibid), though to date this project has never been started.  
Other studies 
The Norwegian psychiatrists Noreik and Grünfeld compared the systems, settings and 
methods of forensic reports issued in Sweden, Denmark and Norway, and claimed that even 
though Denmark and Sweden both had a more standardised approach to their forensic 
investigations, Norwegian reports had a good overall quality. Yet, they never substantiated 
their viewpoint, and the authors concluded that forensic psychiatric activities should be 
improved in Norway (Grünfeld & Noreik, 1997). Their report is not research, but more like a 
travelogue in which an imminent criticism that forensic psychiatry in Norway has gone 
through a minimal amount of development compared to Denmark and Sweden is refuted. 
Davidsen, who is mentioned above, found in a qualitative study of 12 Norwegian and six 
Swedish forensic reports that the Swedish reports were more standardised than the 
Norwegian (Davidsen, 1999). 
Briefly, some other Scandinavian/Nordic studies within (forensic) psychiatry have been 
issued pertaining to homicide in the Nordic countries (Gudjonsson & Pétursson, 1990), a 
comparison of suicide in Copenhagen and Oslo (Rogde, 1996), the use of coercion in Nordic 
psychiatric hospitals (Høyer et al., 2002; Kjellin et al., 2006) and the fatal poisoning of drug 
addicts in the Nordic countries (Steentoft et al., 2001). 
To conclude, little empirically-based research into forensic psychiatry has been done as a 
Scandinavian/Nordic collaboration, and there are mostly survey works and small qualitative 
studies which raise questions for empirical research, but add little new, valid knowledge to 
the field. In his 1997 paper, Holmberg (1997b) rightly concluded that: “So far the excellent 
opportunities for inter-Nordic collaboration have scarcely been exploited in the field of 
forensic psychiatry.” In 2010, this conclusion still seems valid. 
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2.4.3. Forensic psychiatric screening reports 
Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands are apparently the only countries that use 
smaller/preliminary screening reports in their criminal law procedures. The purpose of a 
screening report is to examine the defendant with regard to sanity by legal definition and to 
conclude with a recommendation concerning the need for a full forensic psychiatric report. 
Other countries may also use similar screening reports but, to the best of my knowledge, 
they have not published anything with regard to such procedures. A literature search in 
Medline, PsychInfo, Embase and SveMed+ in both 2005 and 2008 only retrieved one paper 
on this topic (Duits et al., 2008). 
Since screening reports are defined by the criminal law procedures in the aforementioned 
countries, it would be of interest to obtain some systematic knowledge in reference to their 
quality, validity and reliability. Additionally, it would also be of interest to know if the principals 
(police prosecutors, defence lawyers and sometimes the courts) consider the reports to be 
relevant, as best exemplified by whether the recommendations were followed which is the 
topic of Study II (the screening report paper). 
Studies on screening reports 
Screening reports are only mentioned in one study from the Netherlands (Duits et al., 2008). 
The authors investigated which items of the Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in 
Youth (SAVRY) were mentioned in pre-trial mental health evaluations, and such an 
evaluation is described as performed by forensic psychiatrists and psychologists for the 
juvenile courts. The purpose of the evaluations is to clarify if and to what extent a mental 
disorder or the deficient mental development of the defendant played a role in the index 
offence. Duits et al. (2008) randomly chose files from the period between 1998-2000 of 100 
juveniles (93 boys, 7 girls) out of 600 who had a pre-trial evaluation, and discovered that 24 
out of 30 of the SAVRY items could be extracted from 90% of the evaluations. However, five 
historical SAVRY items did not appear in 25-63% of the files, and the authors were surprised 
that the historical items seemed to play only a minor role in the evaluations. Because of this, 
the authors recommended that SAVRY should be used as a checklist in the evaluation and 
pre-trial assessment of juveniles. 
Screening reports versus competency evaluations 
In the United States, several research studies have been carried out in regard to the 
evaluations of competency/fitness to stand trial (Heilbrun & Collins, 1995; Warren et al., 
2004), and screening instruments for use in such competency evaluations have been 
developed (Vitacco et al., 2007; Zapf & Roesh, 1997; Smith & Hudson, 1995; Zapf & Viljoen, 
2003). These studies suggest that competency reports have some similarities to the 
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European screening reports as far as their length and the methods used, although the 
purpose of the competency reports is quite different, and these reports shall examine the 
mental status of the defendant with regard to his competence to appear in court, to 
understand the proceedings, and to participate or assist in his own defence.  
In Norway at least, all defendants as a rule are obliged to meet in court during the 
proceedings, but can be excused from participating due to special circumstances such as 
acute illness and so on.  
Can screening devices be useful? 
Screening reports deal with a topic insofar as one screening device/report can influence the 
decision for a full report or a battery of test, etc. There is an entire body of research in this 
field, i.e. whether small screening devices or tests may lead to a different (clinical) decision, 
more extensive investigation or additional tests. Since such procedures have only a limited 
similarity to the research concerning screening reports, studies in this area will only be briefly 
mentioned.  
A few studies have compared open (clinical) interviews with structured screening 
techniques such as the International Neuropsychiatric Interview MINI (Pinninti et al., 2003; 
Egan et al., 2003). In both studies, the authors found that concordance between the clinical 
and structured approach was poor with respect to the primary diagnosis and co-morbid 
conditions, and this structured approach diagnosed more positive diagnoses and co-morbid 
conditions than the clinical method. The authors concluded that the structured screening 
approach was more comprehensive, sensitive and specific than the standard clinical 
assessment concerning diagnoses. It should however be noted that neither of the studies 
presented a gold standard, so it is not known which of the methods had the best “hit-rate” 
concerning the diagnosis and co-morbid conditions. 
Another study investigated whether a self-report screening questionnaire would produce 
many false negative responses in assessing personality disorders. In short, the authors 
found that the false negative rate as per use of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-III-
R/IV for Axis II disorders, SCID-II, was low for every diagnosis, which was taken as support 
for the validity of the self-report, and that the clinicians would only need to conduct further 
questioning for those diagnostic elements scored positively by self-report. The authors stated 
that an efficient screening assessment instrument for personality disorders could combine a 
self-report which is reliable when a clinical assessment is needed (Jacobsberg & Perry, 
1995). 
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Summary 
There seems then to be some support for using screening instruments in both clinical 
psychiatric and forensic practice. One advantage of using screening devices in forensic 
examinations is that structured clinical interviews can yield a more reliable description of a 
diagnosis, thus avoiding a tendency to emphasise information according to the experts’ pre-
formed hypotheses (Gullhagen, 2004). Screening devices and the forensic psychiatric 
screening reports serve one common purpose, namely that both can be of assistance in 
deciding if further examination is be called for. While research has been conducted on 
various screening instruments, a minimal amount of research seems to have been conducted 
on forensic screening reports. 
2.5. Amnesia and unconsciousness 
This section describes amnesia in relation to the concept of unconsciousness in the 
Norwegian Penal Code and research on amnesia and homicide. 
2.5.1. Amnesia and homicide 
Amnesia is a broad term referring to psychological conditions in which the normal memory 
function is disturbed. Webster’s Dictionary (The Merriam-Webster Online) defines amnesia 
as a loss of memory usually associated with brain injury, shock, fatigue, repression or illness. 
Another definition of amnesia is an inability to remember or a denial of memory (Gunn & 
Taylor, 1993). 
Some experts consider a claim of amnesia for a serious criminal act to be one of the 
easiest symptoms to simulate and one of the hardest to disprove in a legal setting (Kiersch, 
1962; Parkin, 1997; McSherry, 1998). In some countries, the question of whether a 
defendant actually remembers an alleged criminal act will have important implications in 
regard to their sanity in legal terms.  
In Norway, the experts should, as part of a standard mandate from the court, evaluate 
whether a defendant has suffered from “unconsciousness” (Penal Code § 44) or reduced 
consciousness (§ 56 c). The legal concept of “unconsciousness” is difficult to comprehend. 
Unconsciousness is not equivalent to amnesia, even though amnesia is strongly linked with 
unconsciousness which involves a complete or near-complete lack of ability to encode and 
comprehend environmental stimuli. In NOU 1990:5, unconsciousness is described as:
 “…the concept does also include that motoric ability is preserved, likewise the ability to 
see and hear (“relative unconsciousness”). It is the ability to receive and adapt information 
which is broken or impaired, and to put the information into a conscious context, so that this 
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information can later be recalled and remembered in a way that actions are based on the 
received and perceived information” (my translation, pp. 43) (NOU 1990: 5, 1990).  
In cases of unconsciousness, the defendant will not be aware of his or her acts at the 
time, and this lack of encoding will consequently involve amnesia.  
To conclude that a defendant acted in a state of unconsciousness at the time of a crime 
requires more than just a claim of lost memory. It should be documented that the memory of 
the actual event is lost (that is, no encoding and storage of information has occurred) and is 
not possible to retrieve. The mandate for the experts is to examine whether the defendant 
acted in a state of unconsciousness, not merely if he/she had amnesia in regard to the act. 
Therefore, defendants may claim amnesia, but their inability to recall an episode (however 
dramatic) will not necessarily be sufficient for the experts to regard the defendant as 
someone who acted in a state of “unconsciousness”, and the court will independently decide 
if it agrees with this conclusion. Nevertheless, the term amnesia is used throughout this 
thesis since amnesia is the (clinical) concept used on an international basis in research 
literature. 
Traumatic events – are they forgotten or remembered? 
There is a controversy surrounding whether traumatic (criminal) events will impair 
recollection or actually enhance memory of the event. Some researchers argue that 
recollection of a crime-related event will be impaired due to a high stress level and extreme 
emotions which perpetrators experience while they commit the (violent) crime (Arbodela-
Florez, 2002). The act itself then is so traumatising for the perpetrator that it will be difficult to 
retrieve any memory of the crime. Extreme emotions due to provocation have been labelled 
as “red outs” and have been suggested to cause an altered emotional state which impairs 
the memory of the criminal act (Swihart et al., 1999). Impaired or reduced memory due to 
trauma have been labelled as traumatic memory argument or TMA (Porter et al., 2007).  
However, Magnussen (2004) argues that neuropsychological research demonstrates that 
emotional activation reinforces attention, encoding and the consolidation of episodic memory. 
As a consequence, traumatic events will be remembered more vividly, clearly and in greater 
detail than non-traumatic events according to Magnussen. The presumption that traumatic 
events actually enhance the memory of the criminal act is labelled as traumatic superiority 
argument or TSA (Porter et al., 2007). There is increasing evidence in favour of the TSA 
model (ibid) and support for this view originates from research conducted on both the victims 
and witnesses of criminal acts. 
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Victims and witnesses 
A field study by Sporer (1996) tried to estimate whether stress had an impact on witnesses’ 
memory of a dramatic criminal event. Three groups: victims, witnesses who had not been 
victims and peripheral bystanders were interviewed and the results compared after they had 
witnessed a criminal event. The level of stress among the three groups was assessed and 
classified according to the presence of weapons, personal harm/damage, reported fear, etc. 
Though caution should be taken regarding the possibility of obtaining accurate measures of 
individual stress (Magnussen, 2004), stress did not seem to impair memory. In reality, 
witnesses who reported the highest levels of stress (“scared to death”) gave the most vivid 
and detailed accounts of the event (Sporer, 1996). Despite limitations (whether the details 
reported by the witnesses were correct was not checked, and whether much more extreme 
events will have the same impact on memory function is not known), the study apparently 
confirms the TSA model.  
Research on memory for traumatic experiences has been performed on war veterans, 
victims of torture, and survivors of concentration camps and natural disasters. This research 
seems to confirm that the memory of extremely stressful and fearful events is usually very 
good, i.e. both vivid and detailed (Magnussen, 2004). It is not uncommon for people who 
have endured situations or periods of extreme stress to experience intrusive memories. That 
is, the episodes seem to be “glued” into the person’s memory in an uncontrollable way. In 
one study, 78 statements (at a trial of a war criminal in the 1980s) of survivors of a 
concentration camp during World War II were compared with statements given to Nuremberg 
investigators shortly after the war. Again, the memories of the survivors was detailed and 
accurate on many aspects such as harsh treatment, daily routines, etc. (Wagenaar & 
Groenweg, 1990). According to Porter et al. (2007) “….there is mounting evidence that both 
victims’ and witnesses’ memory of potentially traumatic events are relatively accurate for 
“core” details and can be highly resistant to misinformation”. 
In contrast to victims and witnesses and the TSA model, perpetrators of violence 
frequently claim a loss of memory for their crime. 
Perpetrators 
Claims of amnesia for criminal acts are not uncommon for defendants in general, but are 
most common in cases of homicide (Leitch, 1948; Taylor & Kopelman, 1984; Parwatikar et 
al., 1985; Guttmacher, 1955; Menzies, 2005; Evans, 2006; Bradford & Smith, 1979; Pyszora 
et al., 2003), and the prevalence of such claims ranges from 22%-47% in the aforementioned 
studies.  
As a general rule of thumb, approximately 20%-30 % of those who commit serious violent 
crimes report amnesia about their criminal act (Jelicic & Merckelbach, 2007). 
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2.5.2. Characteristics of defendants claiming amnesia 
Several topics with regard to crime and amnesia such as the characteristics of defendants 
claiming amnesia have been empirically studied (Parwatikar et al., 1985; Taylor & Kopelman, 
1984; Cima et al., 2003; Cima et al., 2004; Häkkänen et al., 2008; Evans et al., 2009; O' 
Connell, 1960; Pyszora et al., 2003). 
O’Connell (1960) interviewed 50 perpetrators of homicide and found that 20 claimed 
amnesia. Of those who claimed amnesia, 8/20 (40%) of the perpetrators had average or 
above average intelligence compared to 25/30 (83%) of those who did not claim amnesia, 
though neither the level of significance (p = .004) nor the methods used for intelligence 
measurement were given by the author. O’Connell also found that 50% of those claiming 
amnesia showed hysterical personality traits compared to 10% who made no such claim, but 
again, the method of measurement was not stated. 
Cima et al. (2003) studied 62 male inmates at a German psychiatric correctional institute 
regarding their IQ, diagnosis, and eventual simulation based on case notes and initial 
screening routines. Applying a German version of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
(WAIS), they found that the IQ of those claiming amnesia (n = 17, mean IQ = 78.5) was lower 
than those who did not (n = 45, mean IQ = 90.8), (p <.05), but this association between 
claimed amnesia and low intelligence has not been replicated in other studies. The authors 
also found that 87% of those who claimed amnesia were diagnosed with antisocial 
personality disorder versus 47% for the non-claiming group (p <.01).  
Taylor and Kopelman (1984) conducted structured interviews concerning mental states at 
the time of the crime and details of the offence in 203 men on custodial remand for violent 
and non-violent offences, 34 (17%) of whom were convicted for murder. They also checked 
the defendants’ background data such as police statements and pre-offence records, 
discovering that 10% of the total sample claimed amnesia for their acts, and that such claims 
were made in cases involving violence, most frequently in homicide cases (26% of the 
homicide group claimed amnesia). All the men in the amnesia claiming group had a mental 
disorder (21% depression, 36% schizophrenia, and 42% alcohol abuse), while men in that 
group were older than the non-amnesia group (41 years versus 33 years, p = .003).  
Pyszora et al. (2003) also found that offenders sentenced to life imprisonment who 
claimed amnesia were older than their non-amnesic peers (p <.05), and they retrospectively 
studied the available case notes of all sentenced to life imprisonment in England and Wales 
in 1994 (n = 207), among whom 166 (80%) were convicted for murder. Thirty-one per cent of 
those convicted for murder claimed amnesia for their offence, and 20% (8/41) among those 
charged for other crimes (p = .14). They also found that claims of amnesia versus no 
amnesia were associated with alcoholic and dissociative blackouts (p <.0001), alcohol 
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abuse/dependence (p <.025) and a history of mental disorders, primarily anxiety, depressive 
and personality disorders (p <.0025). 
Parwatikar et al. (1985) tested for intelligence and personality in 105 men charged with 
homicide as part of a routine on admission to a state maximum security unit for pre-trial 
evaluation, and also checked police records and the social history of the defendants. They 
identified three groups: 1) Those who confessed murder (n = 50), 2) Those who denied 
committing murder (n = 31), and 3) Those who claimed total amnesia for the alleged 
homicide (n = 24). Comparisons were made between Groups 1 and 3, and a multivariate 
analysis of variance showed that those claiming amnesia were intoxicated by drugs and 
alcohol at the time of the alleged murder (p <.001) and scored higher on three Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) scales [hysteria (p <.003), hypochondriacs (p
<.03), and depression (p <.037)] compared to those who did not. The groups did not differ in 
regard to schizophrenia or psychopathic deviancy scales of the MMPI.  
Cima et al. (2004) studied hospital records of 308 convicted male patients at two forensic 
clinics of whom 103 (33%) were convicted for murder or attempted murder. They examined 
whether the patients had made a claim of amnesia for the index crime by studying 
psychotherapists’ notes and police interviews. If a claim of amnesia had been made, the 
records were studied for inconsistencies (changing their stories regarding their ability to 
remember the crime) by the defendant, crime details, neurological impairments and the type 
of psychological testing done. Out of the 72 patients (23%) who claimed partial or total 
amnesia, 26 (36%) had no recollection of the crime; while in the amnesia group 24 (33%) 
had committed murder. Members of the amnesia group were older than the non-amnesia 
group (p <.01), had more prior convictions (p <.01) and higher frequency of substance abuse 
(p <.01). The authors did not find any significant association between psychosis and claims 
of amnesia. 
A large Finnish study examined homicide offender (females n = 79 and males n = 577) 
characteristics in those claiming no, partial or total amnesia. They studied the both forensic 
examination and crime reports of all defendants subjected to forensic examination between 
1995 and 2004. Of the cohort, 238 (36%) claimed partial amnesia and 53 (8%) total amnesia. 
The authors found that a larger proportion of women (61%) claimed partial amnesia 
compared to the men (42%), (p <.01), though no significant gender difference was found as 
far as total amnesia was concerned. For men, being intoxicated from alcohol or drugs (p
<.001), being alcohol dependent (p <.001), and being older (p <.001) were associated with 
claims of total amnesia. As for women, claims of total amnesia were associated with the 
presence of a personality disorder (p <.05). No significant differences were found between 
those claiming amnesia and not, concerning intelligence and psychopathology in either 
gender (Häkkänen et al., 2008). 
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Finally, 105 young (mean 19.7 years) male offenders convicted of a serious violent crime 
were interviewed regarding their memory of their crime. They found that 19% claimed partial 
amnesia and 1% claimed a total loss of memory, and the only variables significantly 
associated with claims of amnesia were those of a high alcohol intake and an emotional tie to 
the victim. The proportion of those claiming total amnesia was unusually low in this sample in 
comparison to other studies (Evans et al., 2009). 
Reactive versus instrumental violence 
The distinction between reactive and instrumental violence may also be informative as it 
pertains to those claiming amnesia in serious criminal cases. According to Christianson et al. 
(2007), a reactive homicide is due to an impulsive reaction, which is characterised by 
spontaneity, high emotional stress, and an intention to harming the victim following a 
provocation. By contrast, an instrumental homicide is planned, goal-oriented, less driven by 
emotion and the offender has no strong attachment to the victim. Due to the planning 
involved in instrumental homicides, it would be expected that such offences would be easy to 
remember (Christianson et al., 2007). In an as yet unpublished paper, Christianson and von 
Vogelsang consider this hypothesis to be confirmed. They gathered information about 146 
homicide cases, 89 of which were coded as reactive and 57 as mainly instrumental, and they 
compared the offenders’ memory before, during and after the crime. Forty-seven percent of 
the reactive homicide offenders and 28% of the instrumental homicide offenders claimed a 
loss of memory in the early stages of the investigation phase (p = .02). Later, 23% of the 
reactive offenders and 14% of the instrumental ones maintained a claim of amnesia during 
their criminal act (p = .15) (Christianson & von Vogelsang, 2006). For this reason, the type of 
homicide act committed may give an indication as to which offenders will be more likely to 
claim and maintain a loss of memory for their crime.  
To sum up, the referred studies are of varying quality and demonstrate quite mixed 
results regarding the characteristics of offenders claiming amnesia versus those who do not. 
Alcohol intoxication and a violent crime, especially homicide, seem to be two common factors 
for defendants who claim amnesia in a criminal setting (Taylor & Kopelman, 1984; Cima et 
al., 2003; O' Connell, 1960; Häkkänen et al., 2008; Parwatikar et al., 1985; Pyszora et al., 
2003). There is also a moderate amount of support for an age factor, i.e. that defendants 
claiming amnesia are older than those without such a claim (Cima et al., 2004; Taylor & 
Kopelman, 1984). Otherwise, there appears to be no clear “amnesia claiming profile” or 
causal factor for claiming amnesia in the offender groups, with the possible exception of the 
distinction between reactive and instrumental violence.  
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2.5.3. Are claims of amnesia in penal cases genuine or false? 
Another widely debated and important topic is whether or not claimed amnesia in criminal 
cases is genuine or mainly simulated, with the term “simulated or malingered amnesia” 
referring to amnesia simulators who intentionally exaggerate memory problems (Wiggins & 
Brandt, 1988). The debate related to empirical studies such as those mentioned above has 
produced two camps that interpret the findings somewhat differently.  
The following arguments in favour of the authenticity of claimed amnesia have been 
proposed: 1) Some defendants contact the police after a crime, but are still unable to recall 
the criminal act itself (Taylor & Kopelman, 1984; Porter et al., 2001; Hopwood & Snell, 1933; 
Pyszora et al., 2003). 2) Amnesia per se is not regarded as a valid defence in some 
countries, so as a consequence, the motivation for simulating amnesia will be minimal in 
those places (Kopelman, 1995; Gunn & Taylor, 1993). 
On the other hand, there are many reasons for falsely claiming loss of memory about a 
crime. According to Porter et al. (2007), this could be an attempt to raise doubt about the 
degree of involvement in the offence, while additionally avoiding having to lie about 
involvement in the crime and trying to gain sympathy from family members or the court/jury. 
In some countries, a loss of memory can have legal implications - such as automatism in 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand. In Norway a defendant may, in a very few cases, be 
regarded as “unconscious” which has clear legal implications. Merckelbach and Christianson 
(2007) summarised three related motives for simulating amnesia in legal settings: 1) A claim 
may enable the defendant to remain silent without appearing uncooperative. 2) The claim 
may initiate a forensic psychiatric examination which could increase the probability that the 
defendant will be found to have some type of mental disorder due to experts’ pathology bias 
(Wedding & Faust, 1989), and 3) The defendant may avoid painful memories, and loss of 
memory gives them an excuse not to speak with experts or therapists about their crime.  
Scepticism has also been raised in relation to claimed amnesia in criminal cases since 
witnesses and even victims of extreme violence often have good rather than poor memory of 
the dramatic events (Porter et al., 2001; Magnussen, 2004). Even so, others have argued 
against the notion that claimed amnesia in criminal cases can be genuine or authentic (Cima 
et al., 2003; Magnussen, 2004; Christianson & Wentz, 2002). 
Several clinical indicators of malingered amnesia have been suggested such as a sudden 
onset of memory loss after an event, a global loss of memory for the alleged crime and a 
dogmatic attitude by the defendant, i.e. refusing to explore the possibilities of memory 
retrieval (Christianson & Wentz, 2002; Power, 1977; Schacter, 1986). There are some claims 
that malingered amnesia can resemble how amnesia is presented in films, i.e. a profound 
loss of identity and autobiographical knowledge, a complete change in personality (in Crime 
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Doctor from 1943, a dodgy criminal receives a blow to the head and soon thereafter 
becomes a leading criminal psychologist!), and the full embracement of a psychological 
rather than neurological basis for amnesia (Baxendale, 2004), which indicates that in some 
cases, amnesia may be learned. Defendants who simulate amnesia may score extremely 
low (below chance levels) on memory-based tests (Jelicic & Merckelbach, 2007), although 
the evidence for this latter assumption has not been conclusive. 
Post-conviction – does memory return? 
Despite frequent claims of amnesia among perpetrators of violent crimes, some memories 
may return after the conviction. Hopewood and Snell (1933) studied 100 maximum security 
hospital patients with a mixture of offences (71% homicide) who were selected due to a claim 
of amnesia at the trial. After studying the case files, they considered 14 patients as obvious 
malingerers and concluded that 78 suffered from genuine amnesia. Among them, 30 (38%) 
regained their memory of the crime, and most of them did so within six months.  
Pyszora et al. (2003) found that of the 207 defendants sentenced to life imprisonment, 
29% claimed amnesia for their offence. At three years post-conviction, 33% of the amnesic 
sample had a complete recovery of their memories, 26% had partial a recovery, while the 
rest reported no recovery of their memories.  
Christianson et al. (2006) sent a questionnaire to 182 prisoners sentenced for homicide 
or sexual offences and 83 responded, including roughly half the homicide offenders and half 
the sexual offenders. One of the items concerned whether they wanted to forget their 
criminal act, and 53% of the homicide and 35% of the sexual offenders confirmed that they 
did, indicating that offenders actually want to forget or suppress their crimes. The offenders 
were also asked if they had either a complete or partial loss of memory for their crime, and 
58% of the homicide and 45% of the sexual offender group confirmed such an experience. A 
follow-up question concerned the current vividness of their memory for their crime, and 23% 
of the homicide group stated that they had only a very vague memory of their crime. Since 
58% had reported a partial or total loss of memory, the authors calculated that 35% have had 
more or less memory recovery of their crimes (Christianson et al., 2006).  
These studies indicate that perpetrators’ memories of their crimes, though initially stated 
as forgotten, are often recalled to a certain extent over time. 
Summary  
There is a considerable amount of research literature on defendants who have claimed 
memory loss for their homicidal act, including various characteristics such as whether the 
homicide is instrumental or reactive, whether the claim is feigned or genuine, etc.  
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The literature presents suggestions on how experts methodically should or could assess 
claimed amnesia in criminal cases (Jelicic et al., 2004; Jelicic et al., 2006; Jelicic & 
Merckelbach, 2007; Heinze & Purisch, 2001; Christianson et al., 2007; Parwatikar et al., 
1985). In the opinion of this author, however, no studies have evaluated how experts actually 
examine claims of amnesia in homicide cases, and such a study could help to identify 
strengths and weaknesses in the experts’ examinations of amnesia claiming defendants. By 
acquiring such knowledge, we may be able to provide the experts with the necessary tools 
for conducting a thorough examination of the authenticity of claimed amnesia, which is the 
topic of Study III (the amnesia paper). 
2.6. Forensic psychiatric and clinical decision making 
According to the psychologists Tversky and Kahneman, there are several ways clinicians 
and (forensic) experts may commit systematic errors of judgement, i.e. so-called bias. In 
human judgement, we regularly use “rules of thumbs” which reduce the effort and increase 
the speed of making judgements (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In certain cases, however, 
these rules - or heuristics - may lead to systematic errors in judgement. According to these 
authors, the most common heuristics are: availability (the most recent and salient information 
will bias judgement), confirmatory (to overvalue supportive evidence and undervalue counter-
evidence), anchoring (not sufficiently reconsider/change a judgement despite new 
information), overconfidence (to be unreasonably confident in a decision or statement), 
hindsight bias (the inclination to see events that have occurred as more predictable than they 
in fact were before they took place), and illusory correlations (the phenomenon of seeing the 
relationship one expects to see in a set of data even when no such relationship exists, i.e. 
the overestimation of a link between two variables). 
Forensic psychiatric experts are asked to determine whether a defendant fulfils the 
medico-legal criteria for insanity. Optimally, the experts should provide the court with as 
verifiable, objective, valid and reliable information as possible. Unsystematic biases cannot 
be totally avoided, though the systematic biases of the experts are a potential problem for the 
court. 
Forensic psychiatric judgements may be investigated by studying eventual differences 
between the decision making processes of experts versus those of laypeople. If laypeople 
make judgements that do not significantly differ from those made by experts given the same 
case material, then it could be discussed as to whether the courts really need experts doing 
forensic examinations in the first place.  
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2.6.1. Laypeople versus professional judgements 
Studies have investigated judgements made by experts versus laypeople in many different 
fields (Oscamp, 1965; Jackson, 1986; Rowe & Wright, 2001).  
Oscamp (1965) examined the level of accuracy and confidence in clinical decisions 
among eight clinical psychologists with “several” years of experience (five with PhDs), 18 
psychology graduate students, and six undergraduate psychology students. To determine 
the accuracy of their judgment, a case study was constructed which simulated the clinical 
situation as closely as possible. The case was of a “normal” adolescent who had never been 
psychiatrically hospitalised (see the case of Joseph Kidd, as reported by White (1952) in his 
book “Lives in progress”). The task of the judges was to predict his future actions by five 
(multiple) choices as they successively received more information, and at each stage, they 
should also mark their level of confidentiality in their predictions. Stage 1 contained only brief 
demographical data; Stage 2 added 1.5 pages of Kidd’s childhood and so forth until Stage 4, 
which covered Kidd’s life up until the age of 29. Confidence judgments were made according 
to a scale that defined confidence in terms of the expected proportion of correct decisions 
(Adams, 1957). 
Oscamp found that none of the judges ever reached a 50% accuracy rate in their 
predictions, with an average accuracy of 28%. Interestingly, there were no significant 
differences among the three groups of judges in terms of accuracy and expressed 
confidence. Increasing information did not produce a significant increase in accuracy, 
although the mean stated confidence in all the group judgments increased from 33% at 
Stage 1 to 53% at Stage 4. It remains an open question whether the material presented in 
this study really gave the participants a fair and objective chance of making accurate 
judgements. 
Rowe and Wright (2001) evaluated nine empirical studies of experts versus lay 
judgments with regard to the risk of a negative event occurring. In these nine studies, 
experts’ and laypeople’s’ judgments were compared on several topics such as toxicology, 
ecological risk, nuclear risk, risk of the millennium data-bug, risk to oil field workers and so 
on. Though there was a trend towards experts’ perceptions of risk as being less than that of 
laypeople, there was no evidence to support the fact that experts’ judged risk any differently 
than laypeople, and the hypothesis that the experts were more veridical in their risk 
assessments than laypeople was not confirmed. However, a methodological reservation has 
to be made concerning these results: The authors concluded that the studies referred to 
were so flawed (characteristics of the expert and lay samples were poorly defined, and 
important demographic aspects of expert and lay samples were not controlled for in all 
 
 
 
39
studies) that it was hard to draw any definite conclusions in terms of the differences or 
similarities between experts and laypeople.  
In a Canadian study, Jackson (1986) examined possible differences in the decision 
making processes between laypeople and professionals as to forensic psychiatric 
assessments, and her study investigated laypeople (n = 180, rating one case each), 
psychiatrists (n = 10, rating nine cases each), and court judges (n = 10, rating nine cases 
each). The study used criminal case vignettes combined with three classes of information: 
positive, negative or absent concerning social and psychiatric history, and the severity of the 
crime. Based on these study descriptions, the laypeople and professionals rated several 
variables such as legal insanity, prediction of future offence and so forth, and were told to 
state the degree of confidentiality in their judgements.  
Jackson found no significant differences in the ratings between professionals and 
laypeople in their judgements on fitness to stand trial, criminal responsibility, dangerousness 
or prediction of future offence, and 80% of the laypeople were extremely or quite confident in 
their “fitness to stand trial” ratings (Jackson, 1986). The confidence of the professionals 
generally followed the same pattern as the laypeople, though with slightly lower ratings.  
There are no corresponding studies from Scandinavia, with the exception of one Swedish 
study by Yourstone et al. (2008) that found a gender bias in forensic psychiatric decision 
making on homicide cases since 45 practicing experts, 46 judges and 80 psychology 
students rated a case vignette describing a homicide case in the same way. The only 
difference in the case description was if the perpetrator was female or male, and a significant 
effect was connected to the gender of the perpetrator since the information was rated as 
more indicative of legally defined insanity if the perpetrator was a woman, p <.01 (Yourstone 
et al., 2008). 
Summary 
The literature reviewed here suggests that the judgements of professionals do not markedly 
differ from that of laypeople. It could be that the studies do not give the experts the 
opportunity to use their training in an optimal way, thereby hampering their chance of making 
better judgements compared to laypeople. It would therefore be of interest to perform a study 
to reveal whether these findings are replicable in a Norwegian setting using a design 
resembling Jackson’s study, but moderated for Norwegian conditions. 
2.7. Summary background 
Psychology and psychiatry are international disciplines. In contrast, forensic psychiatry and 
psychology are national in nature because of the ties to the legislation of individual countries 
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in relation to the criteria for legal insanity (Rasmussen, 2008). In court proceedings, Norway 
adheres to the inquisitorial system in which the courts appoint experts to conduct a part-
neutral examination of the defendant (i.e. not acting on behalf of either legal party), resulting 
in a forensic report.  
Norway is one of the only countries in the world to use the purely biological principle, 
meaning that the experts should only investigate if the defendant was suffering from 
psychosis, unconsciousness/amnesia, or severe mental retardation at the time of the crime 
since the defendant’s motivation for the crime is not an issue. There is no standard setting in 
which this forensic evaluation takes place, no speciality in forensic psychiatric or 
psychological expertise, and therefore no systematic recruitment of new forensic psychiatric 
experts. In almost all penal cases which require a forensic evaluation, two experts are 
appointed. 
The NMFB makes a quality assurance of all forensic reports issued in Norway and functions 
somewhat like a peer review organ.  
The status of Norwegian forensic reports is unclear in terms of the use of methods, 
standards, verifiability and quality, with most of the current practice in that field seemingly 
based on traditions, values and strong subjective opinions. Consequently, we have only 
small, fragmented empirical knowledge about forensic psychiatric practices carried out in 
Norway and Scandinavia. Forensic reports can play a vital role in criminal proceedings, and 
the quality of such reports may have implications concerning the legal safeguards of the 
defendant. In addition, the victim’s sense of justice may be influenced, although this thesis 
does not deal with that particular aspect. 
Some have argued that neither psychiatry nor psychology have developed a sense for 
the critical examination of their own practices (Wright & Cummings, 2005). Hence, a 
constructive and scientifically based evaluation of a field may pave the way for improved 
methods. It is this author’s belief that empirical studies may raise the level of discipline in the 
quality of the forensic psychiatric field.  
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3. THIS THESIS
3.1. Setting 
I started to work as a clinical psychologist in the Office for Forensic Psychiatry at the Oslo 
Police Department in 1998. The head of the office, chief psychiatrist Stein E. Ikdahl, MD, 
suggested that I should possibly start a previously planned study comparing various 
Scandinavian forensic psychiatric reports (Paper I). This work was completed with support 
from the Centre for Research and Education in Forensic Psychiatry, Oslo University Hospital, 
Ullevål. In completing Paper I, I obtained relevant reports and received support and help from 
chief psychiatrist Peter Kramp, MD, PhD, head of the Clinic of Forensic Psychiatry in 
Copenhagen, Professor Sten Levander, MD, PhD, head of the Forensic Psychiatric Clinic of 
Malmö and the former head of National Medical Forensic Board (NMFB) in Norway, 
Professor Kjell Noreik, MD, PhD.  
In cooperation with Stein E. Ikdahl and one of my supervisors, Professor Alv A. Dahl, MD, 
PhD, a sample of forensic psychiatric screening reports and the decision of the principals 
were studied (Paper II). To compare screening reports and full reports, the former head of 
the NMFB, Randi Rosenqvist, MD, procured access to the full reports. The amnesia study 
(Paper III) was completed in collaboration with senior psychiatrist Henning Værøy, MD, PhD, 
Akershus University Hospital and Alv A. Dahl. And once again, Randi Rosenqvist at the 
NMFB was most helpful in obtaining access to the full forensic reports.  
The last study (Paper IV), was conducted together with Assistant Professor Cato 
Grønnerød, MA, PhD, from the Department of Psychology, and post doc statistician Joseph 
Sexton, MS, PhD, Department of Biostatistics, both from the University of Oslo, as well as 
the help of my supervisor, Professor Petter Laake, MS, PhD.  
I received a research grant for this project from the Norwegian Foundation for Health and 
Rehabilitation.  
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3.2. The studies for this thesis 
An overview of the studies for this thesis is outlined in Table 2:  
 
Table 2 - Overview of the studies for this thesis
PAPER I PAPER II PAPER III PAPER IV
SAMPLE/
MATERIAL
20 Danish reports 
20 Norwegian reports 
20 Swedish reports 
419 Screening 
reports (SR) 
91 Full reports (FR) 
made in the wake 
of a screening 
report 
102 Forensic 
reports 
21 psychologists 
14 psychiatrists 
126 laypeople 
OFFENCES Homicide All types Homicide All types, i.e. 
“serious” or “minor” 
TARGET
VARIABLE
General overview of 
the forensic systems. 
Assessment of the 
different forensic 
evaluations as done 
in Norway, Sweden, 
and Denmark.  
Evaluate whether 
the conclusion of 
the SR is followed 
by the principals. 
Check the 
concordance 
between the SR 
and a later FR. 
Examine when a 
defendant claims 
amnesia for a 
homicidal act. 
Explore how 
experts 
methodically 
assess the 
claimed amnesia. 
Compare the 
groups judgements 
of insanity, risk 
assessment and 
need for treatment. 
DESIGN Comparison among 
the three countries 
concerning settings, 
acting professions, 
methods, and 
premises for forensic 
conclusions. 
Score all SR 
demographic and 
offence variables, 
diagnosis and main 
forensic 
conclusions. 
Compare these 
data with FR 
Register check to 
see if conclusions 
in SR’s were 
properly followed. 
Compare 
demographic, 
criminal and 
diagnostic 
variables in 
defendants with 
full or partial 
claim of amnesia 
vs. no claims. 
Register all 
methods used by 
experts.  
18 vignettes of 
positive, negative 
(or absent) 
information 
regarding 
psychiatric and 
social history and 
serious vs. minor 
offence compared 
among the groups. 
STATISTICS Descriptive,  
Inter-rater reliability 
by Pearson’s r. 
Continuous variables 
by ANOVA with 
Bonferroni’s 
correction for multiple 
comparisons. 
Categorical variables 
by chi-square. 
Descriptive,  
Inter-rater reliability 
with kappa 
statistics. 
Categorical data 
with chi-square. 
Continuous data 
with independent 
sample t tests. 
Logistic regression 
- strength of 
associations was 
expressed with OR. 
Descriptive,  
inter-rater 
reliability with 
kappa statistics. 
Fisher’s exact 
test. 
Univariate logistic 
regression 
analysis -strength 
of associations 
expressed with 
OR. 
Descriptive, group 
comparisons using 
the Linear Mixed 
Model (accounts for 
correlated 
responses from the 
same individual).   
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3.3. Study I: Scandinavian forensic psychiatric practices – 
an overview and evaluation (the comparative forensic 
reports paper) 
3.3.1. Background 
The Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Norway and Sweden share many common 
features, i.e. geographic closeness, similar languages, democratic ruling systems, high level 
of education, etc. These countries also have a common humanistic perspective that mentally 
disturbed offenders should not be punished in an ordinary way if considered legally insane 
for their offence. Despite these similarities, the countries have quite different ways of 
organising their forensic psychiatric system and the way that experts make a forensic 
psychiatric evaluation.  
According to Wettstein (2005), forensic psychiatry has yet to incorporate new and 
relevant developments within psychiatry and psychology, and make quality issues an 
important item on its agenda. Though he was concerned about the situation in the United 
States, his concerns could be relevant to Norwegian forensic psychiatry as well in my 
opinion. As noted in Section 1.2, I have considered Norwegian forensic psychiatry to be 
based somewhat on conservative attitudes and opinions as opposed to empirical research 
and evidence-based knowledge. The forensic psychiatrist Park Dietz encouraged experts in 
forensic psychiatry to work to achieve excellence in their field (Dietz, 1996). Quality 
improvement may come from more empirical research, and one issue is comparative studies 
of forensic practices among countries. More empirically-based knowledge on the different 
practices of Scandinavian countries may enable us to improve the quality of our own 
practice. As a result, a comparative study of the Scandinavian countries was considered 
relevant, though in order to make comparisons meaningful, we focused on one of the most 
serious types of crime, namely that of attempted homicide and homicide. 
3.3.2. Aims 
The aims of this were twofold: first, to compare how the Scandinavian countries organised 
their forensic psychiatric practices, and second, to compare how their experts assessed 
defendants concerning methods used, setting of the observation, profession of the experts, 
and premises for the experts’ conclusions in cases of homicide.  
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3.3.3. Research questions and hypotheses 
Would there be: 1) Substantial differences among the forensic psychiatric practices of the 
three countries, and 2) Significant differences of the assessment methods used? 
Hypotheses: 1) Due to differences in the organisation of forensic psychiatry in the three 
countries, substantial differences in practices would be observed. 2) For the same reason, 
significant differences in assessment methods would also be observed. 
3.3.4. Materials 
The study sample consisted of 20 forensic psychiatric reports from Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden, respectively, 60 reports altogether. To obtain comparability, the reports were 
chosen according to the following criteria:  
1) The crime charged should be homicide or attempted homicide;  
2) The defendant should be a male of Scandinavian origin (to omit language and cultural 
problems); and  
3) The reports should have been issued during the period from 1999-2001. Only the 
original, and not supplementary reports, were included (see page 16). 
I contacted institutions and persons who had formal access to such reports who could 
give the valid legal permission needed for me to read and score them. In Denmark, Peter 
Kramp, MD, PhD, head of the Clinic of Forensic Psychiatry in Copenhagen, gave us access 
after approval had been given by the Danish Department of Justice. In the process, we 
realized that only scoring reports issued at this clinic could lead to a selection bias. I was 
therefore granted access to the files of the Danish National Medical Forensic Board 
(DNMFB) who had reports issued from all parts of Denmark. I scored eight reports issued at 
the clinic and 12 reports issued from other parts of Denmark.  
I went to the Clinic of Forensic Psychiatry in Copenhagen and the DNMFB, and scored 
the Danish reports there. The Norwegian reports were obtained by personal communication 
with the former leader of the NMFB Kjell Noreik, MD, PhD. The reports were copied by the 
staff at NMFB, and then sent to and scored by me, and lastly, the Swedish reports were 
obtained with help from Sten Levander, MD, PhD, head of the Forensic Psychiatric Clinic of 
Malmö, who chose a sample from the files of the National Board of Medico-legal Affairs 
which were then copied, anonymised, sent to me and scored. 
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3.3.5. Methods 
Rating form 
Since I could not find any studies which had compared forensic psychiatric reports, I 
developed a structured rating form with 53 variables divided into five sections:  
Basic demographic data on the defendant;  
Setting of the observation;  
Profession of the experts;  
Methods used; and  
Premises forming the basis for the conclusions.  
This form was developed in order to obtain a systematic coverage of information that was 
positively stated and evaluated in the reports.  
Two aspects were registered in relation to the setting of the observation: the time 
span from when the crime was committed until a) the court decided that a forensic report 
should be made, b) until the expert received the case, c) the first meeting of the expert with 
the defendant, and d) until the report was delivered. The place of the observation, in addition 
to the duration and number of sessions with the defendant were also covered (See 
Appendix I). 
To check inter-rater reliability, an experienced psychiatrist, Pål Hartvig, MD, who had 
previous experience with forensic work, and I independently scored 10 of the reports 
concerning Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the form. The inter-rater reliability was scored between 
Hartvig and me. 
Statistics 
The material was analysed by use of SPSS-PC version 11.0 in order to obtain descriptive 
statistics of the variables. The level of significance was set at p <.05 and two-sided tests 
were applied. Continuous variables were analysed by an analysis of variance (ANOVA), with 
Bonferroni’s correction for multiple comparisons and categorical variables by chi-square test. 
The inter-rater reliability was estimated by Pearson’s correlation coefficient r.  
3.3.6. Main results 
Inter-rater reliability 
The scoring by Hartvig and myself showed an inter-rater reliability in relation to methods of r 
= 0.83, profession of the experts r = 0.95, premises r = 0.61 and overall r = 0.83. 
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Registered information about the defendant in the reports 
All reports contained information about education, employment, psychiatric history and the 
current psychiatric state of the defendant, previous convictions were registered in all but one 
report, and all but five Norwegian reports contained information from third parties. In a total of 
18 cases (30%), there was no information as to whether or not the defendant had undergone 
earlier forensic examination, and in seven reports (12%), it was not stated whether the 
defendant was intoxicated at the time of the crime. 
Setting of the observations 
The mean time between the committed crime and the finished forensic report was 
significantly shorter in Sweden (mean 73 days, range 31 - 176, median 65) compared to 
Norway (mean 190 days, range 48 - 608, median 131), with Denmark (mean 120 days, 
range 27 - 307, median 117) in between (p = .003). In Denmark, the time from when the 
crime was committed to a court decision to instigate a forensic examination was a mean of 
28 days (range 1 - 90, median 14), while in Norway, the time was a mean of 109 days (range 
1 - 589, median 31) and a mean of 42 days (range 1 - 147, median 36) in Sweden (p = .047).  
Briefly, all the Swedish examinations took place with inpatients in forensic clinics, while in 
Denmark and Norway, the places of examination could be a forensic institution/clinic, prison 
or the expert’s office. Ten of the Danish reports did not specify where the examination took 
place.  
The number of hours spent with the defendant was only accounted for in 16 of the 
Norwegian reports, and was not given in the Swedish or Danish reports. 
Methods used 
All the reports were based on at least one clinical interview with the defendant. Nevertheless, 
the countries differed concerning the application of other methods, in regard to both their 
number and kind. The Swedes applied significantly more tests and other instruments in 
comparison to the Norwegians and the Danes (p <.001). This finding was evident concerning 
the use of clinical medical examinations, diagnostic inventories and global functioning scales 
(such as SCID I and II, and the Global Assessment Functioning scale - GAF), different risk 
assessment instruments such as Historical, Clinical, Risk Management (HCR-20), and the 
Hare Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL – R).  
Premises for the conclusions 
Sweden was the only country that systematically recorded the defendant’s psychiatric 
(according to DSM-IV) and somatic diagnoses (according to ICD-10) in 19 out of 20 reports. 
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In both Norway and Denmark this proportion was five out of 20, and the difference between 
Sweden and Norway/Denmark was significant (Fisher exact, p <.001).  
No reference was made to medical, psychiatric, psychological or other types of literature 
or theory in any of the reports, except for one Norwegian report. In 57 (95%) of the reports, 
the experts stated no doubts with reference to the validity of their conclusions. 
 
To conclude, our hypotheses were confirmed: 1) There were substantial differences among 
the psychiatric practices of the three countries, 2) The use of assessment methods showed 
significant differences.  
3.4. Study II: A study of forensic psychiatric screening 
reports and their relationship to full psychiatric reports 
(the screening report paper) 
3.4.1. Background 
To the best of my knowledge only a few countries in the world have implemented a system 
using forensic psychiatric screening reports, and within Europe, they are Norway, Sweden 
and the Netherlands. Since hardly any study has been published regarding screening 
reports, it is difficult to know which countries and to what extent they are used.  
According to the Norwegian CPA (§ 165), the purpose of a screening report is to explore 
the need for a full report. A more specific translation of the CPA on this subject is: “If there is 
any doubt whether forensic psychiatric observation is necessary, the prosecuting authority or 
the court may decide to obtain a provisional report from an expert by way of guidance” 
(unofficial translation collected by the Faculty of Law Library, University of Oslo). This implies 
that if the principals are in doubt (after examining the case file of the defendant and perhaps 
talking to the defence attorney), as to whether there is a need to instigate a full report, they 
can appeal for provisional psychiatric expert guidance. The arrangement with screening 
(provisional) reports may be viewed as a procedure used in order to save time and money, 
as well as professional resources. The formulation of the CPA indicates that the expert 
should offer guidance to the principal in this matter, but how this should be done is not further 
specified in the CPA. 
It is seldom that the experts at the Office for Forensic Psychiatry at the Oslo Police 
Department are given a specific mandate by the principals, as they normally only request a 
screening report to be made. An expert at the office will then make a clinical psychiatric 
examination of the defendant, and if the expert concludes that there is any doubt about 
whether the defendant is legally insane (due to psychosis, unconsciousness or severe 
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mental retardation), the expert will state this doubt and may eventually recommend a full 
report be made. The practice of the office is to conclude with one of three alternate 
recommendations: to recommend a full report, to not recommend one or to leave the 
decision open/undecided. 
The screening report is considered as expert advice to the principals who are free to 
follow or not follow the recommendations given. If the screening report states that there is 
any doubt about the criminal sanity of the defendant and recommends instigation of a full 
report, the prosecutors may: a) follow the advice and instigate a full report, b) stop further 
prosecution of the case due to code 065 (a special code the prosecuting authorities use 
concerning prosecutory routines), i.e. doubt concerning the legal sanity of the defendant, c) 
ignore the advice and go on with an ordinary prosecution of the case, or eventually, d) stop 
the case due to other reasons (e.g. no criminal act can be proven).  
Empirical knowledge could indicate how the screening reports are viewed and can 
contribute to improvements concerning such reports. 
3.4.2. Aims 
The aims were to examine: 1) The quality of a sample of Norwegian forensic screening 
reports; and 2) To explore how the recommendations issued in these reports were handled 
by the principals.  
3.4.3. Research questions and hypotheses 
Four research questions were addressed: 1) What are the characteristics of persons who are 
subjects for a full report after a screening report versus those who only get a screening 
report? 2) Do the principals follow the recommendations of the screening reports? 3) What 
part of the screening reports is most strongly associated with the prosecutors’ request for a 
full report? 4) What is the relationship between the conclusions of the screening and full 
reports concerning the criteria for legal insanity? 
We held four hypotheses: 1) The characteristics of the defendant hypothesis: Full reports 
would be instigated if the defendant was charged with having committed a serious crime, 2) 
The characteristics of the crime in question hypothesis: The principals positive willingness to 
follow the recommendations of the screening reports depended on the severity of the crime, 
3) The recommendation of a full report would lead the principals to instigate a request for a 
full report hypothesis: The principals would try to safeguard themselves against the risk of 
not considering possible criminal insanity by ignoring expert advice, and 4) The screening 
versus full reports hypothesis: There would be differences between the screening and the full 
reports regarding the conclusions of legally defined insanity. 
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3.4.4. Materials 
The authors PG and SI had access to screening reports since we both worked at the Office 
for Forensic Psychiatry at the Oslo Police District. We were granted access for research 
purposes in this study by approval from the Oslo Police Department and the Directorate of 
Public Prosecution. The material for this study consisted of all 419 screening reports issued 
by the office from January 1, 2002 to May 31, 2005. Additionally, all 91 (22%) full reports 
issued concerning these defendants were collected from the files of the NMFB based on 
approval of the study from the Board of the NMFB. Only the original full reports, and not the 
supplementary reports, were included (see page 16). 
3.4.5. Methods 
Rating form  
Since we could not find any studies which covered screening reports and their relationship to 
full forensic reports, a structured rating form was developed by me with the assistance of 
Stein Ikdahl.  
The form consisted of 33 items for the screening reports, with 17 additional items 
concerning the full reports, creating a total of 50 variables. Information rated from the 
screening reports was the demographic data on the defendant (age, sex, work employment, 
partner relation and earlier psychiatric/psychological treatment), type of crime charged and 
the ICD-10 diagnoses if any (they had originally been stated for internal use only at the Office 
for Forensic Psychiatry, the Oslo Police Department). The recommendations of the screening 
reports were noted, and the presence of psychosis, unconsciousness or severe mental 
retardation (IQ <55) was considered.  
The 17 items rated for the full reports contained corresponding variables of those for the 
screening reports for the sake of comparison such as the experts’ main conclusion 
(psychosis, unconsciousness and severe mental retardation). However, the experts’ 
conclusions regarding test use, stated diagnosis and if they had stated any doubt concerning 
their conclusion were recorded for the full reports as well. 
The concordance of the conclusions for psychosis, unconsciousness or severe mental 
retardation for the screening and full report was calculated by using kappa statistics (see 
code book, Appendix II). 
Information on how the recommendations in the screening reports were handled by the 
principals was collected from the Norwegian Criminal Register, independently of the ratings 
forms. This handling was checked against the conclusions of the screening reports, that is, 
the recommendation for a full report, case dismissed (and the reason for this, i.e. doubt 
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concerning the defendant’s accountability, etc.), and whether the defendant was sentenced 
or not.  
All the reports were scored according to the forms by either Ikdahl or me. In order to 
examine the inter-rater reliability, both of us scored 30 of the screening reports as to key 
variables such as presence of psychosis, unconsciousness or severe mental retardation, as 
well as the main conclusions: positive, negative or open recommendation of a full report. The 
screening reports were scored at the Office for Forensic Psychiatry, and the full reports were 
scored at the NMFB. We did not score reports issued by ourselves in order to avoid a 
potential selection bias in the scoring. If one of the authors had issued a report in the sample, 
the other author would score his report. 
Statistics 
The analyses were performed using SPSS version 14.0 software. A significance level of p 
<.05 was set, all tests were two-tailed, and the inter-rater reliability was estimated by kappa 
statistics.  
Categorical data were analysed by chi-square test and continuous data by independent 
sample t-tests. The associations between relevant independent variables and the initiation of 
full reports (dependent variable) or not (reference) were examined using logistic regression 
analyses. The strengths of the associations were expressed as odds ratios (ORs) with 95% 
confidence intervals (95%CI).  
3.4.6. Main results 
Inter-rater reliability 
Concerning psychosis, the agreement between Ikdahl and me was kappa 0.88, while there 
was complete agreement concerning the presence or not of unconsciousness and mental 
retardation (kappa 1.00). For the main conclusion of the screening reports, our agreement 
was kappa 0.56. 
Characteristics of defendants with a full report following a screening report  
In univariate regression analyses, we found that three variables were significantly associated 
with instigation of a full report, namely the (younger) age of the defendant (p = .007), a 
positive recommendation stated in the screening reports (p <.001) and the severity of crime, 
i.e. particularly homicide and attempted homicide (p <.001). However, in the multivariate 
analysis, only positive recommendation (p <.001) and severity of crime (p =.006) were 
significantly associated with instigation of a full report.  
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The principals handling of the recommendations of the screening reports 
Among the 118 screening reports with a positive recommendation of a full report, 59 (50%) 
led to instigation of such a report by the prosecution authorities. Of the 59 reports in which a 
positive recommendation was not followed, 20 (34%) of the cases were dismissed by the 
prosecutors due to doubt regarding the defendant’s legal sanity, and 32 (54%) of the cases 
were not closed with a final decision at the time of our study. In seven cases, we found no 
further information, except that an ordinary sentence had been given. If the recommendation 
in the screening report was negative, this advice was followed in 98% of the cases, while in 
the 181 cases with an “open” recommendation, 16% were followed by a full report. 
In a follow-up analysis conducted in October 2009, we rechecked the 32 cases which had 
not been closed with a final decision when we first analysed the data. Of the 118 SR’s with a 
positive recommendation for a full report, 81 (69%) had led to instigation of such a report, 
and in 37 cases (31%), recommendations of such a report were not followed. Of these 37 
reports, 27 (73%) had been dismissed by the prosecution authorities because of doubt 
concerning the defendant’s accountability, four were dismissed for other reasons (decision 
not to bring criminal charges), and six were sentenced (see Appendix III a-b). 
Concordance between screening and full reports regarding insanity by legal terms 
The agreement between the conclusion of psychosis for the screening and the full reports 
was 46%, kappa 0.25. Concerning unconsciousness, the agreement was 78% (kappa not 
applicable), though the agreement occurred mainly through negative conclusions since the 
diagnosis was uncommon. The agreement concerning severe mental retardation was 94% 
(kappa not applicable) for the same reasons as indicated with unconsciousness.  
Concerning psychosis, 33 of the screening reports concluded in doubt, while in the 
conclusion of the full reports, such doubt was only stated in one report. There was a high 
agreement (24 cases) among the reports with negative conclusions, i.e. no psychosis, and 
none of the negative conclusions in the screening reports concerning psychosis was 
overruled in the full reports. However, 10 of the positive psychosis conclusions in the 
screening reports were negative in the full reports, and doubt was expressed in the 18 
screening reports in contrast to none in the full reports.  
 
In conclusion, the four hypotheses of Study II were all supported: 1) Defendants accused 
of a serious offence were significantly associated with the instigation of a full report, 2) The 
severity of the offence was significantly associated with the prosecutor’s willingness to follow 
the recommendations of the screening reports, 3) Recommendation of a full report led the 
principals to instigate a request to conduct a full report, 4) There were differences between 
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the screening and full reports regarding the conclusions of insanity by legal terms, especially 
regarding psychosis. 
3.5. Study III: A study of claimed amnesia in homicide cases 
and how forensic psychiatric experts examine such 
claims (the amnesia paper) 
3.5.1. Background 
Some of the most complicated forensic psychiatric cases concern defendants who claim that 
they are unable to remember their alleged criminal act. How can the experts investigate the 
authenticity of such a claim?  
In homicide cases it is not uncommon for defendants to claim that they have lost all or 
most of their memories of their alleged crime, and several strategies and methods have been 
suggested in how to best assess claims of amnesia and whether the claim is genuine or not. 
According to the Norwegian Penal Code, the experts shall evaluate whether a defendant 
acted in a state of unconsciousness (see page 29) and not evaluate the amnesia per se. 
Nonetheless, the term amnesia will be used here since international literature commonly 
uses this term.  
To the best of my knowledge, there have been few if any studies which have evaluated 
the practice of experts assessing claimed amnesia in homicide cases. In other words, what 
sources they use to evaluate a case, and what type of instruments and methods they 
employ.  
Obtaining knowledge about the methodological basis behind the experts’ conclusions in 
amnesia cases could contribute to a discussion of how this should be done, thus leading to a 
more standardised procedure in this regard. 
3.5.2. Aims 
The aims of this study were: 1) To explore the circumstances of amnesia claims in a cohort 
of Norwegian defendants charged with homicide, and 2) To examine how forensic psychiatric 
experts methodically assess claimed amnesia in such defendants.  
3.5.3. Research questions and hypotheses 
What seems to characterise defendants (a Norwegian cohort) charged with homicide who 
claim amnesia for their crime? 2) How do forensic psychiatric experts methodically assess 
claimed amnesia in such defendants? 
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We hypothesised that the experts would: 1) Conduct two or more interviews with the 
defendant and collect supplementary information from third parties, and 2) Differ as to what 
type of methods they used based on a claim of amnesia or not, and that only in a very limited 
way would they apply personality, diagnostic, memory, neuropsychological/neurophysiologic 
(CT, Cat Scan, EEG, etc.) or other tests as a basis for their conclusions.  
3.5.4. Materials 
We made an application to the NMFB to obtain access to all Norwegian forensic psychiatric 
reports issued for the courts in the period from January 2002 to May 2007 pertaining to 
defendants charged with homicide, but only the original and not the supplementary reports 
were included (see page 16). The cohort consisted of a total of 105 reports, and none of the 
defendants had been convicted when the reports were issued. 
3.5.5. Methods 
Rating form  
I developed a structured rating form which was modified after a pilot testing in five reports 
with the help of Henning Værøy, MD, PhD. The form eventually consisted of 92 variables, 
which we divided into nine sections:  
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Table 3 - Content of rating form of Study III 
Variables Items 
1. Socio demographic: Age, sex, place of birth, education, 
employment, economy, partner relation, 
former contact with psychiatric health care, 
and previous sentences and forensic 
psychiatric examinations  
2. Observation setting: Dates for the alleged act and for the 
examination, and if the defendant agreed to 
participate or not 
3. Profession of experts: Psychiatrists, psychologists, team of 
different professionals 
4. Main conclusions of amnesia:  Total , partly or none  
5. Type of amnesia if present:  Organic, psychogenic (dissociative) or 
simulation 
6. More information on eventual amnesia: Former episodes of amnesia, substance 
abuse at the time of crime, sleep disorders 
or other organic factors 
7. Psychiatric/diagnostic evaluation: According to ICD-10 system if present 
8. Methods applied by the experts: Clinical interview, information from third 
parties, neuropsychological, personality and 
memory tests, screening devices, 
neurophysiologic tests (e.g. CT, Cat Scan, 
EEG) etc. 
9. Eventual comments from the NMFB: No comments, general comments or request 
for revision of conclusions 
 
For further details, see Appendix III. 
Værøy and I independently scored all the reports. In order to check the inter-rater 
reliability, both of us scored 12 reports related to the following three key variables: claimed 
amnesia for the act or not, if the claim was accepted by the experts, and the presumed main 
cause if valid amnesia was detected. If one of us had issued a report to the cohort, the other 
author would score it in order to avoid a potential selection bias in the scoring. 
 
 
 
55
Statistics  
The inter-rater reliability was estimated by kappa statistic. Continuous variables were 
analysed with a Mann-Whitney U-test (non-parametric). The categories of claimed amnesia 
(partial and total) versus non-claimed amnesia were analysed in 2 x 2 contingency tables 
with a Fisher’s exact test because of the small expected numbers in the cells. The level of 
statistical significance was set at p <.003 due to multiple comparisons based on Bonferroni’s 
correction, all tests were two-tailed, and the statistical analyses were carried out using SPSS 
version 15.0 software. 
3.5.6. Main results 
The main topic here was to investigate the characteristics of defendants who claimed partial 
or total amnesia and to explore how experts methodically assess claimed amnesia in 
homicide cases.  
Inter-rater reliability 
Whether the defendant had claimed amnesia for the act obtained a kappa of 0.75. There was 
complete agreement (kappa 1.00) between both raters as to whether the expert accepted the 
claim for amnesia as being valid or not, as well as concerning the eventual main cause of the 
amnesia. 
Socio-demographic and criminal profile of the cohort 
The mean age of the 102 defendants was 33 years (SD = 10.5), and 94 of the defendants 
were men and 8 were women. Seventy per cent were Norwegian citizens, and 55% had nine 
years of education or less. Sixty percent were single, 57% were unemployed, 51% had 
previous convictions, 11% had undergone a previous forensic examination, and a total of 
61% had former contact with the psychiatric health care system. 
Characteristics of the defendants claiming amnesia 
Of the 102 defendants, 26 claimed partial and 17 total amnesia for their alleged act, a total of 
43 defendants (42%). We found no significant differences concerning socio-demographic or 
criminal variables among those who claimed partial, total or those who had no claim at all. 
No significant differences concerning the same variables as previously listed were found 
when the group that claimed any type (i.e. total or partly) of amnesia was compared to the 
non-claim group. 
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Methods applied by the experts in assessing claimed amnesia 
We found no significant differences among the three amnesia groups, i.e. no claim, partial 
claim or total claim of amnesia as per the experts’ number of examinations (the experts had 
conducted at least two clinical interviews with the defendant in 90% of the cases and the 
mean of number of examinations was 3 – range 7, median 3), use of diagnostic instruments, 
neurophysiologic examinations, neuropsychological tests, memory tests or somatic 
examinations. Only one defendant with no claim of amnesia was given a memory test. 
When we tested the combined (total and partial) claims of amnesia group versus the 
group with no claims of amnesia, no significant differences emerged in the methods applied 
by the experts, and no significant differences were observed in the use of methods between 
the teams of two psychiatrists and the team of one psychiatrist and one psychologist. 
One report contained only information from the police documents, while 28 reports 
contained information from two sources: police documents and the clinical examination, and 
54 of the reports contained information from three sources: police documents, personal 
examination of the defendant, and information collected from third parties. Furthermore, 13 
reports used four sources/methods, five used five sources/methods, none used six of the 
sources/methods, and one used all seven methods listed. 
Accepted cases of amnesia 
The experts accepted that nine had partial but not total amnesia out of the 102 cases, which 
constituted 9% (95%CI 4.5-16.1%). Four of those claiming total and four of those claiming 
partial amnesia were accepted as being partially amnesic by the experts (Figure 1). One 
defendant was classified as partially amnesic due to intoxication from alcohol/drugs, although 
this defendant had made no amnesia claim. 
Figure 1 - Overview over the material and the different groups regarding claims 
of amnesia 
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Three of the nine reports concluding with amnesia received corrective comments from the 
NFMB, the quality control organ for all forensic reports issued in Norway. This was in 
contrast to the total cohort where such corrections were given in 17 of 93 (18%) cases (p = 
.37). 
Time span 
The mean time from when the alleged crime was committed to the first examination of the 
defendant by the experts was 193 days (SD 476, range 1 - 3987) (two cases were not 
registered). After omitting seven cases that were observed more than a year after the 
criminal act, the mean time was reduced to 91 days (SD 73, range 1 - 353). 
 
In conclusion, the hypotheses of Study III were partially confirmed: 1) In 90% of the 102 
cases, the experts had conducted at least two interviews with the defendants, and in 60%, 
they had collected supplementary information from third parties. 2) The experts hardly 
differed as far as what type of methods they used whether the defendant claimed amnesia or 
not. Only in a very limited way, did they apply personality, diagnostic, memory, neurological 
or other tests as a basis for their conclusions. However, using small groups will increase the 
risk of making Type II errors.  
3.6. Study IV: A comparative case vignette study of decision 
making in forensic psychiatric cases (the case vignette 
paper).
3.6.1. Background 
Up until the last four decades, the courts more or less uncritically accepted the psychiatric 
assessments of the experts. A growing body of criticism has emerged due to a presumed 
lack of reliability and validity of the conclusions made by the experts, a failure to meet 
scientific standards and a failure to follow established methods. As such, some authors have 
concluded that forensic psychiatric experts are prone to the same types of notions, heuristics 
and biases as non-experts. 
Despite this criticism, little empirical research has actually been conducted on the quality 
of the work done by the experts and the conclusions they have reached. Therefore, we 
wanted to empirically test one aspect of the criticism, namely that the judgments made by 
experts in regard to forensic issues hardly diverge from the judgments made by laypeople.  
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A forensic psychiatric assessment can be roughly divided into three phases: 1) Collection 
of data (obtaining documents, interviewing the defendant, etc.), 2) Assessments/judgments 
of the data, and 3) Presentation of the findings/conclusions based on data. This study 
concerns the second phase, namely that of assessing the data. 
To observe how professionals and laypeople judge the same forensic case vignettes may 
tell us how such judgments are done and if there are differences among the samples. Such 
knowledge may enable us to learn more about how experts in this special field can contribute 
to the legal process. 
3.6.2. Aims 
The aim of this study was to examine whether the judgments concerning forensic psychiatric 
case vignettes would be significantly different between laypeople and professionals and 
psychologists and psychiatrists.  
3.6.3. Research questions and hypotheses 
Would the judgements of the professionals, i.e. experts, (specialists in psychiatry and 
psychology) differ significantly from judgements made by laypeople based on the same case 
vignette material? Also, would the judgments made by forensic psychiatrists differed 
significantly from the judgments made by forensic psychologists? 
We held one hypothesis: There would be no significant differences among laypeople, 
psychiatrists and psychologists when they evaluate: a) insanity by legal terms, b) risk of 
crime recidivism, and c) need for psychiatric treatment.  
3.6.4. Materials 
In order to produce the case material, we were given access to the forensic psychiatric 
screening reports issued after 2002 at the Office for Forensic Psychiatry, and we chose 42 
reports. The reports were selected to find clear and/or prototypical descriptions of both 
positive and negative psychiatric and social histories as well as descriptions of both major 
and minor offences. We made such a selection because we wanted to see if there would be 
different judgments among psychiatrists, psychologists and laypeople based on whether 
case vignettes had a positive or negative description. 
I recruited psychiatrists and psychologists based on a list acquired from the NMFB of all 
acting experts who had issued at least one forensic court report in Norway since 2002. Of the 
82 experts invited, 51 (62%) responded and 37 (45%) agreed to participate. However, three 
experts who had agreed to participate never returned the questionnaire and the responses 
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from one expert could not be used due to incoherent answers. We managed to recruit two 
additional experts as replacements and ended up with 14 psychiatrists and 21 psychologists.  
We registered the following data for each expert: gender, age, the approximate number of 
forensic cases in their professional history as well as the number of cases over the last three 
years, whether they had obtained a doctoral degree, whether the psychologists had obtained 
a specialist degree, the number of years of professional experience, and the number of years 
as a specialist. 
We recruited a sample of 126 laypeople among lay judges in court cases in Oslo during 
the spring of 2008 with the help of two paid assistants. The assistants asked a random 
selection of lay judges whether they were willing to participate in a study of how laypeople 
evaluated descriptions of criminal offenders. We excluded psychologists, psychiatrists, 
judges, lawyers and police personnel from the sample, and the assistants kept recruiting until 
the aforementioned total of 126 laypeople was reached. Each lay judge rated one randomly 
selected vignette under the guidance of the assistants and received a lottery ticket as 
reward, and the gender, age, level of education, occupation and previous experience as a lay 
judge were registered.  
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3.6.5. Methods 
The design of the study is graphically presented in Figure 2: 
Figure 2 - Graphical presentation of the design of the case vignette study 
 
Validation of the case vignettes 
We extracted suitable descriptions from the reports to form anonymous and balanced sets of: 
1) A positive psychiatric history (lack of serious psychopathology, e.g. no reports of 
psychiatric treatment, generally healthy mental functioning, no reported serious psychiatric 
symptoms) and a negative psychiatric history (presence of serious psychopathology, e.g. 
hospitalised in a mental hospital, previous suicide attempts, psychotic symptoms), 2) A 
corresponding set of a positive social history (e.g. uncomplicated background, parent(s) 
present and caring, school years with no serious problems) and a negative social history 
(e.g. drug problems, alcoholic parents, juvenile delinquency, domestic violence), and 3) A set 
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of former convictions for minor crimes (e.g. driving under the influence, minor thefts) and 
serious crimes (e.g. homicide, rape, arson). 
We then transformed the 18 vignettes into an opposite description. In other words, 
positive psychiatric and social histories were transformed into negative ones, and vice versa, 
and serious offences into minor, thereby creating an alternate set of 18 vignettes based on 
the initial descriptions. By creating an alternative set of vignettes, we temporarily had a total 
of 36 vignettes (18 ordinary and 18 alternate ones).  
We examined the content validity of the vignettes by asking representatives of various 
professions such as psychiatric nurses, psychologists, psychiatrists, lawyers, and mercantile 
personnel from the staff at the Centre for Forensic Psychiatry at Oslo University Hospital to 
evaluate both sets of 18 cases. We established two groups with five persons in each group 
who evaluated the cases individually without contacting each other. They were asked to rate 
the vignettes according to what type (positive or negative psychiatric and social history or 
crimes (minor/serious)) they preferred. If the group unanimously rated a given case 
description as having a negative psychiatric history, we would choose this description as one 
of the validated negative psychiatric cases to be used in the study. If one or more of the five 
in the group rated the given case description as positive and the rest of the group rated it as 
negative, the description was rejected. Based on this feedback, we only selected cases 
which achieved a unanimous agreement in terms of positive/negative psychiatric and social 
history and minor/serious crime descriptions.  
The validation process concluded with a final set of 18 “definite case” vignettes without 
negative comments on a lack of clarity or coherence, which covered all possible 
combinations of elements. These vignettes were presented to the participants with a random 
case number, without any identification of the specific combination of psychiatric and social 
histories and minor/serious crimes present. 
The dependent variables 
We asked the participants to rate each case based on three outcome variables. The first 
variable was Insanity by Legal Terms (“insanity”) defined according to Norwegian Penal 
Code, Section 44 (see Section 2.1.3), and a brief definition of insanity was given on each 
rating form. The second variable was Risk of Repeated Offence (“risk”), defined as risk of 
committing a new criminal offence. The third variable was Need for Treatment (“treatment”) 
in psychiatric health care in the immediate future. 
Ratings of the variables were done on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (not present) to 7 
(present to a high degree), i.e. a higher scale score indicated more insanity, a higher risk and 
a higher need for treatment, respectively. We obtained three variable ratings from the 
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participants in each case, and also obtained ratings on 12 other related variables that will be 
analysed in a subsequent publication. 
Statistics 
The members of the professional group each rated multiple cases, so evaluations from the 
same individual were not independent. Because of this, we used the Linear Mixed Model 
(LMM) to analyse the data because this model is an extension of the standard regression 
model which allows multiple outcomes to be dependent.  
When we analysed, e.g. insanity, we treated this as the outcome variable and used the 
model to investigate how it was dependent on a) the participant group (layperson, 
psychologist, or psychiatrist), and b) case history components (negative or positive social 
history, negative or positive psychiatric history, minor or serious criminal offence), and risk 
and treatment were treated in a similar manner.  
All computations were performed using the R statistical software (R Development Core 
Team, 2004), with the significance level set to p <.05. 
3.6.6. Main results 
One noticeable difference is that the psychiatrist group had a much higher number of 
previous forensic cases than the psychologist group. The effect of experience cannot 
therefore be separated from the effects related to the differences in professional training.  
Age and gender (which were analysed together since separate analyses yielded no 
difference) of the raters were not, however, significantly related to any of the outcome 
variables, i.e. Insanity (p = .42), Risk (p = .20), and Need for Treatment (p = .15). With this in 
mind, we did find differences between the groups.  
Participant group differences 
We found differences between laypeople and experts on both Insanity (p = .008), Risk (p = 
.024) and Need for Treatment, (p = .009). On average, the laypeople rated all variables 
higher than the experts, i.e. they considered the case vignettes as being more Insane, having 
more Risk and more Need for Treatment. 
There were no significant differences between the psychiatrists and psychologists 
concerning Insanity (p = .28), but they differed in their judgments on Risk (p = .030) and 
Need for Treatment (p = .021), as the psychologists gave higher ratings than the 
psychiatrists on these two variables. 
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Insanity 
The groups evaluated Insanity differently (p = .025). Laypeople rated insanity significantly 
different from the experts (p = .008), while the difference between the psychiatrists and 
psychologists was not significant (p = .276).  
The average rating by laypeople was 3.13, which was somewhat higher than the 
psychiatrists and psychologists, who scored in a similar manner, approximately 2.4 on 
average. Case descriptions with a described negative Psychiatric History received ratings 
which on average were 1.54 points higher than cases with a positive Psychiatric History. The 
difference between case descriptions with a negative and positive Social History was small, 
only 0.14 and a serious offence resulted in a 1 point higher rating than in cases where the 
offence was minor.  
Risk 
There were significant differences among the three groups (p = .003) concerning Risk. 
Laypeople and experts rated Risk differently (p = .024), while the psychiatrists and 
psychologists also rated differently from each other (p = .030) on this variable.  
The average Risk ratings from laypeople were the highest (i.e. more risk) of the three 
groups. The corresponding average rating of the psychiatrists was considerably lower 
regarding Risk, with the psychologists’ ratings in between. Furthermore, on average, cases 
with a negative and positive Psychiatric History were rated similarly. Cases with a negative 
Social History yielded mean ratings approximately 1.3 points higher than cases with a 
positive Social History, and on average, a severe criminal offence produced evaluations 
roughly 1.4 points higher than a minor offence.  
Need for Treatment 
There were a significant difference in the mean scores among the three groups with respect 
to the Need for Treatment ratings (p = .004), and the ratings from the laypeople were 
significantly higher than those of the experts concerning the Need for Treatment (p = .009). 
The psychiatrists and psychologists also rated Need for Treatment differently (p = .021), and 
the psychologists gave higher ratings than the psychiatrists on this variable. 
The laypeople gave the highest mean ratings regarding Need for Treatment, and the 
psychiatrists giving the lowest ratings. Cases with a negative Psychiatric History were given 
considerably higher mean ratings than cases with a positive history, with a difference of 
about 3 points. On average, cases with a negative Social History were rated somewhat 
higher than cases with a positive Social History, and a Serious Criminal Offence produced an 
average evaluation about 1.3 points higher than a minor offence. 
 
 
 
 
64 
In conclusion, our hypothesis was not confirmed. There were significant differences in the 
judgments of the case vignettes between laypeople and forensic experts (psychologists and 
psychiatrists) in their judgements concerning: a) Insanity, b) Risk and the c) Need for 
Treatment. There were significant differences between the laypeople and the professionals in 
all three outcome variables, but no significant differences between the psychiatrists and the 
psychologists regarding insanity, although there were significant differences between the two 
groups regarding risk and treatment. 
3.7. Ethics 
For Study I, approval and access was granted by the NMFB in Norway and the Norwegian 
Department of Justice. In Denmark, approval and access was granted by the NMFB and the 
Danish Department of Justice. In Sweden, we contacted Sten Levander, MD, PhD, head of 
the Forensic Psychiatric Clinic of Malmö who granted us the permission and necessary help 
to obtain relevant reports. It was not clear to us, however, if he sought or received approval 
from the Swedish Department of Justice. 
The National Data Inspectorate approved of Studies II and III, while the Directorate of 
Public Prosecution granted permission to study the screening reports in Study II. In addition, 
we were granted exemption from a declaration of non-disclosure of confidential information 
for research purposes from the Justice Department concerning Study II, and none of the 
defendants were informed that their reports were used for the research described in this 
thesis.  
All the respondents in Study IV gave their informed consent to take part. 
The studies for this thesis were approved by The Regional Committee for Research 
Ethics of Health Region East. 
3.8. General Discussion 
3.8.1. General methodological issues 
The aim of this thesis was to conduct an analysis of forensic psychiatric practices, methods 
and judgment processes as is primarily performed in Norway. This was done with regard to 
setting, verifiability, methods, premises stated in the forensic reports and judgement 
processes in forensic experts versus laypeople. To fulfil this aim, four studies were 
conducted. Studies I - III were quite similar in design and use of methods and will therefore 
be discussed together, whereas Study IV will be discussed separately. 
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3.8.2. Design issues 
Since at the time of inception we could not find any studies that had previously empirically 
studied the aims of Papers I - III, we had to develop relevant rating forms for each of the 
three studies. These forms had a common aim, namely to convert data extracted from the 
text of the reports into unambiguous numbers for quantitative analyses. Positive statements 
in the forensic psychiatric reports pertaining to: 1) Basic demographical, psychiatric and 
criminological data on the defendant, 2) Observational settings, and 3) Content such as 
length of the reports and the premises for the conclusions all received their unique numbers. 
Each form was developed based on a combination of experiences with forensic work and 
the need to obtain relevant data in order to elucidate the problems raised in each study. 
Drafts of the forms were made and revised several times after discussions with colleagues 
and supervisors. The testing of a new questionnaire should go through several phases of 
pilot trials and feedback in order to secure reliability and validity, but such testing was not 
done with these forms which must be considered a major weakness of design concerning 
Papers I - III. On the one hand, most of the information collected with these forms had a 
factual character that described time, procedures, places of examination and so on. Few 
data demanded interpretation or value judgments from the rater, while on the other hand, the 
rater eventually was not free of interpretation bias. As a result, the major conclusions and 
most important information were checked by two raters, their inter-rater reliability coefficients 
were calculated, and these coefficients showed satisfactory findings. However, the samples 
were small, so the reliability calculation showed a wide confidence interval. The problem of 
small sample sizes, low statistical power, and the risk of Type II errors are discussed below. 
The rating form of Paper I should cover the methods used in Sweden, Denmark and 
Norway, although my lack of detailed knowledge about the practices of Sweden and 
Denmark could cause the risk of leaving out relevant information. In Studies II and III, this 
was not much of a problem since I had issued numerous screening and full reports and was 
very familiar with their content.  
Study IV was based on the design of a study by Jackson (1986), but her design was 
adapted and extended for the Norwegian court settings. Jackson included fitness to stand 
trial, insanity, dangerousness, need for treatment, criminal responsibility and the prediction of 
future offences as outcome or dependent variables. In our study, we only included three 
outcome variables: Insanity, Risk and Need for Treatment, and we also made the case 
vignettes somewhat longer than those done by Jackson. We considered the fact that her 
vignettes were somewhat lacking in the necessary information, and that more information 
would demand more cognitive processing from the participants. In addition, longer case 
vignettes could better reflect the “real world” (that is, most forensic cases usually contain a lot 
 
 
 
66 
of information) and consequently initiate a more realistic judgment process among the 
participants.  
Our design also differed from that of Jackson since we included psychologists instead of 
judges. The main design challenge of Study IV was to make case vignettes which contained 
the necessary and sufficient amount of information in a form by which the values of the cases 
(positive/negative, social and psychiatric history and serious/minor crime) would be clear and 
easily understood. We used pilot testing of the vignettes with personnel at our centre with a 
variable professional background in order to reach this goal, and their feedback led to 
modification of the vignettes. 
3.8.3. Validity issues 
Internal validity 
Internal validity is defined as the extent to which a study is representative of a particular 
group of individuals being studied. The degree to which a study’s results can be generalised 
to other individuals or settings reflects its external validity, and representativeness, possible 
bias and confounding factors could affect internal validity (Friis & Vaglum, 1999; Benestad & 
Laake, 2004).  
Bias can be defined as the result of systematic error in the design or conduct of a study. 
Systematic error results from flaws in either the methods of selection of the study participants 
or in the procedures for gathering relevant exposure and/or disease information. A 
consequence of a bias may be that the observed study results will tend to differ from the true 
(“real world”) results. This tendency towards erroneous results is called bias (Szklo & Nieto, 
2004). Systematic error (bias) needs to be distinguished from random sampling error due to 
the variability which results from the use of samples to estimate the study parameters in the 
reference population. The sample estimates may differ substantially from the true parameters 
because of random error, so if our samples are different from their populations in a 
systematic way, then we have caused a bias in the samples. There are various types of bias 
that can occur which need to be discussed in relation to our samples.  
Selection bias is in operation if we intentionally or without realizing it select patients and 
controls that systematically differ from their populations. The reports examined in Paper I are 
samples drawn from the respective population of defendants charged with attempted 
homicide or homicide in Norway, Sweden and Denmark. I had quite specific inclusion criteria 
for the reports required, but given the small sample size the representativeness of the 
collected reports is uncertain. As a consequence of that, a selection bias concerning the 
selection of the reports cannot be ruled out (see limitations under Section 3.8.4, page 73). 
We have further discussed selection bias in the Danish sample of Paper I, since originally, 
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only cases from Copenhagen were considered. To what extent the sample selected by 
Professor Levander had a bias concerning defendants from Sweden in Paper I should have 
been explored, but this has not been done.  
By including all screening reports in Paper II and all amnesia cases in Paper III, the risk 
of selection bias was negligible in those studies. 
In Study IV, we obtained laypeople serving as lay judges in Oslo courthouse. The 
procedure for approaching lay judges in Norway was done randomly in order to obtain a 
representative sample of “laypeople”. However, not all people can be appointed to serve as 
lay judges. People with any former jail sentences, drug addicts, the mentally retarded, etc. 
will not be appointed, which can be seen as a selection bias regarding the entire population 
of Norway. On the other hand, the sample is probably representative of appointed lay judges, 
except from a geographical perspective, since our laypeople sample came from the Oslo 
region and not other parts of the country.  
The psychiatrists were chosen from a list obtained from the NMFB and were experts 
known to have conducted forensic examinations. The psychologists were also chosen from 
the same list, although they had less experience than the psychiatrists in regard to the 
number of forensic examinations. The psychologists had a median of 10 cases, range 1–350, 
compared to the psychiatrists’ 100 cases, range 5–1087, so the psychiatrists were much 
more forensically experienced. Yet, this professional difference cannot be considered as a 
selection bias, but rather as a confounder that eventually should be controlled for in the 
statistical analyses.  
Information bias is regularly understood in two ways. The first is in terms of wrong 
information about the defendants. All (Norwegian) defendants subjected to forensic 
examination have been identified in the official register of the NBMD as suspected of 
homicide. Now, since they had not been convicted, a selection bias may have occurred since 
some of the defendants were innocent and did not belong in the sample of persons who had 
committed homicide. A re-examination of whether the defendants were considered innocent 
by the court would only have been possible by obtaining the court verdicts from various parts 
of the country, and some of the cases could have also been dismissed by the prosecution 
authorities. It is therefore questionable whether such re-examinations were even possible. 
The second understanding of information bias is systematic deviations in relation to key 
information given by the participants. Key information in this thesis concerns the positively 
stated information which has been written down in the screening and full reports, though we 
cannot be assured of the validity of the information that the experts issuing these reports 
have put into them. According to Wettstein (2005), the forensic report is only a “window” into 
the evaluation that has occurred. Hence, what is recorded in the reports may differ from what 
actually took place. The risk of information bias is considerable simply because for various 
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reasons, some of the experts might have omitted (important) information or misinterpreted 
some of the data in the cases. 
Since the same case vignettes were used for both laypeople and experts, there is no 
information bias in Study IV.  
Interpretation bias concerns the raters’ understanding of what has been written in the 
reports and our check for this bias are the measures of inter-rater reliability.  
In Paper I, we obtained a Pearson’s correlation of r = 0.83, 0.95, 0.61 and overall r = 
0.83, respectively, (see page 45) which reflects a large positive correlation. In Study II, the 
kappas were 0.88, 1.00 and 056 (see page 50) regarding the three variables checked, and 
the agreement varied from moderate to (almost) perfect. In Study III, we obtained a kappa of 
0.75, 1.00 and 1.00 for the three variables we checked (see page 55). 
The experts’ interpretation of observed and reported psychopathology is an important 
source of bias that we are unable to evaluate, as one possible source of random error 
concerns the entire transformation process. Studies I - III were all based on register data, i.e. 
we read, analysed and scored the forensic reports. After we read them, we transformed their 
content into data in the forms. Some of the reports were of considerable length, and some 
were quite difficult to comprehend in order to locate the relevant information we were 
interested in. Ellingsen, who studied all reports from 1980, stated that: “Some reports are 
difficult to read. They could have a long and an indefinite start. They can be unclear or 
organised in an unusual way”, and: “Unfortunately, there are also many reports which are so 
badly edited, that they are almost impossible to navigate through” (Ellingsen 1987, p. 11, my 
translation). In some cases, this was a problem for our studies as well, and this may have led 
to random rather than systematic errors in the scoring process. 
In Study IV, we run the risk of interpretation bias since the case vignettes had only brief 
descriptions of social and psychiatric background and crimes committed, possibly creating an 
opening for different interpretations. However, this was only an eventuality among the 
experts who rated several vignettes because among the laypeople who only rated one 
vignette each, the error could only be random.  
Availability bias is a human cognitive bias which causes people to systematically 
overestimate probabilities of events associated with memorable or vivid occurrences. In 
Study IV, all groups systematically gave higher insanity ratings of vignettes with serious 
crimes in comparison to minor crimes, which might reflect an availability bias connecting 
crime and insanity, perhaps intensified by media coverage. 
 
The term confounding refers to a situation in which an association between a given 
exposure and an outcome variable is observed as the result of a third variable (or group of 
variables), usually designed as a confounding variable, or merely a confounder. The 
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confounding variable is causally associated with the outcome and non-causally or causally 
associated with the exposure, but is not an intermediate variable (mediator) in the causal 
pathway between exposure and outcome. The common cofounders in this thesis are age, 
gender and level of education, and we checked and eventually adjusted for all these 
variables in all the studies.  
External validity  
External validity involves generalisations, i.e. external validity is the degree to which the 
conclusions in a study would hold for other persons in other places and at other times.  
In Study I, we chose homicide/attempted homicide as an index crime, and in Study III, we 
only chose reports with homicide as the index crime. The reason for this was that homicide of 
course is one of the most serious crimes to be accused of anywhere in the world. Even so, 
from an international perspective, the annual rate of homicides has been stable over the last 
10 years at approximately 40 in Norway (0.91 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2002) which is quite 
low (in Finland about 160 homicides take place annually, which yields approximately 3.2 per 
100 000), so those charged of homicide in Norway may therefore differ from those in other 
countries and cultures. Given the seriousness of such a crime and the eventual long 
sentence that ensues if the defendant is found guilty, we presumed that the forensic experts 
would apply the best methods available (“peak performance”) in order to reach valid 
conclusions of their examinations. Focusing on homicide also gave us the opportunity to 
compare the methods used when the experts assessed the same type of serious crime, and 
yet another reason to choose homicide as index crime was that a homicide is legally clear to 
interpret since a charge of homicide will imply that a very serious act has occurred – a 
person has died. Attempted homicide on the other hand is not so easy. Attempted homicide 
could be interpreted by prosecutors as an assault, actual bodily harm, or as an attempted 
homicide. Inclusion of attempted homicide would have enlarged our sample size, but the 
ambiguity would (in Study III) reduce our opportunities to investigate the possible 
characteristics of defendants claiming a loss of memory for an alleged homicidal act. In 
addition, several international studies have used homicide as an index crime in claimed 
amnesia, thus making it natural to choose reports with homicide as index crime for the sake 
of comparison. 
The external validity of our findings in Paper III might possibly be reduced since we 
cannot automatically make generalisations in forensic examinations for defendants of other 
serious crimes such as armed robbery, rape or attempted homicide. Nevertheless, such a 
reduction of validity is probably not likely since we examine the procedures for a forensic 
examination, which should be quite similar as it concerns all types of serious crimes.  
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Study I demonstrated that there were considerable differences among Norway, Sweden 
and Denmark in terms of procedures and work methods concerning forensic reports, which 
has to do with established administrative traditions and lawmaking in these countries. The 
fact that countries which have so much in common differ to such an extent shows that 
external validity across countries and jurisdictions is a definite challenge in forensic 
psychiatry. For that reason, we are of the opinion that external validity in such matters is 
mainly limited to within each country.  
In Study II we chose only screening reports issued at the Office for Forensic Psychiatry, 
Oslo Police Department. As far as we know, screening reports are made in about the same 
way all over Norway according to established rules and jurisdiction, so there is reason to 
consider strong external validity in relation to our findings here.  
In Study III, we chose all reports concerning homicide in the period from 2002 – May 
2007. This constituted a complete coverage of the cases in question which were forensically 
assessed in Norway in that period, due to the good quality of the register of NMFB, thereby 
indicating that our findings probably give a reliable picture of the current methods applied by 
the experts in Norway. 
In Study IV, all the cases were originally drawn from psychiatric screening reports issued 
at the Office for Forensic Psychiatry to constitute “real” forensic cases which we later 
transformed into prototypical cases, and all of them contained different information regarding 
social and psychiatric history and the crime committed. Our vignettes are at the disposal of 
other researchers who want to replicate our study or use them in an alternative design. 
Consequently, the external validity must be considered to be good. 
Support for the validity of our results would come from the replication of our research 
design with other samples drawn from the same population, or from other researchers 
conducting the same studies on different samples. However, the first three papers of this 
thesis have been based on themes in which we lack comparable studies, and support from 
similar results in other studies cannot be drawn on to support the validity of our findings. So 
the conclusion of our studies is that they may have both considerable internal validity, and to 
a variable degree, external validity as well within Norway.  
Statistical issues 
The small sample size in Study I give an apparent risk of Type II errors, i.e. significant 
differences do not materialise as they would in a larger sample. Nonetheless, we found that 
significant differences should be considered as robust considering the sample size, and we 
used Pearson’s correlation coefficient r as a measure for inter-rater reliability. In hindsight, 
we consider this a limitation since it does not consider differences in variance, and only 
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measures association and not agreement. Instead, we should have used the kappa or 
intraclass correlation statistics for testing inter-rater reliability. 
In Study II, we had a considerable sample size (n = 419) which provided adequate 
statistical power for the analyses. We were therefore able to draw conclusions without having 
to consider Type II statistical errors. 
In Study III, we had 102 reports concerning homicide cases. The level of statistical 
significance was set at p <.003 due to multiple comparisons based on Bonferroni’s 
correction, so the risk of spuriously significant associations was thereby virtually eliminated. 
No significant differences were observed when comparing the amnesia claiming group with 
the group that made no such claim. These findings may reflect the truth, but may also be due 
to Type II errors which is the price paid for not making Type I errors since these two types of 
statistical errors are related.  
One example which illustrates that a larger cohort has found differences is the study done 
by Häkkänen et al. (2008). They had a cohort of 656 Finnish homicide convicts and found 
several significant differences in the characteristics of those who claimed vs. no claim of 
amnesia (see page 33). On the other hand, such a large cohort may produce Type I errors 
with spuriously significant differences. 
In Study IV, we used the Linear Mixed Model (LMM) since the experts each rated multiple 
cases and evaluations from the same individual were not independent, while the LMM allows 
multiple outcomes to be dependent. We found significant differences among the three 
groups, although we also found that the different groups rated the cases differently according 
to the descriptions given. Hence, we found interaction effects, but there were individual 
configurations for each case, and it is difficult to grasp the actual interpretations of the 
interactions. The statistical analysis was carried out by Joseph Sexton, MS, PhD.  
3.8.4. Discussion of specific results 
The comparison study 
Main findings to be discussed:  
A comparison of the three countries revealed differences concerning forensic psychiatry in 
organisation, legislation and the setting of the observation. As far as the methods used, it 
was found that Swedish, and to some extent Danish experts had a more frequent use of 
tests and instruments as a supplement to the clinical interview than Norwegian experts (p 
<.001). The time span from the committed crime to the finished forensic report was a mean 
of 73 days in Sweden, 120 in Denmark and 190 in Norway (p <.003). Sweden also had the 
longest sections of discussion in their reports compared to Denmark and Norway (p <.001). 
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Discussion:  
The fact that Swedish experts applied more tests than their Scandinavian colleagues is a 
reflection that almost all Swedish defendants are examined while being inpatients in a 
forensic clinic (where examinations are made by teams of psychiatrists, psychologists, 
nurses, and other relevant professionals) for four weeks. Thus, the experts will have both 
more time and better settings for more extensive testing. The Danish experts will also have 
this opportunity when the observation takes place within a hospital setting or at a clinic 
(perhaps outpatient) like the Clinic of Forensic Psychiatry in Copenhagen. The Norwegian 
experts observe defendants at various places such as at the defendant’s home, in prisons 
etc., which does not allow for the best opportunities for conducting time consuming and 
concentration demanding tests.  
In half of the Danish reports, it was not stated where the examination took place. The 
reason for registering this variable was to check the verifiability of the reports, i.e. what was 
stated regarding the framework conditions behind the issued reports, which can be of great 
interest for the legal parties in the court proceedings. Under what conditions did the 
examination take place, and were these conditions sufficient for a thorough and optimal 
examination of the defendant? Since half of the Danish reports missed were lacking this 
information, they may be somewhat less verifiable in this respect than the reports from 
Norway and Sweden.  
 
The reason for registering the time span from the crime to the finished forensic report was 
to check the circulation time of the cases in the medico-legal context of these countries. Too 
long of a time span could imply more recall problems for the defendant, which is considered 
essential information for the forensic examination. The mean time in Norway of 190 days 
(more than half a year) intuitively seems “too long”, and may make information based on 
memory less valid, and conclusions about criminal insanity at the time of the crime will also 
suffer from long time spans such as the Norwegian one. 
An explanation for this variation in time from committed crime to finished report could be 
the different organisation of the police investigation routines, court systems, etc. within the 
respective countries. Another explanation could also be the circumstances related to the 
homicide in question. In some homicides, the defendant is obvious and immediately caught, 
while in other cases the criminal investigation goes on for a long time before the suspect is 
arrested, so it is reasonable to state that the time from arrest to finished report would be of 
importance. 
The time also varied from the experts’ first meeting with the defendant to the finished 
report, but this time span was not registered in the Swedish reports. Still, in most cases, 
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Swedish defendants are examined on an inpatient basis for four weeks in specialised 
forensic clinics as a standard procedure, meaning that the time span is less relevant to 
register. The reason why the Norwegian experts used a longer period of time to deliver 
finished reports than the Danes is not known, though the Danish forensic psychiatric system 
seems to be somewhat more organised than their Norwegian counterpart. For instance, 
some Danish counties have specialised forensic psychiatric clinics such as the one 
mentioned in Copenhagen, leading one to speculate that this mode of organisation could 
increase the effectiveness in relation to the circulation time of each case.  
The Swedish reports contained longer sections of discussion than the Danish and 
Norwegian ones, which mean at best, this indicates that Swedish reports are more thorough 
in discussing the premises for their conclusions. However, this must be labelled as “soft data” 
since there might be numerous reasons that Swedish reports contain longer chapters with 
discussion about font type, margins, line spacing, tradition, etc, and counting pages is 
probably not a very valid way of examining forensic reports. 
Limitations 
As previously mentioned, the study has a small sample size and there is a risk of Type II 
errors.  
The reports were selected by others (in Denmark, the Clinic of Forensic Psychiatry and 
the DNMFB; in Norway, the NMFB and in Sweden the National Board of Medico-legal Affairs, 
see page 44). Although the reports are based on a set of clear criteria, I cannot rule out a 
selection bias because those who selected them may have chosen reports which they felt 
had a very high quality since they would be included in a Scandinavian study.  
Another eventual limitation is whether the study, as mentioned on page 69 under external 
validity, is representative. The sample included 60 evaluated forensic reports from the period 
from 1999-2001. Approximately 550-600 reports are issued every year in each of the 
Scandinavian countries studied in this thesis. This is equal to a total of about 5,000 reports 
issued over a three-year period, thus our sample covers about 1.2% (60/5,000) of the total 
number of issued reports, and in this study, I only registered cases of males charged with 
homicide or attempted homicide. To further illustrate: 285 ordinary reports were issued in 
Norway in 1999, and 44 of them were concerning charges of homicide/attempted homicide 
which represents 15% of all forensic reports issued that year, with the same figure for 2000 
also at 15%. In 1999 and 2000, the corresponding figures for Sweden were 16.5% and 18%, 
respectively, while we lack data from Denmark. This means that approximately 85% of the 
Norwegian and 83% of the Swedish forensic reports did not concern charges of homicide or 
attempted homicide in these years, so the findings from the forensic reports for these crimes 
might not be representative of the other reports. It could however be argued that reports 
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concerning homicide and attempted homicide may tap the “peak performance” of the experts 
since such cases are the most serious and often imply extensive coverage in the media. 
I did not register the type of homicide, i.e. whether it was planned/instrumental (see page 
34) or committed in a strong affect/intoxicated state by alcohol or other substances. 
Consequently, the time span registered (between committed crime and finished report) can 
be a result of technical aspects of the investigation. That is to say, a difference in time span 
between the countries could to a certain degree be explained by different types of homicide. 
I registered “methods used” for forensic examination (Table 3 in Paper I), though I only 
registered methods which I presumed would be commonly known and eventually applied 
such as SCID I and II, GAF, WAIS, etc. As a result, the most frequently used method was 
named “other” (14 in Denmark, 5 in Norway 17 in Sweden), which could imply that some 
methods could have been missed by my lack of detailed knowledge of the applied methods 
in Denmark and Sweden.  
Given these limitations, Paper I can only present hypotheses related to the quality of 
Scandinavian forensic reports as to defendants charged with homicide or attempted 
homicide. 
The screening report study 
Main findings to be discussed:  
The severity of the crime, i.e. especially homicide and attempted homicide (p <.001) and a 
positive recommendation stated in the screening report, (p <.001) compared to an open 
recommendation, characterised the defendants who had a full report after a screening report. 
We found that 50% of the 118 screening reports which recommended a full report were 
followed by the prosecution authorities. In a follow-up analysis undertaken in October 2009, 
we found that of the 118 positive recommendations, 81 (69%) had led to a full report, and a 
non-recommendation of a full report was followed-up in 98% of the cases. Among the 181 
reports without a clear recommendation, 16% were followed-up by a full report. The 
concordance between screening and full reports on insanity by law was 46% regarding 
psychosis, 78% regarding unconsciousness and 94% regarding mental retardation. 
Discussion:  
The principals almost always followed the advice not to initiate a full report. The use of 
screening reports may be seen as a way of speeding up the criminal proceedings in a case, 
i.e. not initiating a full report which takes time and/or to save money. When the 
recommendation from the provisional report is to not instigate a full report, this might be a 
readily taken indication that there is no doubt concerning the legal sanity of the defendant. 
Hence, there will be no need for a (time consuming) full report. Another interpretation is that 
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the prosecutors themselves did not find any considerable psychopathology in the defendant, 
much the same as the experts doing the screening reports.  
After the first round of analysis, the impression would appear to be that the principals 
found screening reports with “positive” recommendations, that is, they were advised to 
initiate a full report of moderate use, but they only followed 50% of the positive 
recommendations.  
Twenty of the 59 cases with a recommendation for a full report were not prosecuted 
further, meaning that the prosecutors stopped the case according to code 065, (see page 48) 
because of doubt concerning the defendant’s sanity by legal terms. This implies that positive 
recommendations led the prosecutors to stop the case and not prosecute it any further, and 
32 of the cases had not been finalised with indictments at the time of our study.  
An updated analysis, including the 32 formerly undecided cases given in Paper II was 
conducted in October 2009. Of the 118 positive recommendations of the screening reports, 
81 (69%) were followed. Of the 37 cases in which the positive recommendation had not been 
followed by the prosecution authorities, 27 cases (23%) had not been prosecuted further due 
to doubt concerning the legal sanity of the defendant. 
This implies that the conclusions in the screening reports seem to be quite useful for the 
prosecutors, which is in contrast to our statement in the Paper II. In other words, the 
prosecutors apparently found the positive recommendations useful since they followed the 
advice in a clear majority of the cases. A positive recommendation seems to then function as 
both an instigation for a full report and as an instigation to stop further prosecution of the 
case due to doubt regarding the legal sanity of the defendant – especially if the crime in 
question was minor.  
There is a concern that 181 (43%) of the screening reports had an “open conclusion”, 
though an open conclusion does not seem to fulfil the need of the principals for a conclusion 
in regard to legal sanity. One possible explanation for the high number of “open conclusions” 
could be that the expert took this to be a code for a negative conclusion/recommendation 
and implicitly believed that the principals would understand this code. 
This point came to light in a personal communication with the head of the Office for 
Forensic Psychiatry, chief psychiatrist Stein E. Ikdahl, MD. Perhaps there is a need for a 
change in the practices of the office, i.e. to state a clearer and more explicit recommendation 
in all the reports, which might increase the utility of the screening reports for the principals. 
The agreement between the screening reports and the full reports in terms of psychosis 
was quite low, which could put into question the validity of the screening reports. Still, one 
factor might lessen these concerns. None of the negative conclusions regarding psychosis 
was overruled by a positive conclusion in the full reports, i.e. there were few false negative 
diagnoses of psychosis in the screening reports, thereby using the full reports as the “gold 
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standard”. In fact, the screening reports did produce more false positive conclusions when 
the full reports are used as the gold standard. However, the screening reports produced no 
false negatives when we used the conclusions of the full reports as the gold standard, which 
implies that the screening reports fulfilled their task as a practical screening device. A few 
defendants might get their cases incorrectly dismissed due to doubt regarding their legal 
sanity based on a screening report, although that probably only occurs when the crime is of a 
minor nature.  
Limitations 
In Study II, we only chose screening reports issued at the Office for Forensic Psychiatry in 
Oslo. Despite our stretched deduction that screening reports are made in about the same 
way in Norway, we did not examine this, and despite the regulations in the CPA, established 
rules and jurisdiction could imply that screening reports issued by other police departments 
diverge somewhat from those issued at the Oslo Police Department, which can be 
considered as a limitation of the representativeness of this study. On the other hand, it is a 
problem to obtain screening reports from other parts of the country because that there are no 
similar forensic psychiatry offices in other police districts in Norway. We could have asked 
each district if they happened to store their screening reports, but it would be quite dubious if 
that were the case. 
Another limitation is the inter-rater reliability values observed between Dr. Ikdahl and 
myself on the main conclusions of the screening reports. Our agreement was kappa 0.56, 
with a kappa of 0.41 - 0.60 considered as being in moderate agreement. We had expected a 
higher agreement on this issue and found that we had a somewhat different interpretation of 
what constituted a clear conclusion/recommendation. The 30 reports were rescored after we 
agreed that only explicitly stated conclusions in the reports should be regarded as a positive 
or negative recommendation. However, we did not conduct a new inter-rater study, so we do 
not know whether our new procedure actually increased our inter-rater reliability or not. In 
hindsight, we should have conducted a new inter-rater study, but this was not done. 
The amnesia study 
Main findings to be discussed:
In the 102 homicide cases, 26 defendants claimed partial and 17 claimed total amnesia. We 
observed no significant differences in the characteristics of the defendants among the partial, 
total and no amnesia claiming groups. There were also no significant differences observed 
among the three amnesia groups with concern to the experts’ application of diagnostic 
instruments, neurophysiologic examinations, neuropsychological tests, memory tests or 
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somatic examinations. Only one defendant - with no claim of amnesia - had a memory test, 
and the procedures and content of the experts’ examination were no different in cases with 
claims of partial or total amnesia. 
Discussion:  
The lack of significant characteristics for the defendants claiming partial or total amnesia for 
their alleged act comes as no surprise since other studies have come up with mixed results 
when trying to identify such characteristics. Previous studies (see Section 2.6.2) have found 
that those claiming amnesia have a lower IQ, more pathological personality traits (hysterical 
traits), more mental disorders, more prior convictions and were older than the non-claimers. 
The only finding that has gained some support is that amnesiacs are older than those making 
no claim of amnesia, and there are apparently no clear characteristics of defendants who 
claim partial or total amnesia for alleged homicide. It seems then that dynamic variables 
(factors characterised by continuous change, activity or progress) are more influential or 
decisive for a claim of amnesia in homicide cases. Substance abuse and the homicide being 
“proximate”, i.e. very physically close to the victim such as a stabbing or strangulation, 
relational closeness of the victim, etc., seem to be significant factors in relation to a claim of 
amnesia. We could therefore speculate if it is futile to search for specific characteristics of 
defendants claiming amnesia, though a more valid approach could be to look for dynamic 
and social factors leading up to a claim of amnesia. 
The experts were quite thorough in interviewing the defendant. That is, in 90% of the 102 
cases, the experts had conducted at least two interviews with the defendant. In 
approximately two-thirds of the cases, they had also collected information from third parties, 
but there were few other supplementary methods. Though the experts accepted a few claims 
of amnesia (9/43, 21%) as being genuine, and then only as partial amnesia, none of the 
defendants were actually tested in order to find evidence of simulation of the alleged 
amnesia. According to Christianson et al. (2007), an expert will only be able to identify 
simulators by the use of tests and structured interviews that focus on specific memory 
characteristics. There may be several reasons for the low proportion of test applications 
observed in our study. First, both in Norway and the other Nordic countries, there seems to 
be no established tradition for the use of tests as part of a standard forensic psychiatric 
examination (Grøndahl, 2005). Second, we find that forensic textbooks seldom give good 
recommendations as to how to make assessments of claimed amnesia in defendants. Third, 
the settings of the observation may be suboptimal, e.g. in the defendant’s home, visiting 
rooms in prisons and so on. Fourth, the experts making forensic assessments are mainly 
psychiatrists without sufficient psychometric expertise to employ the relevant test, although 
such competence will vary, and fifth, during the examination in court, some experts may 
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consider it easier to defend no use of tests rather than being exposed to tricky questions 
from lawyers about the validity and reliability of such tests.  
In reality, there is a vast array of tests, inventories, etc. which can be used in addition to 
the more traditional methods for the assessment of the validity of claimed amnesia, and 10 
examples of such instruments are given in Table 4: 
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Table 4 - Ten examples of instruments that could help experts in detecting 
possible memory disorders or the deliberate feigning of mental and/or memory 
disorders.
NAME REFERENCE TARGET VARIABLE ADMINISTRATION TESTED
PSYCHOMETRIC 
PROPERTIES
APPLIED IN 
MATERIAL 
(N)
DESa (Bernstein & 
Putnam, 1986) 
(Carlson et al., 
1993) 
Dissociative 
symptoms and 
disorders 
Self-report 
measure 
Yes 
Se=76% 
Sp=85% 
No 
GKTb (Iacono & 
Patrick, 2008; 
Jelicic & 
Merckelbach, 
2007) 
Memory 
malingering (i.e. to 
obtain what the 
defendant knows of 
a crime) 
Lie 
detection/polygr
aph 
Unknown No 
MMPI-2c (Sweet et al., 
2008; Rogers et 
al., 2003) 
General 
psychopathology, 
validity scales and 
profiles (fake 
good/bad) 
Test/self-report 
measure 
Yes 
Se & Sp only 
on different 
subscales  
Yes (6) 
RMFITd (Jelicic & 
Merckelbach, 
2007; Sweet et 
al., 2008) 
Memory 
malingering 
Test Yes 
Se=36% 
Sp=85%* 
No 
SCID-De (Steinberg, 
1993) 
Dissociative 
symptoms and 
disorders 
Semi-structured 
interview 
Unknown No 
SIMSf (Jelicic et al., 
2004; Jelicic & 
Merckelbach, 
2007) 
Malingering of 
mental disorders or 
cognitive 
impairment 
Self-report 
measure 
Yes 
Se and Sp 
labelled as 
“high” 
No 
SIRSg (Rogers, 2008) Malingering of 
mental disorders 
Structured 
interview 
Yes 
Se & Sp not 
stated 
No 
SVTh (Jelicic & 
Merckelbach, 
2007; Cima et 
al., 2003) 
Memory 
malingering 
Test Unknown No 
TOMMi (Jelicic & 
Merckelbach, 
2007; Sweet et 
al., 2008) 
Memory 
malingering 
Test Yes 
Se=45% 
Sp=95% 
No 
WMSk (Bosnes, 2007; 
Sweet et al., 
2008) 
General memory Test Yes 
Se & Sp only 
on subtests 
Yes (1) 
Note: aDissociation Experience Scale; bGuilty Knowledge Test; cMinnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory-2; dRey’s 15-Item Memory Test; eStructured Clinical Interview for DSM-
IV Dissociative Disorder; fStructured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology; gStructured 
Interview of Reported Symptoms; hSymptom Validity Testing; iTest of Memory Malingering 
jVictoria Symptom Validity Test; kWechsler Memory Scale 
Se= sensitivity, Sp= specificity, *= Figures vary 
 
 
 
 
80 
However, none of these methods are either appropriate or suitable for the Norwegian (or 
perhaps even a Scandinavian) setting. Polygraph testing such as the Guilty Knowledge Test 
remains highly controversial and only a few of the instruments such as the DES, the MMPI-2, 
the SCID-D, and the WMS (WMS-R, translated in 1992) have been translated into 
Norwegian. On the other hand, both the TOMM and SVT are easily administrated even 
without any translation. Even so, none of these can actually detect whether the defendant 
was amnesic at the time of the crime, but they may constitute a valuable supplement to 
clinical judgement in such cases. 
Limitations  
Study III has a relatively small sample size and there is a consequent risk of Type II errors. 
Our results may reflect true findings, but in a larger sample our non-significant differences 
could turn out to indeed be significant. To obtain a larger cohort of course would of have 
required a longer sampling period with a risk of changes in forensic legislation, methods, etc. 
We did not register the distinction between reactive and instrumental homicides in our 
rating form. If we had done so, we might have been able to explore further characteristics of 
those claiming amnesia versus those who did not. Unfortunately, such a distinction is not 
always made in the Norwegian forensic psychiatric reports, so we would have had to 
interpret and classify this distinction ourselves based on the content of the reports which 
would have probably led to a low reliability in the scorings since the reports do not usually 
describe such a distinction. This could have also led to interpretation bias since we would 
have had to interpret whether the homicide in question should be placed in the reactive or 
instrumental category.  
We studied reports issued on unconvicted defendants, but studies of amnesia can be 
vulnerable as far as reliability is concerned. That is to say, cases of claimed amnesia might 
not be reliable due to the confounding effects of the legal process (Evans, 2006), as some 
cases might result in an acquittal due to presumed innocence. So when we studied the 
characteristics of defendants in reference to a claimed loss of memory, we may have 
inadvertently studied persons not belonging to the homicide sample at all. 
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The case vignette study 
Main findings to be discussed:  
We found differences between laypeople and experts with regard to judgments of Insanity (p 
= .008), Risk of New Crimes (p = .024) and Need for Treatment, (p = .009). The laypeople 
gave the case vignettes higher ratings, i.e. being more Insane, having more Risk and being 
more in Need for Treatment, than the forensic experts did. The difference regarding Insanity 
between the experts (psychologists and psychiatrists) was not significant (p = .276), though 
we found significant differences between the experts concerning Risk (p = .030) and Need 
for Treatment (p = .021), and the psychologists gave higher ratings regarding Risk and Need 
for Treatment than the psychiatrists. 
 
Discussion:  
The only difference between the experts and the laypeople in our study was a higher mean 
rating, so one could speculate whether laypeople could just replace the experts in the courts 
with instructions to downscale their ratings, although this would probably not be the case. 
When both the laypeople and experts had exactly the same ratings in relation to insanity, the 
overall case descriptions of the vignettes were positive. But when any negative element was 
introduced into the social, psychiatric or crime description, the laypeople gave higher ratings 
than the experts. For this reason, the laypeople and experts actually assessed the 
components of psychiatric history, social history and crime quite differently. 
Generally speaking, the psychiatrists had the lowest case ratings concerning Insanity, 
Risk and Need for Treatment of the three different groups of judges despite the negative 
descriptions of psychiatric history and serious crime, but the psychiatrists were the most 
experienced group in terms of forensic work. Hence, this might imply that the psychiatrists 
had a higher threshold for considering a person to be legally insane or at least higher than 
the two other groups, and they were also less affected by a negative psychiatric case 
description compared to the other groups. The psychiatrists also judged the cases as having 
a lower risk for committing new crimes as compared with the laypeople, while the 
psychologists’ rating were in between these two groups.  
Again, one might speculate on whether more forensic experience and knowledge results 
in lowered ratings, which may imply that the experienced experts reflect the standards of the 
field, but alternatively, it could also mean that the experienced experts have an artificially 
high threshold regarding risk assessment.  
It is worth noting that the psychologists had the highest ratings of treatment in cases with 
only positive descriptions, thereby possibly reflecting a tendency within the psychologists 
group to think that more people are in need of therapy than the psychiatrists, even when the 
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cases lacked negative social and psychiatric descriptions, and the offences were minor. 
Consequently, many of these judgements are seemingly connected to experience with 
forensic work, although it should be stressed that differences varied across case description 
and did not follow a clearly discernable pattern.  
There were no differences in the judgements between psychologists and psychiatrists in 
terms of insanity, a finding that perhaps indicates that there is no need for a debate as to 
which profession makes the most valid forensic assessments. We find it noteworthy that all 
the groups considered descriptions of serious crimes to yield higher insanity ratings 
compared to minor crimes. A serious criminal act is often associated with insanity, and may 
reflect an availability bias (a human cognitive bias that causes us to overestimate the 
probability of events associated with memorable or vivid occurrences), thus connecting crime 
and insanity which is perhaps intensified by media coverage (McKenna et al., 2007). As my 
personal experience with several court proceedings has shown me, defence lawyers in 
criminal cases frequently highlight such a connection. Connecting crime and insanity also 
reflects a European point of view when it comes to the criteria for initiating a forensic 
examination, as opposed to other parts of the world in which more of an emphasis is put on 
the behaviour of the defendant as a reason for initiating a forensic report (Soothill et al., 
1983). 
The results from this study are in contrast to several other studies which did not find 
significant differences in the judgements between experts and laypeople such as Oscamp 
(1965) and Jackson (1986). Our diverging results are difficult to explain, though we could 
speculate that we used more comprehensive case vignettes than in Jackson’s study, thereby 
enabling the experts to use their professional skills in a better way in the judgement of the 
vignettes. Our findings were more in concordance with Rowe and Wright (2001) which 
discovered that experts perceived the risks of various scenarios as being lower than 
laypeople did.  
Two tentative conclusions can be drawn from our study: First, when judging clinical 
vignettes, being an expert does make a difference. The experts make different ratings 
compared to laypeople, possibly due to a combination of clinical experience and a particular 
knowledge of the threshold for insanity by legal definition. This point towards a continued 
need for experts to assess criminal insanity in defendants in penal cases, though there is a 
clear difference between just judging clinical vignettes and filing a full report. The study 
indicates that the claim related to the fallacy of the forensic expert is exaggerated, but 
despite this, there is still a need for the further development of quality and standards of 
forensic psychiatric examinations and testimony (as seen in Study III), though the need for 
such quality improvement does not imply that the experts should be discarded from the 
courts.  
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Second, the psychologists and psychiatrists performed in a similar way when judging 
case vignettes regarding insanity, so whether the expert is a psychologist or psychiatrist 
does not seem to be of great importance since both groups can perform this task in 
approximately the same manner given their experience and knowledge of the standards of 
the field. The results can be considered encouraging, as both professional judgment and 
experience do seem to matter. This conclusion should be noticed in both the courts and 
within the field of decision making in psychology, the reason being that this will allow the 
courts to gain access to more professionals conducting such reports.  
Limitations  
There are two limitations concerning this study: 
First, the participants’ judgments were not compared to a known outcome or a so-called 
“gold standard” since we only investigated whether there were differences in the judgments 
between the groups regarding three outcome variables. With a known outcome, we could 
also have compared the groups’ accuracy in their judgments, but based on our design we 
cannot tell if any group made more - or fewer - “correct” judgments than the other.  
Second, as previously mentioned, a forensic psychiatric assessment can be roughly 
divided into three phases: 1) Collection of data (obtaining documents, interviewing the 
defendant, etc.), 2) Assessments/judgments of the data, and 3) Presentation of the data, 
both in the written report, and in some cases, verbally in court. In this study, the participants 
only made an assessment of the data, i.e. the second phase, thus reducing the ecological 
validity of the study since our study did not represent the entire task of the experts. When 
they make a forensic report, the experts must obtain the data, which is an essential task 
requiring specialised skills as some defendants can be difficult to interview, and the forensic 
expert must be explicit in differentiating what information will be of relevance in order to 
answer the mandate from the court. Nevertheless, the judgement process itself is of interest 
to study since judging the obtained data is crucial for the final conclusion. In addition, since 
the creation of a full forensic report consists of obtaining, judging and presenting data, this 
can strengthen our conclusion that the criticism of the fallacy of the forensic expert is 
exaggerated due to a lack of knowledge concerning the process of making a full forensic 
report. 
3.8.5. Summary, consequences and suggestions for future research 
One could claim, at least for Studies I and III, that they just confirm “what everybody already 
knows in the field”. However, despite their limitations, these studies are among the first of 
their kind in Scandinavia within forensic psychiatry to use an empirical design and research 
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approach to assess the state of the field today. Consequences and suggestions for future 
research based on the findings of our four studies are:  
 
Paper I:  
In Norway, the setting of the observation needs to be improved. It is questionable from an 
ethical perspective that examinations of defendants take place in their cells, visiting rooms in 
prisons, etc. A more standardised setting could also give the experts an opportunity to 
conduct a more thorough examination with access to various assessment tools and tests. 
The three Centres for Forensic Psychiatry in Norway could provide both practical aid and 
suitable offices for several forensic examinations to take place, and in the long run, we could 
establish observation clinics staffed with specialised milieu personnel, nurses and clinicians. 
External experts could obtain very valuable information from observations of a defendant in 
such a clinic, which would be a development toward the Swedish method of practice. 
Future research may want to involve larger samples of Scandinavian reports (with regard 
to the comparison study) to better validate the findings of the present study. This research 
could also examine whether there is a growing trend among forensic psychiatric experts 
towards a greater use of research-based methods that would also be of interest in order to 
compare the quality of the reports with the severity of the criminal charge. This may be 
accomplished by scrutinising possible methodological differences in reports concerning 
homicide as compared to less severe criminal acts.  
 
Paper II:  
Forensic psychiatric screening reports seem to be valid and useful for the principals who 
mainly followed the recommendations stated in the reports. Moreover, none of the negative 
conclusions in the screening reports related to psychosis were overruled and changed into a 
positive conclusion in the full reports. Hence, screening reports did not seem to overlook 
serious psychiatric conditions such as psychosis, although they created a few false positive 
cases in our sample.  
Screening reports seemed to fulfil the function intended by the law makers. However, due 
to a lack of general criminal statistics concerning their use, we do not know whether these 
reports are cost effective or time saving. This type of useful statistical information is built into 
the criminal registry as a routine practice in Sweden, with a similar practice in the Norwegian 
penal system possibly allowing for more knowledge about the effects of the screening 
reports. If future research confirms the usefulness of such reports, they could be 
implemented in a more regular way within the penal system.  
The findings of the screening report study should therefore encourage more studies in 
terms of the reliability of the experts conducting such forensic examinations, which would 
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hopefully increase both the quality and scientific base of this branch of forensic psychiatry. 
We only studied reports from the Office for Forensic Psychiatry in Oslo, although a 
nationwide study is needed for further recommendations on the use of screening reports in 
the penal system. 
 
Paper III:  
In the amnesia study, no characteristics distinguished the defendants who claimed amnesia 
from other defendants. Whether the defendant claimed amnesia or not did not influence the 
methods used by the experts, despite the apparent difficulty in assessing such claims. There 
are no legal regulations that require the use of standardised tools in the creation of forensic 
assessments in either in Norway or the other Scandinavian countries, and recommendations 
concerning the evaluation of claimed amnesia in criminal cases should be developed, which 
could be done by using the methods of guideline development established in psychiatry or by 
a specially appointed “task force” group. 
We found no traits to significantly distinguish defendants claiming amnesia from other 
defendants, thus a more fruitful research approach could be to identify the dynamic factors 
involved in such a claim. In doing so, we may find predictors (in addition to substance abuse) 
that can aid in empirically verifying or validating this phenomenon. 
 
Paper IV:  
Laypeople rated case vignette histories far differently from the experts with regard to 
Insanity, Risk and Need for Treatment, giving more severe ratings pertaining to all three 
variables as compared to the experts. The psychiatrists had the lowest severity ratings 
among the three groups, i.e. scoring less on Insanity, Risk and Need for Treatment, while 
psychologists and psychiatrists had roughly the same judgements about insanity, 
demonstrating that professional judgement and experience do seem to make a difference in 
how forensic cases are assessed.  
As a result, procedures to further increase the validity and reliability of the judgments 
made by the experts should be developed. One such step would be to establish educational 
programs in forensic psychiatry, incorporating knowledge of law, decision theory, conduct of 
optimal forensic examination, use of tests and so forth. This type of program should include 
not only theory, but also practical exercises and discussion of cases, and such courses are 
currently being developed at the Centre for Forensic Psychiatry at Oslo University Hospital in 
collaboration with the Department of Justice.  
Obtaining feedback is a powerful stimulus for change, and for more experienced experts, 
feedback routines could be developed in collaboration with the NMFB which in addition to the 
short and official comments given (see page 16), could provide the experts with more 
 
 
 
86 
comprehensive advice (which they do, though it is kept internally within the NMFB). In 
addition to enhancing the quality of the examinations and methods of the individual expert, 
the entire organisation of Norwegian forensic psychiatry could be subjected to a 
comprehensive quality control and evaluation.  
Study IV only gave an indication that experts judge forensic case vignettes differently 
than laypersons. Other studies could more deeply explore how experts and laypeople are 
similar or different in their judgments, and can tell what characterises the expert vs. the lay 
judgment. Further research could investigate whether the judgments and predictions of 
experts and laypeople diverge when given a case vignette with a known outcome. In other 
words, are judgments made by experts in the field of forensics more accurate than those 
made by laypeople based on forensic case descriptions? It would also be of interest in 
exploring what judgments and decision making procedures (priming effects, sequence of 
information, etc.) constitute the differences in judgments between experts and laypeople. The 
reason for such a study could be twofold: 1) Because there are approximately 50,000 people 
serving as lay judges in Norwegian courts, it is important to know what factors in the court 
proceedings they are influenced by so as to better give an indication of how information 
should be presented to them in an optimal way. 2) It could also give us knowledge about how 
experts assess and judge given material, thus helping to prevent systematic bias and 
improving the quality of forensic psychiatric examinations. 
3.8.6. General conclusions 
Forensic psychiatry faces the challenge of new laws, new specialised tests regarding 
defendants found to be legally insane, new detention rules concerning defendants 
considered to be at a high risk of recidivism, and the implementation of new methods for risk 
assessment. At the same time, the practice of Norwegian forensic psychiatry appears to be 
quite static and based on tradition, with indications that experts are slow and even reluctant 
to absorb new findings and make proper adjustments to create a more scientifically based 
practice. Additionally, the organisation of forensic psychiatry should be subjected to debate 
and evaluation, and the relevant topics are: 
The appointments of experts to the courts - Would appointing experts differently than the 
way we do it ensure the courts access to the “best” professionals in the field?  
Setting of the examinations - Are the settings in which we conduct forensic examinations 
satisfactory? At this moment, there are no standard settings and they take place in prisons, 
hospitals, the expert’s office or the home of the defendant. Should we establish forensic 
clinics for such purposes?  
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Specialisation - Should forensic psychiatry and psychology become specialised fields as 
they are in Sweden? Would such specialisation and the establishment of a forensic 
psychiatric department (as is done in Sweden) enhance the possibilities for support, a better 
milieu and research in the field?  
The forensic system - Would implementation of the psychological rather than biological 
principle help to create more thorough examinations (since the expert must find a connection 
between insanity and the crime at the time the crime occurred) and enhance the legal 
safeguards for the defendant? 
Research regarding the quality of forensic examinations is sparse, and there are many 
limitations such as the lack of a gold standard, which restrains the use of experimental 
methods, as well as ethical considerations, since it would be unethical to make manipulations 
of the forensic methods. As mentioned by Wettstein (2005), the forensic report is only a 
“window” into the evaluation itself and is therefore limited. In other words, we only study the 
reports and not how the examination with the defendant actually took place. One way to 
overcome such a limitation would be to record and/or videotape forensic examinations, 
although the feasibility of this approach is faced with ethical and practical limitations. 
Anonymous peer reviews of reports within a quantitative design may also enhance 
knowledge of the strengths and weaknesses of the issued report for the courts.  
Research concerning the memory of offenders is also sparse. Follow-up studies with in-
depth interviews of defendants who have claimed amnesia before the court proceedings 
could yield valuable information about the nature and validity behind claims of amnesia in a 
criminal setting.  
Studies of how professional judges and attorneys perceive the work of experts could also 
give valuable knowledge to better optimise forensic psychiatric examinations. A Norwegian 
replication of a study conducted in the UK (Leslie et al., 2007) is called for.  
 
In sum, the aforementioned suggestions may increase the reliability and validity of 
forensic examinations. Forensic psychiatry could develop from a practice dominated by 
clinically-based opinions, beliefs and tradition into a more verifiable, standardised, research-
based practice. This development could further contribute to the recruitment of more experts 
from additional professions (the courts are sometimes in need of more experts), hopefully 
resulting in an enhanced quality of reports. As a result, principals may also perceive the 
standards, work and conclusions in a more positive manner. At best, such a development 
could increase the legal safeguards of the defendants, although such actions must be 
followed up with financial incentives from, e.g. the Department of Justice. This should not be 
too hard to achieve, considering the relatively small expense that forensic psychiatry 
constitutes today. 
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2Abstract
We tested whether the judgment of forensic psychiatric experts differed from that of 
laypersons. We constructed 18 case vignettes that were rated by 21 psychologists, 14 
psychiatrists and 126 laypeople on the following variables: Insanity by Legal Terms, Risk of 
Repeated Offense, and Need of Treatment. We found significant differences among laypeople 
and professionals on all three variables (p = .008, p = .024, and p = .009, respectively), 
although the differences were dependent on the composition of the case vignettes. Case 
vignettes containing negative descriptions and/or serious crimes were rated high on all 
variables by laypeople, whereas the professional groups’ ratings varied according to the 
variations given in the information.
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One of the first known evaluations of expert judgment found that corn seed experts were 
often wrong in their judgments, and based their conclusions on fewer indications than the 
experts themselves had presumed (Hughes, 1917; Kirkebøen, 1999). Later, several studies 
have shown that experts’ judgments both within medicine (Einhorn, 1974), psychology 
(Oscamp, 1965) and law (Ebbesen & Konecni, 1975) are often inaccurate and unreliable 
(Shanteau, 1992).
The expert forensic psychiatric witness is essentially a product of the 19th century (Gutheil 
& Simon, 2005; Foucault, 1978; Allan, Louw, & Verschoor, 1995). These experts play an 
important role in advising the courts in complex matters such as human behavior, criminal 
responsibility, competence to stand trial, and risk assessment. Up until the last four decades, 
the courts were often impressed by the experts’ qualifications, and more or less uncritically 
accepted their psychiatric assessments (Jackson, 1986; Saks & Koehler, 2005; Ennis & 
Litwak, 1974). A growing body of criticism has weakened the expert witnesses’ elevated 
status in the courtroom, and this criticism has been comprehensive and sometimes quite harsh: 
a lack of reliability and validity of the conclusions made by the experts (Faust & Ziskin, 1988; 
Dawes, 1994; Wettstein, 2005), a failure to meet certain scientific standards in treating data, 
the presentation of theories in an idiosyncratic manner, a general failure in following 
established methods (Coles & Veiel, 2001), and little use of data sources other than the 
clinical interview (Petrella & Poythress, 1983; Heilbrun & Collins, 1995; Grøndahl, 2005).
A persistent point of criticism has been that judgments made by psychiatric court experts 
are prone to the same types of notions, heuristics and biases as those of non-experts. For that 
reason, the judgments made by the experts will not necessarily substantially diverge from 
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Merckelbach, Nijman, Knauer, & Hollnack, 2002). 
Despite all this criticism, relatively little research has actually been conducted with regard 
to the quality of forensic evaluations, i.e. standards, practices, and the use of methods 
(Wettstein, 2005). A few studies however have been conducted in regard to the clinical 
decisions of experts versus laypeople. Oscamp (1965) examined the level of accuracy in 
clinical decisions among experienced clinical psychologists and undergraduate psychology 
students using a true case vignette. The judges should predict his actions by the use of five 
multiple choices as they received more information in four successive stages about the person 
in question. None of the judges ever achieved a 50% accuracy rate in their predictions, and 
there were no significant differences among the three groups of judges with regard to 
accuracy (Oscamp, 1965). 
Rowe and Wright (2001) evaluated nine empirical studies on expert versus lay judgments 
for various types of risk. The judgments concerned topics such as ecological risks, nuclear 
contamination risks, risks from the millennium data bug, etc. Even though the main 
conclusion drawn was that experts did not evaluate risk any differently from laypeople, the 
authors found that the studies had several methodological weaknesses since characteristics of 
the expert and lay samples were poorly defined. Important demographic aspects of expert and 
lay samples were not controlled for in all studies, thus making it difficult to draw any 
definitive conclusions pertaining to the differences or similarities between experts and 
laypeople (Rowe & Wright, 2001). 
Jackson (1986) examined the judgments of laypeople and professionals in forensic 
psychiatric assessments using a criminal case vignette design. One hundred and eighty 
laypeople rated one case each, and 10 psychiatrists and 10 court judges rated nine cases each. 
The raters received information divided into three categories: positive or negative, absent 
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legal insanity, prediction of future offenses, etc. Jackson found no significant differences in 
the ratings among the professionals and the laypeople (Jackson, 1986).
To sum up, the literature suggests that the judgments of professionals do not markedly 
differ from those of laypeople. We think it is important to investigate the established claim 
that there are small differences between laypeople and professionals in clinical and forensic 
judgments. If this claim holds true, one consequence would be that appointing professionals to 
assist the courts in forensic psychiatric matters would be deemed to be unnecessary. 
Confirming such a claim could therefore support an argument in favor of a radical change of 
practice in the courts and by relevant professionals. On the other hand, if there are differences 
in the judgments made by laypeople and professionals, it could be argued that some of the 
persistent criticism of professionals acting for the courts is not supported by research. A 
forensic psychiatric assessment can be roughly divided into three phases: 1) collection of data 
(obtaining documents, interviewing the defendant, etc.), 2) assessments/judgments of the data, 
and 3) presentation of the data, both in the written report, and in some cases, verbally in the 
court. This study concerns the second phase, namely assessing the data. Consequently, the 
main aim of this study is, to examine if the judgments are the same or if there are significant 
differences between laypeople and professionals. 
We based our study on Jackson (1986), and adapted and extended her design to a 
Norwegian setting. Based on professionals and laypeople reading the same clinical case 
vignettes, we propose the following hypothesis: We will not find significant differences 
among laypeople, psychologists and psychiatrists when they evaluate: a) insanity by legal 
terms, b) risk of repeated offense, and c) the need of psychiatric treatment. These are the core 
issues in forensic psychiatric examinations as requested by the courts. 
Methods
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the evaluation of both mental health professionals’ and laypeople’s perceptions of various 
mental health issues (Taylor & Sorenson, 2007; Stevens & Brodsky, 1995; Bjørkly, 1998; 
Yourstone, Lindholm, Grann, & Svenson, 2008). The study was approved by the National 
Committee for Research Ethics of Health Region East and the National Data Inspectorate. 
Case material 
We obtained 42 forensic psychiatric screening reports from the Office for Forensic 
Psychiatry, Oslo Police District, Norway, issued after 2002 (after a revision of the penal 
code). Such screening reports are regularly used within the Norwegian penal system to check 
to see if a full psychiatric report is needed (Grøndahl, Ikdahl, & Dahl, 2007).
We extracted suitable descriptions from the reports to form anonymous and balanced sets 
of: 1) a positive psychiatric history (lack of serious psychopathology, e.g. no reports of 
psychiatric treatment, generally healthy mental functioning, no reported serious psychiatric 
symptoms) and a negative psychiatric history (presence of serious psychopathology, e.g. 
hospitalized in a mental hospital, previous suicide attempts, psychotic symptoms), 2) a 
corresponding set of a positive social history (e.g., uncomplicated background, parent(s) 
present and caring, school period without serious problems) and a negative social history 
(e.g., drug problems, alcoholic parents, juvenile delinquency, domestic violence), and 3) a set 
of former convictions for minor crimes (e.g., driving under the influence, minor thefts) and 
serious crimes (e.g., homicide, rape, arson). The psychiatric and social history could also be 
absent, with this classification creating a total of 18 combinations (3 psychiatric * 3 social * 2 
convictions), and each combination formed one case vignette. 
We then transformed the 18 vignettes into opposite descriptions. That is, we transformed 
positive psychiatric and social histories into negative, and negative psychiatric and social 
histories into positive, serious offenses into minor and so on in order to complete an 
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set of vignettes, we temporarily created a total of 36 vignettes (18 ordinary and 18 
alternative).  
We examined the content validity of the vignettes by asking representatives of various 
professions such as psychiatric nurses, psychologists, psychiatrists, lawyers, and mercantile 
personnel from the staff at the Centre for Research and Education in Forensic Psychiatry, 
Oslo University Hospital, to evaluate both sets of 18 cases. We established two groups, with 
five persons in each group, who evaluated the cases individually without contacting each 
other. They were asked to rate the vignettes according to what type (a positive or negative 
psychiatric and social history) or offense (minor/serious) they considered them to be. If the 
group unanimously rated a given case description as having a negative psychiatric history, we 
would choose this description as one of the validated negative psychiatric cases to be 
presented in the study. If one or more of the five in the group rated a given case description as 
positive and the rest of the group rated it as negative, we would reject that description. Based 
on this feedback, we selected only cases that obtained a unanimous agreement in the 
positive/negative and minor/serious case description.  
This validation process gave us a final set of 18 definitive vignettes without any comments 
on a lack of clarity or coherence, which covered all the possible combinations of elements. 
We then presented these definitive case vignettes with a random case number devoid of any 
identification for the specific combination of negative/positive/absent and minor/serious 
which the case represented. 
Rating procedure 
We then asked the participants to rate each case based on three variables. The first was 
Insanity by Legal Terms (“insanity”), defined according to the Norwegian Penal code, Section 
44, implying one of three conditions: psychosis, amnesia/unconsciousness, or serious mental 
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of Repeated Offense (“risk”), defined as the risk of committing new criminal offenses, and the 
third was Need of Treatment (“treatment”) in terms of psychiatric health care. 
The ratings were done using a 7 point Likert scale from 1 (not present) to 7 (present to a 
high degree), i.e. higher scale scores indicated more insanity, a higher risk and a higher need 
for treatment, respectively. In total, we obtained three ratings from the participants for each 
case, and also obtained ratings on 12 other related variables that will be analyzed in a 
subsequent publication. 
Participants
We recruited a sample of 126 participants among lay judges in court cases in Oslo during 
the spring of 2008 with the help of two paid assistants. The lay judges were asked if they 
wanted to participate in a study of how laypeople evaluate descriptions of criminal offenders, 
and we excluded psychologists, psychiatrists, professional judges, lawyers and police 
personnel from participating. The assistants kept recruiting until a total number of 126 were 
reached. Each lay judge rated one randomly selected case from the case material and received 
a lottery ticket as a reward. We also registered the following data for each participant: gender, 
age, level of education, occupation and previous experience as a lay judge, as summarized  in 
Table 1. 
The first author recruited psychiatrists and psychologists based on a list taken from the 
National Medical Forensic Board over all acting forensic experts who had issued at least one 
forensic court report in Norway since 2002 when changes in the penal code were made. Of the 
82 experts invited to take part in the study, 51 (62%) responded. Thirty-seven agreed to 
participate and 14 declined. Three experts who had agreed to participate never returned the 
questionnaire, and the responses from one expert could not be used due to incoherent answers. 
We managed to recruit two additional experts as replacements and ended up with 14 
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detailed in Table 1: gender, age, approximate number of forensic cases in their professional 
history in addition to the number of cases during the last three years, whether they had 
obtained a doctoral degree, whether the psychologists had obtained a specialist degree, the 
number of years of professional experience, and the number of years as a specialist, when 
applicable. 
Each of the 21 psychologists rated six and the 14 psychiatrists rated nine of the 18 case 
vignettes. Thus, each vignette combination was rated seven times by each of the three groups, 
making a total of 126 ratings per group across the 18 cases.
Statistical Analysis 
The members of the professional group each rated multiple cases, and evaluations from the 
same individual were therefore not independent. We therefore used the Linear Mixed Model 
(LMM) to analyze the data. This model is an extension of the standard regression model 
which allows multiple outcomes to be dependent.  
When we analyzed, e.g. insanity, we treated this as the outcome variable and used the 
model to investigate how it depended on a) the participant group (layperson, psychologist, or 
psychiatrist), and b) case history components (negative or positive social history, negative or 
positive psychiatric history, minor or serious criminal offence). Risk and treatment were 
treated in a similar manner.  
Preliminary analyses showed that the case history components interacted. The effect of 
having, say, a negative psychiatric history depended on the social history and criminal offence 
components. For this reason, we formed a new categorical dummy variable entitled Case 
History which had eight categories, one for each combination of the case components (the 
effect of absence of information was not analyzed). The effect of the participant group could 
express itself in two ways (the categorical dummy variable was called Group). There might be 
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a constant difference between the groups regardless of case history components, or the 
difference between the groups may depend on the case descriptions. As a consequence, Group 
was entered in the regression model as both an additive and interaction term with Case 
History. Thus, if this latter interaction was significant, then the differences between the 
groups depend on the case description. On the other hand, if only the additive group term was 
significant, then the difference between the groups appears to be constant across case 
descriptions.  All computations were performed using the R statistical software (R 
Development Core Team, 2004). The significance level was set to p =.05. 
Results
One noticeable difference in Table 1 is that the psychiatrist group had a much higher number 
of previous cases than the psychologist group. The effect of experience is therefore 
indistinguishable from the effects related to the differences in professional training.  Age or 
gender of the raters were not, however, significantly related to any of the outcome variables (p
= .42, p = .20, and p = .15, respectively). With this in mind, we did find differences between 
the groups.
Group Differences 
The results of the statistical analysis are given in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 shows the p-
values of the model terms for the three outcome variables. Each model in Table 2 contains a 
total of 24 regression parameters; therefore, the tables only present a brief summary of some 
key aspects of the estimated models. Table 3 shows the average response of each group across 
all case descriptions which form the basis of the significance tests in Table 2, and also shows 
how the different case components influenced the evaluations on average across the groups. 
As shown in Table 2, four out of six differences in either Group or Group by Case History 
were significantly different in the groups (Group and Group by Case for Insanity, Group for 
Risk, and Group by Case for Treatment). Table 3 shows the most notable result, this being 
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that on average laypersons rated all variables higher than the professionals, and negative case 
elements were on average rated higher on all variables, except risk in cases with a negative 
psychiatric history.
Table 4 gives an overall test of the group effects, as well as tests comparing the laypersons 
with the professional groups and a test comparing the psychiatrists with the psychologists.
All group effects were significant except insanity for Lay vs. Psychologist and Psychologists 
vs. Psychiatrist, risk for Lay vs. Psychiatrists, and treatment for Lay vs. Psychologist.
Insanity by Legal Terms 
Table 4 shows that we found a significant group effect (p = .025) for insanity. It also shows 
that the laypersons rated significantly differently as compared to the professionals (p = .008), 
while the difference between the psychiatrists and psychologists was not significant (p = 
.276). Furthermore, Table 2 demonstrates that we see that the Group by Case History term is 
significant (p = .044), indicating that the differences between the groups varies with the case 
descriptions.  
Table 3 shows that the average rating by laypersons was 3.13, somewhat higher than the 
psychiatrists and psychologists, who had a similar rating of approximately 2.4 on average. 
The table also shows that case descriptions with a negative Psychiatric History received 
ratings which were 1.54 points higher on average than cases with a positive Psychiatric 
History. The difference between case descriptions with a negative and positive Social History 
was small, only 0.14. A severe Criminal Offense resulted in a 1 point higher rating than cases 
in which the Criminal Offense was minor.  
Figure 1 shows average ratings by the groups split into case elements, with a positive versus 
negative psychiatric history providing the strongest effects. We also noted that laypeople 
consistently rate higher than the professionals. 
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Risk of Repeated Offenses 
Table 4 shows a significant difference between the groups (p = .003), as the difference 
between laypersons and professionals was significant (p = .024). The psychiatrists and 
psychologists also rated differently (p = .030). The Group by Case History term in Table 2 
was not significant, while the Group term was (p = .022). This indicates that the group 
differences were relatively constant across case descriptions.  
Table 3 shows that the average rating from the laypersons was the highest of all the groups. 
The corresponding average rating of the psychiatrists was considerably lower, with the 
psychologists in between. On average, we see that cases with a negative and positive 
Psychiatric History were rated as fairly similar. Cases with a negative Social History yielded 
ratings about 1.3 points higher than cases with a positive Social History. A severe Criminal 
Offense on average produced evaluations roughly 1.4 points higher than a minor offense.  
Figure 2 shows the ratings for risk. Here, we see that psychiatric history plays less of a role 
for psychiatrists, whereas social history is more important. All groups agree that the 
seriousness of the crime is the major factor for an underlying increase in risk. 
Need for Treatment 
Table 4 shows that there was a significant difference between the groups with respect to 
Need for Treatment ratings (p = .004). The ratings from the laypersons differed from those of 
the professionals (p = .009), and the psychiatrists and psychologists also rated significantly 
differently (p = .021). Table 2 shows that the Group by Case History term was significant (p = 
.027), indicating that the differences between the groups varied by case description.
Table 3 shows on average that laypersons gave the highest ratings, followed by the 
psychologists, with the psychiatrists giving the lowest ratings. Here, cases with a negative 
Psychiatric History were given considerably higher ratings than cases with a positive history, 
a difference of approximately 3 points. On average, cases with a negative Social History were 
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rated somewhat higher than cases with a positive Social History, and a severe Criminal 
Offense produced on average evaluations about 1.3 points higher than a mild offense. 
Figure 3 shows treatment ratings that are quite similar to insanity ratings, except that 
laypersons are not consistently higher than the professionals. Both psychiatric history and the 
type of crime provide the strongest basis for the ratings. 
Discussion
We found significant differences among psychiatrists, psychologists and laypeople 
regarding judgments of Insanity by Legal Terms, Risk of Repeated Offense and Need for 
Treatment. Laypeople rated insanity, risk and treatment significantly higher than the 
professionals. We also found significant differences between psychiatrists and psychologists 
in terms of the ratings for risk and treatment. 
It is interesting to note that laypeople gave the highest ratings concerning all three variables 
compared to the professionals. At first glance, one could hypothesize that the only differences 
between the professionals and the laypeople were higher mean ratings, and as a consequence, 
one might just replace the professionals with laypeople with instructions to downscale their 
ratings. However, the interaction effects demonstrate that this is not the case. As an example, 
the lay and professional groups had exactly the same ratings regarding insanity when the case 
descriptions were positive overall. But when any negative element was introduced in the 
social, psychiatric or crime description, the laypeople gave higher ratings than the 
professionals did. As a result, the laypeople and professionals actually gave a different 
assessment of the components of psychiatric history, social history and crime differently. 
Generally speaking, the psychiatrists had the lowest ratings of the three groups. They 
considered the case vignettes as being less insane, less associated with risk and less in need of 
treatment. This was the case despite the negative descriptions of psychiatric history and 
serious crime. The psychiatrist group was the most experienced (in terms of having the most 
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cases) in forensic work. Therefore, this might imply that the psychiatrists judged the threshold 
for considering a person as legally insane as high as or at least higher than the two other 
groups, and were less affected by a negative psychiatric case description compared to the 
other groups. The psychiatrists also judged the case vignettes as having a lower risk compared 
with the laypersons, and the psychologists rated levels in between the two other groups. 
Again, one may speculate that experience and knowledge of the field resulted in lower ratings 
with regard to ratings of risk. This could imply that the experienced professionals reflect the 
standards of the field, though it could also mean that the experienced professionals have an 
artificially high threshold regarding risk assessment.  
It is worth noting that the psychologists had the highest ratings of treatment in cases with 
positive descriptions only. This may reflect a tendency in the psychologist group to regard 
more people in need of treatment than the psychiatrists, even when the case lacks negative 
social and psychiatric descriptions and the offenses are minor. Consequently, many of these 
judgments are seemingly connected to experience with forensic work, yet it should be stressed 
that differences varied across case description and did not follow a clear, interpretable pattern. 
There were no differences in the judgments between psychologists and psychiatrists regarding 
insanity, a finding that in the long run can minimize the need for a debate as to which 
profession makes the most valid forensic assessments.  
We find it interesting to note that all groups felt that descriptions of serious crimes should 
yield higher insanity ratings compared to those of minor crimes. A serious criminal act is 
often associated with insanity, and could possibly reflect an availability bias connecting crime 
and insanity, probably intensified by media coverage (McKenna, Thom, & Simpson, 2007). 
As experienced by the first author, defense lawyers in criminal cases frequently highlight such 
a connection. Connecting crime and insanity also reflects a European point of view when it 
comes to the criteria for initiating a forensic examination, as opposed to other parts of the 
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world which have more of an emphasis on the behavior of the defendant as the criteria for 
initiating a forensics report (Soothill et al., 1983). 
Our results stand in contrast to other studies that did not find any differences in the 
judgments between professionals and laypeople such as Oscamp (1965) and Jackson (1986). 
Our diverging results are difficult to explain. Nevertheless, we could speculate that we used 
more comprehensive case vignettes than in Jackson’s study, thereby better enabling the 
professionals to use their well honed skills in a clinical judgment of the case vignettes. On the 
other hand, our findings were more in concordance with Rowe and Wright (2001), who as a 
trend, found that experts perceived the risks of different scenarios as being lower than those 
found by laypeople.
Two tentative conclusions can be drawn from our study. First, it does make a difference to 
be an expert in a forensic setting. The professionals rate things differently as compared to 
laypeople, possibly due to a combination of clinical experience and knowledge of the 
threshold which constitutes insanity by legal terms in particular. This argument is 
strengthened considerably in that in this study, all the data was already collected and the only 
task that remained was for the participants to make their judgments. In ordinary cases, all the 
data has to be collected. We must presume that the forensic expert possesses far better skills 
in collecting the data compared to a layperson, e.g. interviewing the defendant and perhaps 
third parties. This indicates that the persistent criticism and claim of the fallacy of the forensic 
expert is premature and exaggerated. In contrast, we still think that the quality and standards 
of forensic psychiatric examinations and testimonies should be further developed, but the 
need for such quality improvement does not imply that the experts should be discarded from 
the courts altogether. Secondly, psychologists and psychiatrists performed similarly when 
judging case vignettes in regard to insanity, so whether the expert is a psychologist or a 
Paper IV - Page 15 of 27
16
psychiatrist does not seem to be of importance. Both groups can perform this task in roughly 
the same manner given their experience and knowledge of the standards in the field.
We did find interaction effects between group and case history, although it is difficult to 
grasp the actual nature of these interactions. We saw that the case with all positive 
descriptions was rated differently by the groups, but beyond that there were individual 
configurations for each case. We provided only one case for each combination of case 
elements (e.g. only one case with a positive psychiatric history, a negative social history, and 
serious crime), so we cannot rule out that particular elements of the actual story had an effect 
in addition to the valour of the case elements. Providing several cases with the same 
combination would enable us to minimize these effects, though it would also mean that each 
case would be rated fewer times given our limited supply of participants. 
Furthermore, an important limitation of our study is that the participants’ judgments were 
not compared to a known outcome or a so-called gold standard. We only investigated whether 
there were differences in the judgments between the groups regarding the three outcome 
variables. With a known outcome, we could also have compared the groups’ accuracy in their 
judgments. Based on our design, we cannot tell if any group made more - or fewer - “correct” 
judgments than the other. To investigate whether the judgments and predictions of 
professionals and laypeople diverge in accuracy when given a case vignette with a known 
outcome is the aim of a new study which is being planned. It would also be of interest to 
explore what judgment processes (priming effects, sequence of information, etc.) constitute 
the differences in judgments between professionals and laypeople, which will be the topic of a 
future publication based on our material. 
We are encouraged by our results. Both professional judgment and professional experience 
does seem to matter. This conclusion should be noted in the courts, as well as within the field 
of decision making in psychology.  
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Figure 1 
Average Insanity by Legal Terms Ratings 
 Note. + = positive description, - = negative description, o = description is absent, S = serious 
crime, M = minor crime. 
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Figure 2 
Average Risk of Repeated Offense Ratings 
Note. + = positive description, - = negative description, o = description is absent, S = 
serious crime, M = minor crime.
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Figure 3 
Average Need of Treatment Ratings 
Note. + = positive description, - = negative description, o = description is absent, S = 
serious crime, M = minor crime. 
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Table 1 
Demographic Data 
 Laypeople Psychiatrists Psychologists 
N 126 14 21
Gender
   Female 61 2 3
   Male 64 12 18
Age
M 51.5 57.1 52.8 
   SD 13.7 12.6 9.0 
Lay Sample Education (years)  
   Comprehensive School 4 (3%)  
   Vocational school 19 (15%)  
   College 25 (20%)  
   University 78 (62%)  
   Prior experience as lay judge 111 (88%)  
Professional Samples 
   Doctoral degree (PhD) 4 (29%) 1 (5%) 
   Specialist degree 14 (100%)a 20 (95%)b
   Total No Forensic Cases    
M  196.6 29.8 
SD  284.9 76.3 
   Forensic Cases Last 3 Years    
M  36.3 7.3 
SD  33.1 8.6 
   Years of Professional Experience    
M  29.4 24.7 
SD  13.4 8.4 
   Years as Specialist    
M  21.9 16.1 
SD  13.4 7.9 
Note. a Psychiatry is a medical specialist degree obtained after five years of 
training/courses, etc. 
Note. b As for psychiatrists, a specialty in psychology requires five years of training 
and courses. There are several types of specialists (child, neuropsychological etc). Clinical 
Adult Specialist will be the most frequent specialty in forensic work. 
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Table 2 
Linear Mixed Models Showing Group Differences 
Insanity by Legal 
Terms 
Risk of Repeated 
Offense 
Need of Treatment
df F p F p F p
Intercept 1/88 363.6 <.001 1248.6 <.001 1991.5 <.001
Group 2/88 3.4 .039 4.0 .022 2.1 .133
Case History 7/56 13.2 <.001 16.9 <.001 60.0 <.001
Group by Case 
History 14/56 1.9 .044 1.5 .161 2.1 .027
Note. df = Degrees of Freedom, F = F Test value, p = p-level. 
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Table 3 
Mean Rating and Relative Rating Change with Standard Deviation for Groups and 
Case Elements by Variable 
Insanity by Legal 
Terms 
Risk of Repeated 
Offense 
Need of Treatment 
Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Mean S.E.
Laypersons 3.13 0.20 4.75 0.17 5.09 0.15
Psychiatrists 2.38 0.26 3.91 0.23 4.50 0.20
Psychologists 2.43 0.24 4.32 0.21 4.79 0.19
Negative Social History 0.14 0.22 1.32 0.19 0.63 0.16
Negative Psychiatric 
History 1.54 0.22 -0.18 0.19 3.03 0.17
Severe Criminal Offense 1.00 0.22 1.44 0.19 1.34 0.17
Note. S.E. = Standard Error, Negative Social History = The figure represents the 
average increase (positive) or decrease (negative) in the rating for cases with a negative social 
history compared to a positive social history, and similarly for a Negative Psychiatric History 
and Severe Criminal Offense compared to a minor criminal offense. E.g., when social history 
changes from positive to negative, the risk rating increases by 0.14 on average across all 
groups.
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Table 4 
Linear Mixed Model Showing Group Differences 
Insanity by Legal 
Terms 
Risk of Repeated 
Offense 
Need of 
Treatment 
df LRT p LRT p LRT p
Group Effect 16 28.8 .025 35.8 .003 35.2 .004
Lay vs. Professionals 8 20.6 .008 17.7 .024 20.5 .009
Lay vs. Psychiatrists 8 20.4 .009 13.9 .086 21.4 .006
Lay vs. Psychologists 8 14.4 .073 25.2 .001 13.6 .092
Psychiatrists vs. 
Psychologists 8 9.8 .276 17.0 .030 18.0 .021
Note. df = Degrees of Freedom, LRT = Likelihood Ratio Test, p = p-level. 
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Appendix II 

Codebook – Study II 


K O D E B O K  - P J O
Ikke opplyst/ukjent skåres 00
Politilegens arkivnummer
1 Erklæringens kodenummer
2 Erklæringens årstall (4 siffer)
3 Rekvirerende politidistrikt Oslo 1
Asker og Bærum 2
Romerrike 3
Follo 4
Annet 5
Observanden: Skåring
4 Alder
5 Kjønn Mann 1
Kvinne 2
6 Fødested (tre bokst. kode)
7 Statsborgerskap (tre bokst. kode)
8 Tidl vært undersøkt Ja 1
Nei 2
9 Siktet forhold I Drap 1
Drapsforsøk 2
Mish. Barn/samboer 3
Annen vold 4
Trusler 5
Voldtekt/voldt. forsøk 6
Incest 7
Annen sedelighet 8
Frihetsberøvelse 9
Ran/utpressing 10
Ildspåsettelse 11
Vinning 12
Annen øk. forbr. 13
Narkotikalovgivning 14
Alkohollovgivning 15
Vegtrafikklovgivning 16
Annet 17
10 Siktet forhold  II
11 Siktet forhold III
PJO-prosjektet 04 - 2004 12 20 KODEBOK ver.V - PJO 1
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12 Tidl. dømt Ikke domfelt 1
Domfelt en gang tidl. 2
Dømt  2 3
13 Utdannelse (antall år)
14 Inntekt Arbeide 1
Pensjon annen ytels 2
Sykemeldt 3
Arbeidsledig 4
Elev/student 5
15 Sivil status Gift, partner relasjon 1
Singel, sep/skilt 2
16 Tidligere behandling Ingen kjent tidl beh. 1
Poliklinisk beh 2
Innlagt institusjon 1g 3
Innlagt institusjon >1 4
17 Rus v/påklaget handling Ingen 1
Alkohol 2
Stoff 3
Medikamenter 4
Blandingsmisbruk 5
Betingelser v/undersøkelsen og omløpstid ved PJO Skåring
18 Dato for påklaget handling Da. Må. År.       .     .
19 Dato for undersøkelse Da. Må. År.       .     .
20 Hvor er undersøkelsen foretatt?
Sakkyndige Skåring
21 Undersøker Psykiater 1
Psykologspesialist 2
Erklæringen Skåring
22 Antall sider
23 Satt eller fremkommet diagnose? Ja 1
Nei 2
24 I så fall hvilken/hvilke?
PJO-prosjektet 04 - 2004 12 20 KODEBOK ver.V - PJO 2
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25 Gitt uttrykk for usikkerhet Ja 1
Nei 2
Sakkyndiges konklusjoner i PJO
26 Type hovedkonklusjon PJO Anbefalt 1
Ikke anbefalt 2
Åpen 3
27 Psykose Ja 1
Nei 2
I tvil 3
28 Bevisstløshet Ja 1
Nei 2
I tvil 3
29 Utviklingshemming Ja 1
Nei 2
I tvil 3
30 Sterk bevissthetsforstyrrelse Ja 1
Nei 2
I tvil 3
31 Lettere psyk. utviklingshemming Ja 1
Nei 2
I tvil 3
32 Risiko for gjentagelse Ja 1
Nei 2
I tvil 3
33 Intern F. diagnose
Begrunnelse for konklusjonen
PJO-prosjektet 04 - 2004 12 20 KODEBOK ver.V - PJO 3
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Korresponderende judisiell observasjon
34 Erklæringens kodenummer
35 Erklæringens årstall
Omløpstid ved fullstendig JO
36 Retten oppnevnt sakkyndige Da. Må. År.       .     .
37 Sakkyndige første møte m/obs Da. Må. År.       .     .
38 Avgitt erklæring Da. Må. År.       .     .
39 Hvor er undersøkelsen foretatt?
Sakkyndiges konklusjoner i JO
40 Psykose Ja 1
Nei 2
I tvil 3
41 Bevisstløshet Ja 1
Nei 2
I tvil 3
42 Utviklingshemming Ja 1
Nei 2
I tvil 3
43 Sterk bevissthetsforstyrrelse Ja 1
Nei 2
44 Lettere psyk. utviklingshemming Ja 1
Nei 2
I tvil 3
45 Risiko for gjentagelse Ja 1
Nei 2
I tvil 3
46 Annet
Erklæringen Skåring
47 Antall sider
48 Foretatt testing Ja 1
Nei 2
49 Testen/testenes navn
PJO-prosjektet 04 - 2004 12 20 KODEBOK ver.V - PJO 4
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50 Satt diagnose? Ja 1
Nei 2
51 I så fall hvilken/hvilke?
52 Gitt uttrykk for usikkerhet Ja 1
Nei 2
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Appendix III a-b 

Responses to recommendations –  
open/closed cases 


Appendix IIIa: Prosecutors’ responses to the recommendations of the screening 
reports – 32 cases not closed in the judicial system
Variables Full report
requested
(n = 91) 
Full report not 
requested
(n = 328) 
P
N  (%) N  (%) 
Screening report conclusion: 
  Full report recommended 
  Full report not recommended 
  Open recommendation   
59  (65) 
3   (3) 
29  (32) 
59  (18) 
117  (36) 
152  (46) 
< 0.001 
< 0.001 
     0.01
Fate of “full recommended” 
  Case dismissed†
  Other reasons 
  No information/case still open 
59 (100) 
20  (34) 
7  (12) 
32  (54) 
N                N 
Fate of “full not recommended” 
  Case dismissed†
  Other reasons 
  No information/case still open
3
1
0
2
Open recommendation  
  Case dismissed†
  Sentenced 
  No information/case still open 
29
13
7
                 9 
152
58
63
31
†Dismissed due to doubt of the defendants accountability (code 065 in the criminal 
register)
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Appendix IIIb: Prosecutors’ responses to the recommendations of the screening 
reports – 32 cases closed and included in analysis 
Variables Full report
requested
(n = 113) 
Full report not 
requested
(n = 306) 
P
N  (%) N  (%) 
Screening report conclusion: 
  Full report recommended 
  Full report not recommended 
  Open recommendation   
81   (72) 
3    (3) 
29   (25) 
  37  (12) 
117  (38) 
152  (50) 
< 0.001 
< 0.001 
  <0.001
Fate of “full recommended” 
  Case dismissed†
  Other reasons 
  Sentenced 
  37  (100) 
  27    (73) 
    4    (11) 
     6    (16) 
N                N 
Fate of “full not recommended” 
  Case dismissed†
  Other reasons 
  No information/case still open
3
1
0
2
Open recommendation  
  Case dismissed†
  Sentenced 
  No information/case still open 
29
13
7
                 9 
152
58
63
31
†Dismissed due to doubt of the defendants accountability (code 065 in the criminal 
register)
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Appendix IV 

Codebook – Study III 


K O D E B O K  -  AmPr 
Ikke opplyst/ukjent skåres 99 Ikke aktuelt skåres 999
1 Erklæringens kodenummer
2 Erklæringens årstall (4 siffer)
I Observanden: Skåring
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VI Supplerende opplysninger knyttet til evt. amnesi
27 B
+$
$
T!!.$  
/ 
28 RusmidlerUY8+
+  
/ 
29 38  
/ 
30 =$ 3T$

31 -+..U$88  
/ 
32 B' \$ 
 T 
D+$ )
]TUT
+. (
3 2
33 *+..$U
8$  
/ 
34 D8
 7_
_$ 
,
8$ 
3
$ )
3'88 (
]TUT
+. 2
3
$ 
35 OrganiskeY$8$  
/ 
36 D8 " 
7<
+U+ 
7
$ )
, (
D5$$' 2
B$'88.$
$+ 
38
$+ 
*<
$ 6
:$ 4
3'8$ 0
T 
D'+'8 
3 )
37 ,<.$'$$$  
/ 
38 D8 XU
$5 
,T 
3
$ )
Appendix IV - Page 3 of 7
/ 
1$$++ 2
7++ )
42
B 
43
:$
$U 
44 3+
$
45 ,5$.$.$

/ 
46 B'$
3 6
47 \..$$5
T$

3 
VII Diagnostisk vurdering
48 ,
+
/ 
49 D

+!@- @08$8 F       .
50 7
+@- @08$8 F       .
51 7
+@- @08$8 F       .
39 Psykogene Y$8$  
40 D8  
.+ 
=B, )
- (
41 B' #$+$
 
3$+$
 
\.+  
3.$< 7$Y$U 
 
B$$ 
,8.UT$

 
]$8$ )
=$85 (
X'88U 2
=B, 
\!.$ 
,T$U=$$ 
1$
$ 
7$ )
,<8 (
;U
 2
1$
U85 
 
Appendix IV - Page 4 of 7
VIII Kvalitetsmål på erklæringen, inkl usikkerhetsmomenter
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Appendix V 

Registration form – lay persons – Study IV 

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Appendix VI 

Registration form – experts – Study IV 

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Appendix VII 

Registration form of the Case Vignettes for all 
groups – Study IV 

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Appendix VIII 

Two examples of the Case Vignettes – Study IV 


Kasus vignett nr. 3: Positiv sosial and psykiatrisk historie og mindre straffbart 
forhold
Kasus nr. 3 &%2)Y$
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Kasus vignett nr. 18: Negativ sosial and psykiatrisk historie og alvorlig 
straffbart forhold 
Kasus nr. 18 &%(Y$
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Appendix IX 

Introductory letter to the experts – Study IV 


Besøksadresse: 
7'+!:

,+
Postadresse:
0)0\
Telefon:
Telefaks?
E-post:?
Internet:
040
04
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Navn på eksperten Dato
Vi er to forskere som skal gjennomføre en studie av rettpsykiatrisk 
sakkyndighet og ekspertise innen rettssystemet.  
I den forbindelse er vi interessert i å vite om du har utferdiget en sakkyndig erklæring 
(judisiell/rettspsykiatrisk erklæring, evt. prejudisiell erklæring eller annen sakkyndig 
uttalelse) innen strafferetten siden 2001. Dersom du har det, vil vi gjerne be deg om å 
delta i denne studien. Kort fortalt innebærer dette å vurdere ni korte kasushistorier 
som vi vil stille noen spørsmål til. Svarene returneres til oss etterpå. Alle besvarelser 
avidentifiseres. 
Vi ber deg om å krysse av dersom du ønsker å delta i studien og returnere skjemaet i 
den frankerte svarkonvolutten. Trenger du mer informasjon kan vi nås på telefon: 
 22 02 92 38, mobil: 91 81 48 30, e-brev: pagron@kompetanse-senteret.no
(Grøndahl), mobil: 99 35 09 70, e-brev: cato.gronnerod@psykomatikk.no 
(Grønnerød).
Ja, jeg har utferdiget en sakkyndig erklæring innen rettspsykiatri siden 2001
Nei, jeg har ikke utferdiget en sakkyndig erklæring innen rettspsykiatri siden 2001
Hvis Ja:
Ja, jeg vil delta i studien 
Nei, jeg vil ikke delta i studien 
Med vennlig hilsen 
Pål Grøndahl     Cato Grønnerød
psykologspesialist, stipendiat  dr. psychol, førsteamanuensis
Kompetansesenteret   Psykologisk institutt, UiO 
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